Denmark: Competition Council and DCCA utilise tailored legislation to boost merger regime

In summary

This article provides legal practitioners with an overview of merger control in Denmark, including information on the relevant legislation on merger control, the enforcing authorities, the applicable definitions and the jurisdictional thresholds for mergers. The article gives a thorough account of merger control under Danish law spanning from notification to approval, including explanations of time frames and the different phases of review, as well as the substantive test. Throughout the article, reference is made to relevant and recent case law to give readers a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the application and administration of merger control rules in Denmark.

Discussion points

• Framework of merger control law
• The merger review process
• Economic evidence
• Remedies

Referenced in this article

• Competition Act (Consolidated Act No. 360 of 4 March 2021 and Consolidated Act No. 155 of 1 March 2018)
• Danish Competition and Consumer Authority
• Danish Competition Council
• Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal

Legislation and competent authority

The Danish merger control regime was implemented in 2000 and is largely based on the principles of the EU Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004). Danish merger rules are generally interpreted in accordance with EU law and practice of the European Commission and the European courts, and the substantive test under Danish law is equivalent to the test under EU law. Similarly, jurisdiction is based on turnover thresholds largely calculated in accordance with EU law principles.

Danish merger control rules are set out in Part 4 of the Competition Act. Detailed rules on the calculation of turnover and the notification of concentrations are set out in two executive orders.

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) and the Danish Competition Council (the Council) are the relevant public authorities that enforce Danish merger rules. The DCCA prepares all cases and decides less complicated cases on behalf of the Council, while Phase II mergers are usually decided by the Council.

Mergers

Definition

Pursuant to section 12a of the Competition Act, the following constitute a merger:

• two or more previously independent undertakings amalgamating into one undertaking;
• one or more persons who already control one or more undertakings – by an agreement to purchase shares or assets or by any other means – acquiring direct or indirect control of the entirety of or parts of one or more other undertakings; or
• the establishment of a joint venture that will perform all the functions of an independent business entity on a lasting basis.

Control can be obtained through rights or agreements or in other ways that will, either separately or in combination, make it possible to exert decisive influence over the operations of the undertaking. As such, control may be acquired on a factual basis, for example, by way of a minority shareholder being highly likely to achieve a majority at shareholders’ meetings given the size, dispersion and common presence of the other shareholders in shareholders’ meetings, and on a legal basis (eg, through the acquisition of shares, assets and voting rights), by way of shareholder agreements or through the right to appoint members to the undertaking’s board of directors. Control may also be obtained through an agreement even when no shares, assets or voting rights are transferred, but when the undertakings concerned otherwise agree that one undertaking will have the ability to exercise control over the other. Finally, control may follow from a state of economic dependency.

The acquisition of a minority shareholding may constitute a merger insofar as the acquirer obtains decisive influence over the undertaking (eg, through voting rights or veto rights).

Jurisdictional thresholds

A concentration must be notified to the DCCA if:

• the combined aggregate turnover in Denmark of all the undertakings concerned is at least 900 million Danish kroner, and at least two of the undertakings concerned each have an aggregate turnover in Denmark of at least 100 million Danish kroner;
• the aggregate turnover in Denmark of at least one of the undertakings concerned is at least 3.8 billion Danish kroner, and the aggregate global turnover of at least one of the other undertakings concerned is at least 3.8 billion Danish kroner; or
• the Danish Business Authority, in accordance with the Act on Electronic Communications Networks and Services, has referred a merger between two or more commercial providers of electronic communications networks in Denmark to the DCCA.

The concept of ‘undertakings concerned’ mentioned in the Competition Act (ie, the direct participants to a merger) corresponds with the EU concept, and the European Commission’s practice and the Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice may provide guidance regarding the interpretation of the concept.

Notification procedure

If the jurisdictional thresholds are met, prior notification to the DCCA is mandatory.

In 2022, a total of 68 notifications were processed by the DCAA, of which 58 were notified under the simplified procedure, 10 were pursuant to the full-form procedure and one was withdrawn by the applicants.

In 2023, as at the time of writing, eight notifications have been or are currently being processed by the DCCA, of which seven have been notified under the simplified procedure and one is pursuant to the full-form notification procedure.

