United Kingdom: Cartel Enforcement

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The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the primary enforcement authority in the UK for civil cartels under article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the equivalent Chapter I prohibition under section 2 of the UK Competition Act 1998 (CA98),1 as well as criminal cartels under section 188 of the UK Enterprise Act 2002 (EA). Under the criminal cartel offence, the CMA may seek the disqualification for up to 15 years of directors of companies that have infringed competition law.

Following criticism from the National Audit Office (NAO) in February 20162 as regards the number of cartel enforcement cases brought by the UK regulators compared to their German and French counterparts, the CMA increased its enforcement activity. In March 2017, the CMA launched a campaign to clamp down on cartel activity by encouraging whistle-blowing.3 The campaign encourages people who have witnessed illegal activity to report it, by offering a reward of up to £100,000, as well as promising them anonymity. In a speech published on 29 November 2017,4 the CMA’s executive director for enforcement, Michael Grenfell, noted the CMA’s ‘recent efforts to ramp up competition enforcement’ and that the CMA ‘have done much to heed the recommendation of the National Audit Office’.

Civil enforcement under article 101 TFEU/section 2 CA98

In the second half of 2017 and in early 2018, the CMA issued infringement decisions in the solid fuel products sector, the cleanroom laundry services sector and the estate agency sector. Of these the decisions, the solid fuel products sector and the estate agency sector were pursuant to settlement agreements.

In February 2018, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issued its first statement of objections (SO) to four asset management firms alleged to have shared information in relation to one or more of two initial public offerings (IPOs). According to the FCA, the information exchanges took place during the IPO or the placing process in contravention of the applicable competition provisions.

Damages actions against payment schemes

On 14 July 2016, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) found for Sainsbury’s, a UK retailer, in an action for damages against MasterCard, in the UK’s first stand-alone damages action.5 The claim by Sainsbury’s was issued pursuant to a European Commission decision (upheld by the General Court (GC) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, and together with the GC, the European Court)) finding that MasterCard’s European Economic Area (EEA) multilateral interchange fees (MIFs), governing fee payments between banks relating to transactions made using payment cards, breached article 101 TFEU (Article 101). Sainsbury’s brought a stand-alone claim for damages from MasterCard in relation to losses suffered as a result of the MasterCard UK MIF in force from December 2006 onwards. The CAT held that the MasterCard UK MIF was a restriction on competition by effect under Chapter I CA98 (Chapter I) and Article 101. Accordingly, Sainsbury’s was entitled to recover an amount equivalent to the MasterCard UK MIF paid by it over the claim period exceeded the amount that it would have been charged absent the relevant MIF. Sainsbury’s was awarded £68.5 million, plus interest in damages. MasterCard appealed the CAT’s judgment to the Court of Appeal.

By contrast, on 30 January 2017, in a separate but similar stand-alone action, the High Court of England and Wales (High Court) rejected an action for damages brought by several other UK high street retailers (namely, Asda, Arcadia, Next, B&Q, Comet, New Look, Iceland, Argos, WM Morrisons and Debenhams), ruling that MasterCard’s UK, Irish and EEA MIFs were not restrictive of competition under Chapter I and Article 101.6 The High Court held that it was not bound by the CAT’s findings of law or fact. The retailers appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal

In separate but related proceedings, Sainsbury’s (together with a number of other UK retailers that have since settled) brought a stand-alone damages action against Visa as regards Visa’s UK MIFs under Chapter I and Article 101. On 30 November 2017, the High Court held that Visa’s UK MIFs did not restrict competition for the purposes of Chapter I and article 10.7 Sainsbury’s and Visa both appealed aspects of the judgment to the Court of Appeal.

The five appeals relating to all the MIF judgments (namely, the CAT’s and the High Court’s MasterCard MIF judgments and the High Court’s Visa MIF judgment) were heard jointly by the Court of Appeal in April 2018. The outcome of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in relation to MasterCard’s and Visa’s MIFs will have an impact on the multiple damages actions against MasterCard and Visa pending before the CAT and the High Court.

