Second Circuit

Introduction

During the past two years, the Second Circuit and its district courts have had active antitrust dockets. Courts issued opinions addressing antitrust claims in a broad array of industries ranging from financial products to chemical components. Following the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v American Express, the Second Circuit provided clear guidance on how to address the issue of two-sided markets in jury trials. And it set up a circuit split in Connecticut Fine Wine and Spirits LLC v Seagull, which held that Connecticut’s ‘post-and-hold’ laws for liquor and alcohol prices were not preempted by the Sherman Act – contrary to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, which found preemption when ruling on similar statutes. As home to the nation’s financial center, the Second Circuit and the courts in the Southern District of New York issued a series of antitrust opinions relating to financial products, frequently in cases involving benchmark rate-setting. One area that received particular attention was the issue of antitrust standing, including especially the ‘efficient enforcer’ doctrine.

Second Circuit precedential decisions

Standing and the efficient enforcer doctrine

SIBOR Antitrust Litigation

On 17 March 2021, the Second Circuit reversed the Southern District of New York’s dismissal of a suit brought by a group of investment funds alleging that the defendant financial institutions conspired in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act to fix certain Singapore-based benchmark rates (the Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (usually referred to as SIBOR) and the Singapore Swap Offered Rate (usually referred to as SOR)).[1] A unanimous panel held that the district court erred in deciding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring conspiracy claims under the Sherman Act.

The plaintiffs were investment funds that claimed to have held financial instruments that relied on the manipulated benchmark rates. The plaintiff investment funds dissolved, but prior to their dissolution had assigned their claims to a third party that made the decisions on litigation strategy. The plaintiffs failed to disclose in their pleading that they had dissolved years before initiating the litigation and assigning their claims. In an amended pleading, the third party attempted to substitute in as a party in place of the dissolved entities, but the district court concluded that it had lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time the initial pleading was filed because those entities did not have Article III standing at the time they filed suit.

The Second Circuit agreed that the dissolution of the funds meant that they lacked standing to sue because they did not legally exist at the time the action was initiated, but held that the third-party assignee, which it viewed as the real party in interest, had standing to sue at all relevant times. Although the claims in the underlying litigation were based on antitrust causes of action (among other things), the Second Circuit’s analysis in this decision was confined to Article III standing as opposed to antitrust standing.

Yen LIBOR Antitrust Litigation

On 1 April 2020, the Second Circuit reversed the Southern District of New York’s dismissal of a suit brought by a group of investment funds alleging that the defendant financial institutions conspired in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act to fix yen LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and euroyen TIBOR (Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate) (collectively, yen LIBOR).[2] A unanimous panel held that the district court erred in deciding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring conspiracy claims under the Sherman Act.

The plaintiffs alleged that yen LIBOR rates are the ‘daily reference rates intended to reflect the interest rates at which banks offer to lend unsecured funds denominated in Japanese yen to other banks’ and that they traded in yen-based financial derivatives that were ‘priced [or] benchmarked’ based on yen LIBOR, and claimed that the defendants rigged the yen LIBOR rate to ‘favor [their own] trading positions’ in a way that produced a negative impact on the defendants’ counterparties, such as the plaintiffs. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not establish that yen LIBOR was used to price the financial products that the plaintiffs purchased, and, thus, held that the plaintiffs failed ‘to articulate a concrete injury arising out of Defendants’ alleged manipulation of [yen LIBOR] sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for article III standing.’

The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis of the complaint and reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had in fact alleged ‘numerous instances when the plaintiffs entered into derivatives transactions at prices that were “artificial” due to the defendants’ price-fixing’ and paid higher prices in specific trades. Based on these allegations, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs had ‘plausibly pled that they suffered “monetary loss” in these transactions as a result of Defendants’ alleged manipulation of interest rates, and this is sufficient injury in fact for [A]rticle III standing.’ Notably, the Second Circuit’s holding was limited to the issue of Article III standing and did not address antitrust standing. On remand, the district court heard oral argument on the defendant’s motion to dismiss on 9 February 2021. An order on that motion is still pending.