Timing of the notification

Notification to the DCCA may be filed when a binding merger agreement (which may be subject to conditions) has been concluded between the parties, a takeover bid has been made public or a controlling share has been acquired (in cases where control is acquired through a series of transactions in securities).

A letter of intent will usually not be sufficient for the DCCA to accept the notification, but it may form the basis for informal pre-notification discussions with the DCCA. The DCCA recommends that the parties initiate contact with the DCCA as soon as possible after it has been established that a merger is notifiable and no later than two weeks prior to notification.

A merger may not be implemented prior to the DCCA’s approval; however, the DCCA may, at its discretion, grant derogations from the standstill obligation. The DCCA has granted derogations several times in Danish merger cases and has, for example, permitted companies to start negotiations with distributors and to conclude agreements with suppliers prior to its approval of the merger.

If the parties fail to notify a merger or implement the transaction before approval has been obtained, the DCCA may, consequently, impose fines. When determining the size of the fine, the DCCA will take into account factors such as the gravity of the infringement and its duration. In accordance with the EU Merger Regulation, gun-jumping can result in fines of up to 10 per cent of the annual group turnover.

There were no cases of gun-jumping in 2020, 2021 and 2022. In a notable case from June 2019, the gas station company Circle K Denmark AS accepted a fixed-penalty notice of 6 million Danish kroner for failing to notify the acquisition of 72 service stations. In October 2018, Circle K had notified to the DCCA the transfer of inventory, employees and goodwill relating to 72 service stations from 12 different lessees under the Shell brand to Circle K. Circle K had signed the transfer agreements in May 2016, subsequent to the European Commission’s approval of Circle K’s acquisition of Danish Fuel, which covered (only) some of Shell’s activities in Denmark.

However, the acquisition of the 72 service stations – which should have been notified separately by Circle K to the DCCA – was not covered by the Commission’s merger approval. The DCCA approved the acquisition of the 72 service stations in November 2018, but because Circle K had already implemented the merger, the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime imposed a fine for Circle K’s failure to notify the DCCA in due time. The case demonstrates that failure to notify a merger in due time can constitute a serious criminal offence under Danish competition law, and that such an omission may result in substantial fines.

Time frame for the DCCA’s assessment

Pre-notification phase

There is no statutory time frame for the pre-notification phase under the Danish merger regime. As there are no legislative time limits, the DCCA has a broad time frame to assess a merger.

Even though no statutory time frame exists, in practice it will usually take two to four weeks to have a simplified notification declared complete, and two to 10 weeks for a full-form notification. However, in some cases, pre-notification may take considerably longer; for example, in the case concerning the proposed merger between JP/Politiken/Børsen, the parties initiated the pre-notification process in January 2016, and the notification was declared complete in July 2016, half a year after pre-notification had been filed. Thus, contingent upon the complexity of the merger, the DCAA may deviate from its point of departure on the time frame in the pre-notification phase.

During pre-notification, the parties have an opportunity to informally discuss any questions pertaining to the drafting of the notification, and drafts may be submitted to, and reviewed by, the DCCA. Further, the DCCA usually conducts a public hearing (typically 10 working days) as a part of the pre-notification phase to speed up the process. In consequence, simplified notifications may very often be declared complete only a few days after the end of the public hearing process.

With regard to full-form notifications, the DCCA usually conducts significant parts of the market investigation and case analysis during pre-notification.

Completeness of notification

Once a notification has been filed, the DCCA is bound to declare the notification complete or specify any missing information within 10 working days.

Since August 2013, filing fees must be paid before a merger notification is deemed complete, and thus serve as a condition for this. The fee for a simplified notification is 50,000 Danish kroner, whereas the fee for a full-form notification is 0.015 per cent of the combined turnover in Denmark of the undertakings concerned, subject to a cap of 1.5 million Danish kroner. The fees are not reimbursable, unless:

• the notified transaction is not notifiable;
• the parties withdraw the notification before it is complete;
• the parties withdraw the notification before the DCCA has reached a decision because another Danish authority has refused to permit a merger between undertakings that are involved in the notified transaction; or
• the Danish Business Authority did not have any basis for referring the merger to the DCCA.