Furthermore, in September 2016, a collective damages action against MasterCard on behalf of consumers was brought in Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v MasterCard Inc and Others under the new ‘opt out’ regime introduced in section 47(b) CA98.8 However, on 21 July 2017, the CAT held that the claims were not eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings9 and the CAT refused permission to appeal.10 In October 2017, the lead claimant applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal and to the Administrative Court for permission to challenge the CAT’s decision by way of judicial review. In January 2018, the Court of Appeal ruled that it and the Administrative Court, constituted by the same Lord Justices of Appeal sitting concurrently as both courts, would hear oral arguments on the applications for permission to appeal and to bring a judicial review.

Appeal against the CMA’s decision in Paroxetine

On 8 March 2018, the CAT handed down its judgment in the appeals brought by five pharmaceutical companies challenging the CMA’s infringement decisions fining the companies for agreeing to delay generic entry into the market for the drug paroxetine.11

In February 2016, the CMA imposed fines totalling £44.99 million on GlaxoSmithKline, Alphapharm Ltd, and Generics (UK) Ltd under Chapter I and Article 101 as regards a series of ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements that were aimed at delaying generic entry for the drug paroxetine.12 In a number of recent decisions, the European Commission has found that certain pay-for-delay arrangements in patent disputes breach Article 101 where the originator pharmaceutical firm makes a ‘value transfer’ (essentially, a payment) to generic firms to delay the market entry of generic medicines. The CMA found that, between 2001 and 2004, GlaxoSmithKline (the supplier of branded paroxetine) had agreed to make payments and other value transfers totalling over £50 million to Alphapharm Ltd and Generics (UK) Ltd (suppliers of generic versions of paroxetine) which were aimed at delaying the potential entry of the generic firms on the UK market for paroxetine.

GlaxoSmithKline, Generics (UK) Ltd, Xellia and Alpharma, Actavis UK, and Merck filed appeals against the CMA’s infringement decision. The appellants claimed that the CMA erred in finding that the agreement with the generic firms had as its object or effect the restriction of competition and that the CMA erred in finding that the agreements did not benefit from exemption under the Competition Act 1998 (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000 (Exclusion Order), which at the time excluded certain vertical agreements from the scope of competition law. Generics (UK), Actavis and Merck argued in addition that the CMA had infringed their rights of defence due to the passage of time between the agreement and the CMA’s investigation. Xellia and Alpharma argued that the CMA erred in holding them jointly and severally liable with Actavis. In its appeal, GlaxoSmithKline claimed that the CMA erred in finding that:

  • the agreements did not benefit from an exemption under the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation or from an individual exemption; in defining the relevant market;
  • GlaxoSmithKline held a dominant position under Chapter II CA98 (Chapter II) and Article 102 TFEU (Article 102); and
  • GlaxoSmithKline had abused its dominant position.

As there were significant overlaps between the five appeals, the CAT heard them together. In its judgment, the CAT referred a number of the questions under appeal to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, while ruling on some of the other points of appeal in favour of the CMA.

With regard to Chapter I and Article 101, the CAT referred for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU questions relating to whether the generic companies were potential competitors of GlaxoSmithKline, and whether the agreements restricted competition ‘by object’ or ‘by effect’. The CAT also made a reference to the CJEU with regard to the CMA’s decision under Chapter II and Article 102 in respect of GlaxoSmithKline.

In addition to the questions referred to the CJEU, the CAT dismissed arguments raised by the appellants that the CMA had erred in finding that the agreements did not benefit from exemption under the exclusion order and by GlaxoSmithKline that the CMA had erred in finding that the agreements did not benefit from either a block exemption or an individual exemption. The CAT also dismissed the arguments relating to the infringement of the rights of defence, as well as Xellia and Alpharma’s argument that the CMA erred in holding them jointly and severally liable with Actavis. The matters dismissed by the CAT were not referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.