Challenges to liquor control laws

Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits LLC v Seagull

Here, the Second Circuit rejected an antitrust challenge to Connecticut’s Liquor Control Act (CLCA), holding that the CLCA did not pose an irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act.[3] The appeal addressed a claim by the plaintiff wine retailer alleging that three sets of provisions of the CLCA and related regulations – (1) ‘post-and-hold’ provisions; (2) minimum retail pricing provisions; and (3) provisions prohibiting price discrimination and volume discounts – are preempted by section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Under the preemption doctrine, the inquiry is whether there is an ‘irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes.’ [4] A potential or hypo­thetical situation in which a private actor’s compliance with the state statute may cause an antitrust violation or exert an anticompetitive effect is not enough. Thus, for a state regulation to be preempted by the Sherman Act, it must, in effect, require private actors to engage in per se unlawful conduct.

The Second Circuit held that two of the challenged provisions – the minimum retail price and the price and volume discrimination provisions – are not preempted because they are not per se violations of the Sherman Act. With regard to the post-and-hold requirement, the Second Circuit held that requiring wholesalers to post and hold the price for each product they sell for a month did not prevent competitors from making independent pricing decisions. Although the law ‘invites and facilitates conscious parallelism in pricing,’ the court explained, nothing in Connecticut’s regime ‘requires, anticipates, or incents communication or collaboration among the competing wholesalers.’ Thus, the court held that because the CLCA does not require concerted action by competitors, there is no irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act and the CLCA.

This holding conflicts with decisions addressing similar liquor control laws in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.[5] Despite this circuit split, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari.[6]

One-sided market versus two-sided market: a question for court or jury?

US Airways, Inc v Sabre Holdings Corporation

On 11 September 2019, the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated in part a jury verdict in a Sherman Act case,[7] holding in a case of first impression that the issue of whether a market is two-sided or one-sided is a question for the court, not the jury. The defendant owned and operated a global distribution system (GDS), which served as a platform for travel agents to purchase tickets from the defendant’s airline customers. Travel agents were able to access a GDS for free, and could receive payments from a GDS for meeting minimum booking thresholds. When a travel agent booked a flight on a particular airline using a GDS, the airline would pay the GDS a booking fee. As a condition for listing flights on its GDS, the defendant required airlines to agree to list all their flights on the GDS at the same prices and terms as the airline offered on flights the airline marketed directly to customers. The plaintiff airline contended that these provisions violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and caused it to pay supracompetitive booking fees.

Shortly before trial, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United States v American Express Co, which held that in appropriate cases involving transaction platforms (i.e., ‘two-sided’ markets), a fact finder must consider the effect of a restraint on all users of the platform in determining whether the restraint is, on balance, anticompetitive.[8] In such cases, the Second Circuit held, it is an error to focus only on the effect of the restraint on one set of platform users. To reflect the Second Circuit’s American Express decision, the district court instructed the jury to examine the effect of the defendant’s restraints as if imposed in a one-sided market (that is, focusing on the effect of the restraint on the airline) and, in the alternative, the effect of the restraints as if imposed in a two-sided market (that is, focusing on the net effect of the restraints on airlines and travel agents). The jury returned a verdict of approximately $5 million based on the assumption that the market was one-sided, and a verdict in an identical amount on the assumption that the market was two-sided. Both sides appealed.

While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s American Express decision.[9] In the wake of that affirmance, the Second Circuit here held that it was improper for the district court to let the jury decide whether the market was one-sided or two-sided because that determination is a question for the court, not the jury. It therefore vacated the jury’s primary verdict based on the determination that the market was one-sided. The Second Circuit found that the GDS platform was two-sided because the defendant could not sell an airline ticket without simultaneously making a sale to the other side of the platform and because the users on each side of the platform influenced use on the other side. Reviewing the jury’s alternative finding of liability under a two-sided market theory, the Second Circuit held that this alternative finding was insufficient because the jury should have been explicitly instructed to consider the effect of the restraint on both sides of the platform. Moreover, the plaintiff should not have been allowed to ‘spend considerable time at trial presenting an incorrect conception of two-sidedness.’ Despite these errors, the court concluded that the jury had substantial evidence on which it might have determined that the challenged restraint caused anticompetitive effects in a two-sided market. The court ordered a new trial consistent with its opinion.

On remand from the Second Circuit, US Airways amended its pleadings, most recently filing a Fifth Amended Complaint on 2 February 2021. The parties are completing expert discovery in anticipation of a retrial scheduled for April 2022.