Phase I review

Once the notification has been declared complete by the DCCA, Phase I commences. This phase lasts up to 25 working days, which may be extended to 35 working days by the DCCA if commitments are proposed by the parties. If the DCCA is not able to determine that a merger will not lead to a significant impediment of effective competition during Phase I, it will commence a Phase II investigation (and, as such, the case will usually be decided by the Council on the basis of the DCCA’s case analysis, as outlined above).

Phase II review

Phase II investigations must be completed within 90 working days of the expiry of Phase I, but the time frame for a Phase II investigation will automatically be extended by up to 20 working days if commitments are proposed by the parties during the last 20 working days of Phase II.

As of 1 January 2018, the time limits are interrupted if the parties to the merger fail to supply information required by the DCCA in time. Further, the DCCA may, at any time, extend the deadline by up to 20 working days, provided that the undertakings concerned have requested or consented to the extension. If the Council does not reach a decision within the relevant deadline, the Council is considered to have approved the merger.

Recent cases show that in mergers without substantial overlaps or vertical links, approval from the DCCA may be expected two to three months after the first draft of the notification has been submitted (and approximately four to six weeks in simplified notifications), while clearance of more complex mergers may take anywhere from six to 12 months.

In 2022, six proposed mergers underwent Phase II investigations. Of the six mergers, one was withdrawn. Of the five proposed mergers that were accepted, two were initially scrutinised by the DCCA but subsequently accepted with the parties undertaking remedial actions.

To date in 2023, one merger is undergoing Phase II investigations: the NDI Group A/S and Euromaster Danmark A/S case.

Formats of the notification

A merger may be filed as a simplified notification or as a full-form notification. Under the simplified notification proces, less market data needs to be submitted, and the procedure will often be faster as opposed to the full-form notification. However, even in simplified notifications, the parties must submit extensive amounts of information. If the merger is clearly unproblematic (ie, if the parties’ activities do not overlap, and there are no material vertical links), less market information is required to be submitted, and the competition authorities may adopt an approval after a short process.

A simplified notification may be submitted in the following cases:

• mergers in which two or more undertakings acquire joint control of an undertaking and where the turnover in Denmark of the joint venture or of the transferred activities is less than 100 million Danish kroner, or where the total value of the assets or the turnover generated in Denmark by the assets transferred to the joint venture is less than 100 million Danish kroner;
• mergers in which one undertaking acquires sole control of another undertaking of which it already has joint control; or
• mergers in which two or more undertakings merge or one or more undertakings acquire sole or joint control of another undertaking and in which:
  • none of the parties are active in the same product and geographical market or in a product market that is downstream or upstream from a product market in which another party to the merger is active;
  • two or more of the parties to the merger are active in the same product and geographical market, but hold a combined market share in Denmark of less than 15 per cent; or
  • one or more of the parties to the merger are active in a downstream or upstream product market in which another party is active, provided that neither their individual nor their combined market share in those markets in Denmark is 25 per cent or more.

Even if the above conditions are met, the DCCA may, at its (very wide) discretion, require a full-form notification. Accordingly, it is recommended to discuss with the DCCA during the pre-notification phase what type of notification procedure is required, as a request for a full-form notification may result in significant additional costs in filing fees relative to the size of the transaction.

In this regard, on 1 July 2020, the amended Executive Order on the Notification of Mergers came into force,^[1] which was accompanied by updated DCCA guidelines. The Order heightens and further details the requirements for information that must be provided in full-form notifications, outlining and detailing this information in appendix 1 to the Executive Order.

When following the full-form notification procedurethe notification must now, inter alia, include information on the merging parties’ assessment of the counterfactual scenario, including an assessment of whether the parties will resume their previous business activities. Further, the notification must also include information on affected markets and on supply-and-demand substitution (to the extent that the parties have this information). Finally, the Order specifies the documents that must be submitted along with the notification.

A decision requiring the parties to file a full-form notification may be appealed to the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) but is rarely overturned owing to the DCCA’s wide margin of discretion in deciding on the notification form. In the Dansk Supermarked/Wupti case (2015), the DCCA conducted a small market investigation, submitting a short list of questions to a handful of market participants, which led it to require a full-form notification. The parties challenged the decision before the Tribunal, claiming that the DCCA did not have sufficient grounds for requiring a full-form notification.