Appeal against the CMA’s decision in Galvanised Steel Tanks

On 13 December 2017, the CAT gave a ruling refusing Balmoral Tanks Ltd permission to appeal against the CAT’s judgment upholding the CMA’s fining decisions.13 In December 2016, the CMA had issued two decisions finding that suppliers of galvanised steel tanks had infringed Chapter I and Article 101 in relation to the supply of galvanised steel tanks for water storage. In the relevant decisions, the CMA found that Balmoral Tanks Ltd, together with three of the parties to the main cartel – Franklin Hodge, Calglass and KW Supplies – had infringed Chapter I and Article 101 by exchanging commercially sensitive information at a meeting in July 2012.14 In October 2017, the CAT dismissed an appeal by Balmoral challenging the CMA’s decision finding an information exchange.15 On appeal, Balmoral challenged the CMA’s finding that the 2012 meeting gave rise to a concerted practice whereby confidential information was exchanged between the parties. It also challenged the CMA’s decision to impose a fine on Balmoral and the amount of that fine. The CAT held unanimously that Balmoral was party to the infringement identified by the CMA and that there was no basis for criticising the fine imposed. On 27 October 2017, Balmoral applied for permission to appeal the CAT’s judgment. However, the CAT held that none of the grounds of appeal had any real prospect of success and therefore refused Balmoral permission to appeal.

CMA search warrant challenged

On 16 November 2017, the High Court handed down a judgment on a challenge by Concordia, a pharmaceutical company, against parts of an ex parte search warrant issued to the CMA, in connection with an investigation into alleged anticompetitive agreements in the pharmaceutical sector.16 Such a warrant is granted when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that documents required under the CMA’s search powers have not or will not be produced. Concordia applied to partially discharge or vary the warrant in relation to aspects of an ongoing investigation. The CMA contended that the warrant was justified because of new information as regards the ongoing investigation, but withheld the provision of the information to Concordia on the grounds of public interest immunity. The High Court held that when the CMA applies for the relevant warrant, the judge must receive all the information the CMA proposes to rely upon, including material that may be protected by public interest immunity; if the warrant is granted, then prior to the addressee making any application to vary or revoke the warrant, the CMA must identify and exclude public interest immunity material. The hearing will then proceed on the basis of the evidence not excluded. The CMA has appealed the High Court judgment to the Court of Appeal.

Appeal against CMA’s decision in Sports Equipment

In October 2017, the CAT published notice of Ping’s appeal against the CMA’s infringement decision.17

In August 2017, the CMA imposed a fine of £1.45 million on Ping under Chapter I and Article 101 for preventing two UK retailers from selling Ping’s golf clubs on their website. The CMA found that, while retailers may be required to meet certain conditions before being allowed to sell online, such conditions must be compatible with competition law and that, while Ping was pursuing a genuine commercial aim of promoting in-store custom fitting, it could have achieved this through less restrictive means. A non-confidential version of the infringement decision was published on 21 December 2017.18

Civil investigations

Light fittings

On 3 May 2017, the CMA issued a settlement decision finding that the National Lighting Company Ltd (and its subsidiaries) had engaged in resale price maintenance in breach of Chapter I and Article 101, by preventing retailers from setting their own prices online and forcing them to sell at – or above – a minimum price.19 The CMA stated that ‘[w]ith more and more retail activity moving online, making sure competition works well in this channel is a priority for the CMA’. The £2.7 million fine imposed on the company included a reduction to reflect savings due to its admission of liability and its cooperation with the CMA under the settlement agreement. A non-confidential version of the decision was published on 20 June 2017.20

The CMA did not proceed against the downstream retailers further to rule 5(3) of the CA98 Rules, which enable the CMA to address an infringement decision to fewer than all the parties to an infringement.