District court cases

Restraints in credit card industry

In re American Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litigation

On 15 January 2020, US District Judge Nicholas G Garaufis of the Eastern District of New York granted the defendant credit card company’s motion to dismiss a class action complaint alleging that the anti-steering rules in the defendant’s credit acceptance agreement (CAA) unreasonably restrained competition among credit and charge card networks.[10] The court also granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions in the CAA. The defendant credit card company was ‘one of four significant competitors in the nationwide credit card market.’ The plaintiffs were divided into two distinct putative classes: merchants who accepted the defendant’s credit card for payment pursuant to the CAA, and merchants who did not accept the defendant’s credit card for payment but accepted cards from the defendant’s competitors. The plaintiffs brought Sherman Act and California antitrust claims, alleging that the anti-steering provisions in the CAA stifled competition, imposed supracompetitive fees on merchants, increased the price of credit card transactions over competitive levels, and raised retail prices on a national level. Merchant class members also contested the applicability of an arbitration clause in the CAA that gave the defendants the right to elect that any claim be resolved by binding individual arbitration.

The court held that the non-accepting merchant class of plaintiffs failed to establish antitrust standing because those plaintiffs were not ‘efficient enforcers’ of the antitrust laws. The court found that their alleged injury was insufficiently direct, because the defendant merely ‘insulated its ability to charge those merchants ultracompetitive fees’ to the detriment of its competitors by requiring merchants to refrain from steering customers towards its competitors’ cards. Therefore, any injury was ‘incidental to [the defendant’s] anticompetitive behavior.’ The court also found that denying the non-accepting merchant class a remedy did not leave the alleged antitrust violation unremedied because members of the accepting merchant class still had the right to arbitrate. Moreover, the court found that the alleged damages to the non-accepting merchant class were speculative, because the defendant’s non-party competitors were also competing against one another on both sides of the two-sided market. Finally, the court noted that the ‘complex nature of apportionment and the broad nature of the class suggested by Plaintiffs’ presented an ‘obvious risk of disproportionate damages.’

With respect to the accepting merchant class of plaintiffs, the court rejected their argument that the arbitration provision in the CAA was distinguishable from a provision found enforceable by the Supreme Court in American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant.[11] The court found that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘does not establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of preexisting statutory rights,’ and thus the ‘effective vindication’ exception to the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply.

Securities and commodities trading

In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation

US District Judge Paul A Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York issued two notable decisions in In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant financial institutions and the aluminum storage warehouse operators they owned violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to inflate prices in the market for primary aluminum by colluding to lengthen the queues for loading out aluminum (load-out queues) at their warehouses so as to increase the ‘regional premium’ that positively correlates with the queue time. Because this premium formed one component of the price for primary aluminum, the higher regional premium was allegedly passed through to putative class members in the form of higher ‘all-in’ prices for primary aluminum. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of ‘first level purchasers’ of aluminum who ‘purchased primary aluminum from smelters for physical delivery.’

On 23 July 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show that they could establish class-wide impact through common proof.[12] The decision is significant for, among other reasons, its close examination and rejection of the plaintiffs’ statistical models based on average impact that mask the existence of putative class members who did not suffer any injury.

The court emphasized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp v Behrend [13] calls for rigorous review of expert models to ensure that the plaintiffs’ models are both consistent with their theory of liability and measure only those damages attributable to their theory of antitrust harm. The court found that the plaintiffs’ expert had failed to distinguish between harm caused by the alleged conspiracy and harm caused by economic events not attributable to the defendants. The court also found that, because of the nature of the industry, a company-level analysis and a contract-by-contract analysis would likely be necessary to determine impact. However, the expert’s models relied on average impact. As a result, the models concealed the uninjured class members and yielded false positives.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that class-wide injury could be established in this case using anecdotal evidence. Although documentary evidence could provide additional context and be viewed in conjunction with an expert’s models, the court found that the evidence in this case amounted to no more than broad generalizations by market participants in a selection of documents and could not suffice as common proof that all class members suffered pricing injury throughout the class period. The court also noted that market participants and observers had non-uniform contemporaneous views during the class period, and it was doubtful that views on either side of the spectrum could serve as authoritative proof that all first-level purchasers had suffered pricing injury. The Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs’ request under Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to appeal the denial of class certification.