The Tribunal upheld the DCCA’s decision in 2016, which the District Court confirmed in 2018. In January 2020, the Western High Court ruled that the DCCA had been permitted to require a full-form notification to conduct a minor market investigation (irrespective of the fact that this resulted in a higher filing fee, and that no substantial competition issues were eventually found).

Notification forms are available on the DCCA’s website. There is no requirement for certifications, notarisations or other such items. Usually, notifications are filed in Danish, but the DCCA may accept notifications in English. This should be agreed with the DCCA before submission. Supporting documents may be submitted in Danish and English.

Substantive test

The substantive test under Danish law corresponds to the significant impediment of effective competition test under EU law and is interpreted in accordance with the case law of the European courts, as well as the case law and guidance of the Commission. Only concentrations that significantly impede effective competition, primarily as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, will be blocked by the Council or the DCCA.

Previously, the Council and the DCCA arguably had a more static, market share-based approach to findings of dominance and unilateral effects than the Commission. However, this is changing, and in recent years the DCCA has significantly increased its use of economic evidence in Danish merger control proceedings.

Concerning Alm. Brand’s acquisition of Codan Forsikring, the Council approved the acquisition in a ruling on the 27 April 2022. Both companies were engaged in the provision of indemnity insurance, to both private and business customers. As a result of the acquisition, Alm. Brand would obtain a total market share of 20–30 per cent within the market of the provision of indemnity insurance for business customers in Denmark. Irrespective of this, the Council did not find that the acquisition would substantially impede effective competition.

The Council’s ruling noted that the DCCA had undertaken extensive research that found that Alm. Brand had a market concentration spanning primarily small and medium-large business clients, whereas Codan primarily had large-cap business clients. The DCCA further found that business clients would be more sensitive towards price changes as they could best be described as professional purchasers of indemnity insurance, and therefore would regularly engage insurance brokers for the procurement of an array of different indemnity insurances, which aided in creating a more dynamic and agile market. Consequently, the Council approved the acquisition unconditionally as there was no substantial nor qualified risk of unilateral impediment of effective competition.

In February 2021, the Council assessed the STARK/Jens Schultz case. Stark and Jens Schultz are both retailers of generalist building materials. Stark sought to acquire Jens Schultz, which would result in Stark obtaining a national market share of 30–40 per cent of the market for sale of building materials to professionals. The Council saw no problems regarding the national market but was concerned that the merger would impact the local market in South Funen, leading to Phase II investigations. The Council’s illustrative price rise (IPR) assessment showed that the merger would reduce the competitive pressure and incentivise a local price increase.

However, an IPR assessment only provides a static picture, which led the Council to emphasise other factors such as the likelihood of competitors establishing themselves in the area following the merger, which would decrease the incentive to raise prices. The Council concluded that the merger would not significantly impede competition in the market and approved the merger unconditionally in Phase II. After the merger, a competitor did, in fact, open a new branch in South Funen.

The vast majority of Danish mergers are approved. To date, only one, the Lemvigh Müller/AO case in 2008, has been prohibited since the introduction of merger control in Denmark in 2000. However, there are examples of merger notifications being withdrawn by the parties themselves prior to a decision by the Council. There are numerous reasons for withdrawing a notification.

A recent example was the contemplated merger between the Danish companies Aqua d´Or Mineral Water A/S and Royal Unibrew A/S, with both companies undertaking business operations relating to the manufacturing of soft drinks, including the production of mineral water and other bottled water, and the wholesale of the aforementioned beverages.

The companies had notified the DCCA in March 2022, with the contemplated merger entering Phase II investigations in May 2022. Initial investigations found that the merger would decrease the number of large-scale companies operating within the fields of production, distribution and sale of mineral water and other bottled water-beverages within Denmark from three to two. The DCCA further found that the merger would severely impede competition within different markets, including the off-trade market for the production, distribution and sale of branded mineral water within Denmark. The application was withdrawn before the DCCA rendered a decision.

Joint ventures

As with joint ventures under EU law, the creation of a joint venture performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis is considered a concentration under Danish law. Similarly, if the joint venture may also have as its object or effect the coordination of the behaviour between parent companies, this will be assessed according to the rules on anticompetitive agreements (the Danish equivalent of article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). In practice, the DCCA looks to case law and guidelines from the Commission when assessing aspects of a joint venture, such as control and full functionality.