Supply of solid fuel products

On 28 March 2018, the CMA issued a settlement decision finding that two of the main suppliers of bagged household fuels in the UK, CPL and Fuel Express, had infringed Chapter I and Article 101 by engaging in market sharing through bid-rigging their tenders to Tesco and Sainsbury’s and exchanging competitively-sensitive confidential pricing information.21 The two suppliers admitted infringing competition law and agreed to pay fines totalling £3.4 million. The CMA’s investigation, launched in November 2016, was started following a tip-off to the CMA’s cartels hotline which led the authority to carry out surprise inspections at the premises of the two suppliers.

Cleanroom laundry services

On 14 December 2017, the CMA imposed fines totalling £1.71 million on two suppliers of cleanroom laundry services for breaching the Chapter I prohibition. Cleanroom laundry services are supplied to customers with operations in sterile environments, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers and National Health Service (NHS) pharmacies. The CMA found that both businesses had been trading under the ‘Micronclean’ brand since the 1980s in a long-standing joint venture agreement. In May 2012 the companies entered into new, reciprocal trademark licence arrangements under which they agreed not to compete against each other. Under the agreement, one party (Micronclean Limited) agreed to only serve customers in an area north of a line drawn broadly between London and Anglesey, while the second party (Berendsen Cleanroom Services Limited) only served customer located south of that line. The CMA also found that the companies had agreed not to compete for certain other customers, irrespective of their location. A non-confidential version of the decision was published on 8 February 2018.22

Leisure sector investigation

On 26 October 2017 the CMA closed its investigation into the UK’s largest funfair trade body following commitments offered by the Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain to address the concerns raised by the CMA in its SO.23 In December 2016, the CMA had issued an SO alleging that the Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain had breached Chapter I, because some of its rules protected existing Guild members from competition and reduced the potential for new attractions to join fairs.24 The CMA alleged that the Guild’s rules:

  • restricted members (making up to 90 per cent of the travelling fairs sector in the UK) from competing with one another in organising or attending fairs;
  • prevented members from starting new fairs which would compete with existing ones; and
  • made it difficult for non-Guild members to compete.

The commitments from the Showmen’s Guild addressed the CMA’s concerns by opening up Guild-run fairs for non-member showmen and reducing restrictions on rival fairs from opening close to Guild fairs.

Online supply of mobility scooters

On 19 October 2017 the CMA closed its investigation into suspected breaches of competition law in the mobility scooter sector on the grounds of administrative priority.25 TGA Mobility Limited and 2DS & TGA Holdings Limited (together, TGA) had been under investigation since April 2017 in relation to suspected agreements or concerted practices under Chapter I with retailers of TGA’s mobility scooters. By virtue of the agreements, the retailers were prevented from advertising prices of TGA branded mobility scooters online or from advertising them online below specified prices. In order to address the CMA’s competition concerns, TGA brought the online pricing restrictions to an end and notified retailers that they were free to advertise the prices of TGA branded mobility scooters online. TGA also undertook to implement a competition law training and compliance programme.

Auction services

On 29 June 2017, the CMA published its decision to accept binding commitments from ATG Media, the largest provider of live online bidding platforms in the UK, to address online auction concerns.26 In November 2016, the CMA launched an investigation into three practices used by ATG Media which it considered may breach competition laws by preventing or discouraging its customers from using rival platforms. These practices consisted of obtaining exclusive deals with auction houses, preventing auction houses getting a cheaper online bidding rate with other platforms for their bidders through ‘most favoured nation’ or price parity clauses, and preventing auction houses from advertising rival live online bidding platforms in competition with ATG Media. The CMA considered that these practices may have prevented ATG Media’s rivals from being able to compete effectively in the market and may have prevented consumers from getting a better deal for online bidding. By virtue of the commitment decision, ATG Media undertook to stop carrying out any of the practices for a period of five years and the CMA closed its investigation under Chapter I and Chapter II.