Several months after denying class certification, on 17 February 2021, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims that arose from the purchase of aluminum from parties other than the defendants, and dismissed the claims by the plaintiffs that were premised on such purchases.[14] The defendants argued that the plaintiffs that did not purchase aluminum directly from a defendant (i.e., ‘umbrella purchasers’) were not efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws and therefore lacked antitrust standing. The plaintiffs argued that (1) the court had previously found, on a motion to dismiss, that the plaintiffs were efficient enforcers, and that that ruling was ‘law of the case,’ and (2) their claims were not true ‘umbrella’ claims because the defendants ‘rigged the entire market.’

The court agreed with the defendants. The court found that, since the Second Circuit’s decision in Gelboim v Bank of America,[15] the emerging ‘consensus’ among district courts in the Second Circuit is ‘that plaintiffs akin to those implicated by this motion – i.e., entities that transacted exclusively with non-defendants in transactions allegedly influenced by the defendants’ conduct – are not efficient enforcers.’

As for the plaintiffs’ argument that the court should defer to an earlier ruling upholding the plaintiffs’ standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage and finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently established that they were efficient enforcers, the court found that subsequent case law and evidence adduced in discovery called for a different outcome on summary judgment. The motion-to-dismiss decision had been decided before Gelboim, and although Gelboim did not expressly change the law of efficient enforcers, courts deciding efficient enforcer questions in financial market antitrust cases since have interpreted Gelboim as clarifying the application of the efficient enforcer factors and drawing a clear distinction between the plaintiffs that dealt directly with the defendants and those that did not. Moreover, discovery had yielded no evidence that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the allegedly manipulated benchmark always formed a component of aluminum prices was unsupported. Rather, the record showed that non-defendant sellers retained significant discretion over whether to incorporate the benchmark and that parties to such transactions had the freedom to negotiate the elements of price. This discretion by counterparties over whether to include the benchmark broke the causal chain between any alleged manipulation of the benchmark by the defendants and the plaintiffs’ injury.

In re Platinum & Palladium Antitrust Litigation

On 29 March 2020, US District Judge Gregory H Woods of the Southern District of New York granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing a putative class action against the defendant banks accused of a conspiracy to manipulate the global benchmark price of palladium and platinum.[16] The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the CEA allegations concerned primarily foreign conduct. In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded antitrust injury but held that they were not efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws and therefore lacked standing.

The complaint included plaintiffs who traded over-the-counter (OTC) and plaintiffs who traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The court found that the OTC plaintiffs failed to allege that they transacted directly with defendants, and the Exchange plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that the defendants dominated the relevant precious metals derivative markets. More specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations suggested that the defendants’ market share was at most 45 per cent of the relevant market. The court also observed that the benchmark manipulation cases created a potential risk of disproportionate damages, which is a factor courts consider when applying the efficient enforcer doctrine, and held that the risk of disproportionate damages weighed in favor of denying standing to both sets of plaintiffs.

In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litigation

On 4 October 2019, US District Judge Edgardo Ramos of the Southern District of New York dismissed a putative antitrust class action against certain defendants, foreign banks and individuals, for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.[17] The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant banks conspired to fix the price of supra­national, sub-sovereign and agency bonds in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Several foreign defendants and four of their employees moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue.

The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to establish that venue in New York was proper as to the foreign defendants because the complaint failed to show that the foreign defendants transacted business of a ‘substantial character’ in New York. The court also held that personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants was not appropriate under New York’s long-arm statute because the plaintiffs failed to provide a nexus between the defendants’ in-state business and the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to assert ‘conspiracy jurisdiction,’ because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate evidence of a market-wide conspiracy.

In a later decision, on 25 March 2020, the court dismissed the claim against the remaining defendants for failure to state a claim.[18] The court found that the plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing because they did not plausibly plead that they suffered an injury flowing from any illegal conduct by the defendants. Further, the court found that the conspiracy allegations did not allege specific misconduct by specific defendants and thus did not constitute the required ‘allegations that plausibly suggest that each defendant participated in the alleged conspiracy.’ Even the sole allegation as to a specific defendant was insufficient, the court found, because the plaintiffs did not participate in the trades that were the subject of those allegations or allege facts showing that the conspiracy extended beyond the specific trades alleged.