In 2022, the DCCA approved 10 applications concerning the establishment of joint ventures pursuant to the simplified notification process. In comparison, the 2021 figure of approved applications concerning the establishment of joint ventures pursuant to the simplified procedure was six.

Prior to the European Court of Justice’s judgment in Austria Asphalt (C-248/16), the European Commission and the DCCA held that a change from sole control to joint control over an existing undertaking was subject to merger control, regardless of whether the full-function joint venture would perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

In 2018, Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension (ATP) and Danica Ejendomsselskab ApS (Danica) acquired Apartment No. 2 in Randers Storcenter (part of a shopping centre in central Denmark). The case brought up some interesting issues with regard to the DCCA’s jurisdiction. In 2017, Danica sold 50 per cent of its shares in 16 Danish shopping centres to ATP, which entailed the creation of a full-functioning joint venture. However, in 2018, the DCCA based the assessment of its own jurisdiction with regard to the acquisition of Apartment No. 2 in Randers Storcenter on the turnover of the parents (ATP and Danica) and not on the turnover of the joint venture.

Consequently, the acquisition of the apartment met the turnover threshold under the Danish competition rules and was subject to notification. However, the DCCA accepted a simplified notification on the basis of Danish rule equivalents to section 5(a) of the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure (the acquisition of joint control of a joint venture, provided that the joint venture has no, or negligible, actual or foreseen activities in Denmark).

Remedies

If the DCCA finds that a merger gives rise to competition concerns, the parties may propose remedies to obtain an approval. Usually, the commitments will be discussed and agreed in Phase II.

According to the Competition Act, remedies may include:

• the divestiture of a company, parts of a company, assets or other interests;
• the granting of access to third parties to the merged entity’s technology, production facilities, distribution facilities or similar facilities; and
• other measures that may promote efficient competition.

The list of remedies is non-exhaustive. When proposing remedies, the parties must explain in detail how to implement the proposed remedies and how the proposed remedies will solve the competition concerns raised by the DCCA or the Council. The proposed remedies must be binding and must commit the parties either to act or not to act in a certain way. The DCCA may revoke its approval of remedies or impose fines on the parties if the parties fail to comply with the remedies.

In general, the DCCA seems to favour structural remedies over behavioural remedies. This preference is probably owing to the substantial resources that the competition authorities must deploy when reassessing behavioural remedies in the light of a new market situation, as well as the difficulties linked with controlling a merged entity’s compliance with behavioural remedies. However, proposals of the adaptation of solely behavioural remedies has been accepted by the competition authorities in recent cases.

In the case of Knorr-Bremse Systeme für Schienenfahrzeuge GmbH’s (Knorr Bremse) acquisition of 100 per cent of the shares and voting rights of Selskabet af 3. Juli 2021 ApS (DSB Component Workshop), the Council approved the merger on the basis of solely behavioural remedies. Knorr Bremse is a German manufacturer of components and spare parts for trains and is active both in the sale of spare parts and in the maintenance of its own train components (referred to as ‘specialised heavy maintenance’). DSB Component Workshop is a provider of heavy maintenance on trains and has its own small production of spare parts.

The Counsel expressed concerns regarding the proposed acquisition, as the Counsel found a vertical link between the parties, as the DSB Component Workshop purchased spare parts manufactured and sold by, inter alia, Knorr Bremse for the performance of heavy maintenance on trains. The DCCA found that the merger would increase Knorr Bremse’s incentive to foreclose DSB Component Workshop’s competitors’ access to Knorr Bremse’s spare parts based on the fact that:

• Knorr Bremse’s spare parts were an important and unique input in the maintenance of trains;
• Knorr Bremse had significant market power in the supply of spare parts for trains; and
• it could not be assumed that either the replacement of entire train systems or the in-house production of spare parts was an effective counter-strategy competing with heavy maintenance suppliers.

The Council also considered that this would lead to increased costs, thereby harming competition in the downstream market and ultimately leading to train passengers bearing the additional costs.