In issuing its decision, the CMA noted that ‘[o]nline and digital markets represent a large and growing part of the economy and we must ensure that these often fast-moving markets do not evolve in ways which may harm consumers’.27

Residential estate agency services

On 31 May 2017, the CMA issued a decision finding that six high street estate agents had infringed Chapter I by participating in an agreement or concerted practice to fix a minimum level of commission fees for the provision of residential estate agency services under Chapter I. The CMA imposed fines totalling £370,084 on five of the six estate agents involved in the cartel. The sixth estate agent, Annagram, received immunity under the CMA’s leniency policy and paid no fine. As regards the other five estate agents, four agreed a settlement with the CMA. A non-confidential version of the decision was published on 18 September 2017.28

In issuing its decision, the CMA noted that ‘[t]his is the second time the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has taken enforcement action against estate agents in recent years, and raises concerns that the sector does not properly understand the seriousness of anticompetitive conduct and the consequences of breaking competition law.’29 As described below, the CMA launched another investigation in the sector in 2018 ‘on the basis of information received following the decision of the CMA in a previous invstigation in the sector’, that is, as a result of its 2017 decision.

Pay-for-delay in the pharmaceutical sector

On 3 March 2017, the CMA issued an SO to two pharmaceutical companies, Concordia and Actavis UK, alleging that they had entered into a pay-for-delay arrangement by which Actavis had incentivised Concordia not to enter the market for hydrocortisone with its own competing version of the drug in breach of Chapter I and Article 101.30

The CMA is conducting a number of investigations in the pharmaceutical sector, primarily relating to alleged pay-for-delay arrangements in breach of Chapter I and Article 101 (as well as alleged unilateral excessive pricing by dominant firms in breach of Chapter II and Article 102). In October 2017, the CMA launched additional investigations into alleged anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices31 and suspected abuse of dominance in relation to the supply of generic pharmaceutical products.32 The CMA has not provided the detail of these investigations.

Other civil enforcement action

The CMA also launched an investigation in 2017 into suspected anticompetitive arrangements in the UK roofing materials sector33 and in 2018 into the residential estate agency sector.34 These are in addition to the ongoing investigations into the supply of precast concrete drainage products,35 and construction industry products and services.36

Future civil enforcement

The CMA responded to the NAO’s criticism in early 2016 as to lack of case flow by opening a number of new investigations, as well as issuing infringement decisions in others. The CMA has focused its attention on the pharmaceutical sector and the impact of any alleged anticompetitive conduct on prices charged to the NHS, as well as a number of lower-profile and local-targeted cases involving small- and medium-sized firms.

Criminal enforcement under EA section 188

Following a change in the law, for conduct after 1 April 2014, it is no longer necessary for the CMA to prove that individuals acted ‘dishonestly’ to commit the cartel offence in order to secure a disqualification order – effectively creating a strict liability offence. As a result of this, on 1 December 2016, the CMA announced that it had secured the first disqualification of a director of a company found to have infringed competition law.37

Precast concrete drainage products: criminal investigation

On 15 September 2017, the CMA announced that, after pleading guilty to one count under EA section 188, an individual had been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years and made the subject of a six month curfew order from 6pm to 6am. He was also disqualified from acting as a company director for seven years.38 The CMA brought the proceedings against this individual under the provisions in place before the implementation of the 2014 law. The individual was arrested in 2013 at the start of an investigation in the market for precast concrete drainage products, and was charged in March 2016 with ‘dishonestly’ agreeing with others to divide supply, fix prices and divide customers between 2006 and 2013.

Future criminal enforcement

The first disqualification order secured by the CMA in 2016 was an important milestone in its criminal cartel enforcement record. As noted above, the CMA has continued to pursue the disqualification of directors, although it has not secured a disqualification under the 2014 law, since the relevant offences predate 1 April 2014. It will not be until there is a prosecution under the post-April 2014 law, and then one in particular with parallel international civil or criminal aspects, or both, that any future prospects of criminal litigation may become clearer.