Benchmark setting

CDOR Antitrust Litigation

On 14 March 2019, US District Judge Analisa Torres of the Southern District of New York granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a complaint alleging that they conspired to depress the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR), an interest rate benchmark reflecting the interest rate at which certain banks were lending Canadian dollars.[19] The plaintiff pension fund alleged that the defendant banks, many based in Canada, manipulated CDOR in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Commodities Exchange Act, and were unjustly enriched.

The court found the plaintiff’s complaint lacking on three grounds: first, that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants; second, that much of the plaintiff’s lawsuit was time barred; and third, with regard to conduct not barred by the statute of limitations, that the plaintiff had not established antitrust standing because the statistical analyses that it relied on to purportedly show manipulated prices, even if accepted as true, did not show that CDOR was depressed at the time that the plaintiff transacted.

In re ICE LIBOR Antitrust Litigation

On 26 March 2020, US District Judge George B Daniels of the Southern District of New York dismissed a putative antitrust class action alleging that various banks, along with the benchmark administrator, had conspired to manipulate the Intercontinental Exchange London Interbank Offered Rate (ICE LIBOR) benchmark interest rate because the plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts suggesting that any defendant engaged in a conspiracy.[20] In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs’ statistical comparisons failed to plead facts that ‘provide[d] any support for [the plaintiffs’] theories about what the relationships between these factors and the ICE LIBOR rate should be.’ This decision is notable in continuing the trend of holding that statistical comparisons cannot substitute for specific allegations of collusive communications in pleading a conspiracy.

The decision has been appealed to the Second Circuit; oral argument has not yet been scheduled.

Chemical prices

Miami Products & Chemical Co v Olin Corporation

On 27 March 2020, US District Judge Elizabeth A Wolford of the Western District of New York denied the motion to dismiss filed by most defendants alleged to have participated in a cartel to increase the price of caustic soda.[21] The court also granted one defendant’s separate motion to dismiss, without prejudice, because the complaint failed to allege specific facts showing that this defendant (the parent of another defendant) joined the conspiracy, and permitted jurisdictional discovery as to two foreign defendants.

According to the complaint, manufacturers of caustic soda conspired to cut output and increase prices by, among other things, closing plants on pretextual grounds. The court found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the defendants conspired by communicating with each other in trade association meetings and restricting the caustic soda supply with temporary plant shutdowns. The court, citing the allegation that the defendants privately discussed raising prices, rejected the defendants’ argument that they simply responded to public information. Taking all allegations as true, the court found that the plaintiffs had pleaded allegations sufficient to state a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.

After jurisdictional discovery was taken, renewed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to two foreign defendants were filed. Decisions are pending.

*  The authors wish to acknowledge their colleagues Brian Hauser, Benjamin Klebanoff, Osher Gordon, Joy Sarr, Richard Hauser, and Edmund Saw for their able assistance with this chapter, and their partners Richard F Schwed, Agnès Dunogué and Grace Lee for their additional input.


Notes

[1] Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 991 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2021).

[2] Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. UBS AG, 954 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2020).

[3] Connecticut Fine Wines and Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2019).

[4] Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).

[5] See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding aspects of Washington liquor law preempted by section 1); Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding aspects of Oregon liquor law not exempt from section 1, and remanding the case for a determination whether the Twenty-first Amendment shielded the challenged regulations); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 210 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding Maryland liquor provisions preempted by section 1, while reserving on whether Maryland’s regulatory interests under the Twenty-first Amendment with respect to alcohol outweighed the federal interest under the Sherman Act).

[6] Connecticut Fine Wines and Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 140 S. Ct 2461 (2020).

[7] US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019).

[8] United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).

[9] Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).

[10] In re American Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp. 3d 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).

[11] American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013).

[12] In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., 336 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[13] Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).

[14] In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., –F. Supp. 3d–, 2021 WL 638059 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

[15] Gelboim v. Bank of America, 823 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 2016).

[16] In re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litig., 449 F. Supp. 3d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[17] In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 420 F. Supp. 3d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

[18] In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., No. 16 CIV. 3711 (ER), 2020 WL 1445783 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020).

[19] Fire & Police Pension Ass’n of Colorado v. Bank of Montreal, 368 F. Supp. 3d 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

[20] In re ICE LIBOR Antitrust Litig., No. 19 Civ. 439 (GBD), 2020 WL 1467354 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020).

[21] Miami Prods. & Chem. Co. v. Olin Corp., No. 19 Civ. 385 (EAW), 2020 WL 1482139 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020).

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