The Council also assessed the horizontal effects of the merger. The Council found that the parties’ activities overlapped in the northern European market for heavy maintenance on trains and estimated that Knorr Bremse would have a market share of 5–15 per cent in the market for heavy maintenance on trains following the merger. The Council concluded that the merger’s horizontal effects did not significantly impede competition, considering the parties’ limited market shares, the presence of several strong competitors, a potential future reduction in DSB Component Workshop’s turnover and market share and that the parties’ products were to a large extent differentiated and complementary, meaning that they could not be considered close competitors.

In response to the Council’s concerns of the vertical effects, Knorr Bremse proposed four behavioural remedies. Knorr Bremse committed to:

• supply spare parts to existing and future smaller Danish customers on fair, non-discriminatory and transparent terms and prices;
• only refuse to supply spare part on the grounds of documented capacity limits;
• report to the Council if Knorr Bremse receives written complaints from existing or future smaller customers covered by the remedies; and
• resolve any dispute between Knorr Bremse and the customers covered by the remedies through mediation and, if necessary, arbitration.

The Council found that the proposed remedies adequately addressed the Council’s concerns, and therefore approved the merger in Phase II.

The JPPOL/DAO/Bladkompagniet case of December 2021 concerned JPPOL’s acquisition of a majority of shares of Dansk Avis Omdeling A/S (DAO) and A/S Bladkompagniet (Bladkompagniet). JPPOL is one of the largest Danish media companies, which, among other things, publishes three major Danish newspapers. DAO and Bladkompagniet are the primary distributors of newspapers in Jutland and on Zealand respectively. The Council found that DAO and Bladkompagniet horizontally overlapped in the national market for distribution of newspapers, but that the actual competition between the two was limited.

However, the Council was concerned that the merger would affect the vertical market with regard to the distribution of newspapers owing to DAO’s and Bladkompagniet’s market shares of 99 per cent in their respective distribution areas. The Council found that the merger would allow JPPOL to determine the terms and prices on a substantial part of the distribution services market, and to limit competing publishers’ access to distribution services. Further, the Council considered that no companies other than DAO and Bladkompagniet offer the distribution services required by newspapers, and that it would not be profitable for new players to enter into the newspaper distribution market. Consequently, according to the Council, the merger would incentivise JPPOL to raise prices for competing publishers of newspapers, thus creating input foreclosure and restrictions on effective competition.

In response, the parties proposed five behavioural remedies on the merger. DAO and Bladkompagniet committed to four behavioural remedies, mainly concerning a fair and transparent distribution of newspapers. JPPOL committed to sell products and services to DAO and Bladkompagniet on market terms, thus ensuring that the costs would not artificially increase, resulting in higher prices for distribution services. The Council found the remedies adequate and approved the merger in Phase I.

If a merger is approved with remedies, the remedies may be partly or fully cancelled at a later stage if the circumstances have changed significantly.

According to the DCCA’s guidance paper on merger filings, parties are encouraged to consider remedies as early in the process as possible if the concentration may give rise to concerns. Otherwise, the approval process may be prolonged. The parties can also expect the DCCA to market test the remedies. Either the DCCA will contact third parties directly or the proposed remedies will be published on the DCCA’s website with a request for third parties to comment.

Ancillary restrictions

As with EU notifications, approvals by the DCCA automatically cover ancillary restrictions. It is up to the parties to assess whether there are any ancillary restrictions that need to be evaluated by the DCCA with regard to a merger. The Commission’s guidelines and case law apply.

Judicial review

The Council’s decisions in merger cases may be appealed by the notifying parties to either the Tribunal or directly to the Danish courts, if the decision concerns the substance of the case (as opposed to decisions on formality). If decisions are appealed to the Tribunal, they may, in turn, still be appealed to the Danish courts. In both cases of appeal to the Tribunal or directly to the courts, an appeal must be lodged within eight weeks of the Council’s decision, and the Tribunal and Danish courts will have the competence to examine all aspects of the decision. It is also possible to appeal only parts of the decision.

After a merger has been approved, the Council may impose injunctions, as necessary, to secure timely compliance with the accepted remedies.

Third parties have no right to appeal merger decisions to the Tribunal. However, a third party may, if sufficient legal interest is demonstrated, bring the decision of the Council before the Danish courts.

Notes