Implementation of EU Damages Directive

In March 2017, the Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017 (the Regulations) entered into force.39 The Regulations transposed retrospectively the EU Damages Directive40 into UK law. The EU Damages Directive was designed to make it easier for victims of anticompetitive conduct to obtain compensation for loss suffered across the EU. While the UK government stated that it considered UK domestic legislation on competition damages actions already to be broadly in line with the EU Damages Directive, the Regulations make a number of changes to the existing rules in the UK in relation to limitation periods, disclosure rules, and the principle of joint and several liability.

The Regulations provide that the date on which the limitation period for a competition claim commences will be the later of either the day on which the infringement of competition law which is the subject of the claim ceases, or the day on which the claimant either knows or could reasonably be expected to know of the infringement.

The UK’s existing disclosure rules are broader than the minimum standard set by the EU Damages Directive. However, the Regulations impose limits on the ability of the UK courts to order disclosure of certain categories of documents. The courts may therefore not order the disclosure of cartel leniency statements and settlement submissions that have not been withdrawn.

While generally defendants will be jointly and severally liable for the damage caused by a cartel, the Regulations introduce certain exceptions to this principle. Small- and medium-sized enterprises will therefore only be liable for their own direct and indirect sales. Similarly, immunity applicants will only be liable for loss concerning their own sales, unless the claimant is unable to obtain full compensation for the loss or damage from other undertakings involved in the cartel.


On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave the 28-nation European Union. On 29 March 2017, the UK government gave the European Council formal notification under article 50 of the Treaty on European Union of its intention to withdraw from the EU and from the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

The implications of Brexit from an antitrust perspective will depend on the basis of the UK’s ongoing relationship with the EU, which is not clear at the time of writing. For example, section 60 of the CA98 currently provides that any questions relating to competition within the UK are to be dealt in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding questions under EU competition law. From a cartel enforcement perspective, competition law issues that would need to be addressed include the following:

  • the applicability in the UK of European Commission decisions (eg, proceedings before the High Court or the CAT);
  • the binding nature in the UK of judgments of the European Court;
  • the extent to which the CMA could come to a different finding from the European Commission and the European Court; and
  • the conduct of infringement investigations, given that the European Commission would not have jurisdiction to conduct investigations in the UK.


1 Article 3(1) of Council Regulation 1/2003 provides that the CMA has to apply Article 101 TFEU where the CMA applies section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 (national equivalent to Article 101 TFEU) to conduct which may affect trade between EU member states.

2 Available at www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/The-UK-Competition-regime.pdf.

3 See CMA press release of 20 March 2017, ‘CMA launches campaign to crack down on cartels’, available at www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-launches-campaign-to-crack-down-on-cartels.

4 Available at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-competition-enforcement-where-next.

5 Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v MasterCard Inc and Others [2016] CAT 11, judgment of 14 July 2016 available at http://catribunal.org/files/1241_Sainsburys_Judgment_CAT_11_140716.pdf.

8 Section 47(b) allows representative litigants to apply to the CAT to bring proceedings for damages on an ‘opt out’ basis on behalf of a class of claimants.

9 Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v Mastercard Inc and Others [2017] CAT 16, judgment of 21 July 2017, available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/2.1266_Walter_Hugh_Judgment_CAT_16_210717.pdf.

10 Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v Mastercard Incorporated and Others [2017] CAT 21, judgment of 28 September 2017.

11 Generics (UK) Limited and Others v Competition and Markets Authority [2018] CAT 4, judgment of 8 March 2018, available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1.1251-1255_Paroxetine_Judgment_CAT_4_080318.pdf.

12 CE/9531/11 – Paroxetine, CMA decision of 12 February 2016 available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57aaf65be5274a0f6c000054/ce9531-11-paroxetine-decision.pdf.

13 (1) Balmoral Tanks Limited and (2) Balmoral Group Holdings Limited v Competition and Markets Authority [2017] CAT 23, judgment of 13 December 2017 available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1277_Balmoral_Judgment_CAT_28_131217.pdf.

14 [CE/9691/12 – Galvanised steel tanks for water storage information exchange infringement, CMA decision of 19 December 2016, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/58db746440f0b606e300003c/ce-9691-12-information-exchange-decision.pdf.

15 (1) Balmoral Tanks Limited and (2) Balmoral Group Holdings Limited v Competition and Markets Authority [2017] CAT 23, judgment of 6 October 2017, available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1277_Balmoral_Judgment_061017.pdf.

18 50230 – Online sales ban in the golf equipment sector, CMA decision of 24 August 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a3b7d11e5274a73593a0ce5/sports-equipment-non-confidential-infringement-decision.pdf.

19 Light fittings sector: anti-competitive practices, CMA decision of 3 May 2017. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/light-fittings-sector-anti-competitive-practices#settlement-and-infringement-decision.

20 50343 – Online resale price maintenance in the light fittings sector, CMA decision of 3 May 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5948dc48e5274a5e4e00028c/light-fittings-non-confidential-decision.pdf.

21 50366-1 – Supply of solid fuel products, CMA decision of 29 March 2018. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/supply-of-solid-fuel-products.

22 50283 – Cleanroom laundry services and products, CMA decision of 14 December 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7c1830ed915d210ade18c9/case_50283_decision.pdf.

23 50243 – Decision to accept binding commitments offered by the Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain, CMA decision of 26 October 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59f1a493e5274a18bfed8c7a/decision-to-accept-commitments.pdf.

24 Leisure sector: suspected anti-competitive practices, investigation opened on 15 December 2015. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/leisure-sector-anti-competitive-practices#case-timetable.

25 50469 – Decision to close an investigation into suspected breaches of competition law in the mobility scooter sector, CMA decision of 19 October 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59e8ba36ed915d6aadcdaf2c/Case_closure_statement.pdf.

26 50408 – Notice of intention to accept binding commitments offered by ATG Media, CMA decision of 30 May 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/592d366e40f0b63e080000f0/auction-services-notice-of-intention-to-accept-commitments.pdf.

27 See www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-accepts-commitments-offered-to-address-online-auction-concerns.

28 50235 – Residential estate agency services, CMA decision of 31 May 2017, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59bf839d40f0b60d81570509/Non-confidential_decision.pdf.

29 See www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-lifts-the-lid-on-estate-agents-cartel.

30 Hydrocortisone tablets: alleged anti-competitive agreements and abusive conduct, investigation opened on 12 April 2016. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/pharmaceutical-sector-anti-competitive-agreements.

31 Pharmaceutical sector: suspected anti-competitive agreements, investigation opened on 10 October 2017. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/pharmaceutical-sector-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements.

32 Pharmaceuticals: suspected anti-competitive agreements and conduct, investigation opened on 18 October 2017. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/pharmaceuticals-suspected-anti-competitive-agreements-and-conduct.

33 50477 – Roofing materials, investigation opened on 13 July 2017. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/roofing-materials.

34 Provision of residential estate agency services, investigation opened on 27 February 2018. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/provision-of-residential-estate-agency-services.

35 50299 – Supply of precast concrete drainage products: civil investigation, investigation opened on 15 April 2016. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/supply-of-precast-concrete-drainage-products-civil-investigation.

36 Provision of products and services to the construction industry: civil investigation, investigation opened on 28 February 2017. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/provision-of-products-and-or-services-to-the-construction-industry-civil-investigation.

37 See www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-secures-director-disqualification-for-competition-law-breach. The disqualification undertaking is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/583ff903e5274a1303000040/daniel-aston-director-disqualification-undertaking.pdf.

38 CE/9705/12 – Supply of precast concrete drainage products: criminal investigation, investigation opened on 12 March 2013. Case information available at www.gov.uk/cma-cases/criminal-investigation-into-the-supply-of-products-to-the-construction-industry.

39 See www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/385/contents/made.

40 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104&from=EN.

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