India: Trade Issues & Antitrust
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The first decade of the 21st century saw India reap rich dividends from the dismantling of the trade restrictions and high tariff barriers. Supported by a positive and strong industrial policy, India sustained a GDP growth rate of 7.7 per cent compounded annual growth rate (CAGR)1 for 2000–2010. Prior to this, in 1995, India also became a founder member of the WTO.
After being sheltered for decades and mired in old technologies, this opening up of markets left domestic industries vulnerable to increased foreign competition. As anticipated, India became an active user of the WTO trade remedial measures: both anti-dumping and safeguards. Since India’s participation in WTO, it has emerged as one of the most prolific users of anti-dumping measures in the world.
The decade also saw India’s international trade grow at a rate of 20.6 per cent CAGR.2 A number of important free trade agreement negotiations with ASEAN, Japan, Singapore and Korea were also concluded and operationalised as the government had a mission statement with their Look East policy. Aided by dual instruments of trade liberalisation in the domestic markets and trade protectionism under the WTO provisions, Indian industry grew rapidly in the domestic market and became powerful.
Given the evolving economic milieu, a need was felt for a more functional and robust antitrust/competition law.3The existing Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (the MRTP Act) had its roots firmly planted in India’s age of socialism. The MRTP Act focused primarily on curbing monopolies, irrespective of its consequences on the economy. The law was clearly inadequate to deal with the challenges that were expected to flow from the newly liberalised and globalised Indian economy.
Indeed, in 2002 the Supreme Court of India considered a case where an international soda ash cartel was allegedly affecting the Indian market.4 An anti-dumping case was filed, as well as a case for cartelisation under the MRTP Act. The Court considered whether the newer anti-dumping law ousted the jurisdiction of the MRTP ACT, and opined that ‘the two Acts substantially operate in different fields and the following table [reproduced below] brings out some of the distinctions between the MRTP Act and the Anti-dumping provisions’.
|Competition law actions||Anti-dumping actions|
|Competition law is concerned with the regulation of competition in a particular market within the territory of a country. Thus, it incorporates a whole host of anti-competitive practices including: monopolistic trade practices, as defined in section 2(i) of the MRTP Act; restrictive trade practices, as defined in section 2(o); and unfair trade practices as defined in section 36A.||An anti-dumping law is concerned with addressing just one type of unfair, international trade practice that causes injury to domestic industry, ie, ‘dumping’ of goods by an exporting country.|
|A complaint under the MRTP Act can be filed by a trade association or any consumer or a registered consumers association, or a reference can be made by the central government or the state government or even by the director general upon its own knowledge or information. [Section 10(1)(A) of the MRTP Act.]||An anti-dumping petition can be filed by the domestic Industry as defined under the Anti Dumping Rules or suo motu by the designated authority. [See Rules 2(b), 5(1) and 5(4) of the Anti Dumping Rules.]|
|Competition law procedures allow and require consideration of interest groups such as manufacturers, importers, exporters, consumers and the general public. Commercial actors can have their interests assessed through the determination of the market, causation or injury. Interests of consumers are taken into account when assessing the impact of a business practice on competition.|
No interest group other than domestic industry has full legal standing in anti-dumping cases. The predominant interest group is domestic producers. Industrial users and consumers do not have legal standing to maintain a complaint.
|In predatory pricing inquiries, the complainant has to establish that the predator acted with intent to eliminate competition and competitors. Actual injury is not required.||In anti-dumping complaints, intent is irrelevant but actual injury has to be shown. Further, a causal link has to be established between the dumping and the injury suffered.|
|In most countries, competition cases are dealt with by a court of law, where parties are entitled to full discovery rights and due process.||Anti-dumping inquiries are always conducted by government agencies through administrative procedures and law.|
The Court went on to state:
A perusal of the above chart indicates that the two statutes and regimes operate in different and distinct spheres and there is no conflict between the two regimes/statutes. Hence, the question of implied repeal of the provisions of Section 33(1)(j) of the MRTP Act, 1969 on account of the provisions of Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 does not arise... In our opinion, the MRTP Commission has no extra territorial jurisdiction. The action of an exporter to India when performed outside India would not be amenable to jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission. The MRTP Commission cannot pass an order determining the export price of an exporter to India or prohibiting him to export to India at a low or predatory price.
Prior to this case, a high-level committee was set up in 1999 to advise the government on a suitable, modern legislative framework for antitrust law in India. This committee recommended the replacement of the MRTP Act with a new legislation covering anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, merger control and competition advocacy by a new authority. The recommendations of the high-level committee were accepted by the government and this led to the enactment of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Competition Act) and the establishment of its enforcement agency: the Competition Commission of India (CCI).
Trade laws in India
Trade remedial measures are adopted by India to protect its domestic industries from unfair trade practices (dumping or subsidisation) or in case of emergency situations (emergency safeguard measures).
The World Trade Organization (WTO), through its agreements, allows for three types of trade remedial measures to be implemented by a member country to protect its domestic industries:
- Anti-dumping duties under the Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Anti-dumping Agreement): in India, the Anti-dumping Agreement is given effect through section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (and the Anti-dumping Rules thereunder). The Directorate General for Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties (DGAD) under the Ministry of Commerce is the appointed Designated Authority which conducts the investigations and recommends duties. These recommendations are crystallised only once they are levied by the Ministry of Finance through a customs notification to that effect.
- Anti-Subsidy and Countervailing Measures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM): section 9 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (and Countervailing Duty Rules made thereunder) is the chief Indian legislation specific to Anti-Subsidy and Countervailing Measures.
- Safeguards measures under the Agreement on Safeguards (Safeguards Agreement): apart from the Safeguards Agreement, section 8B (General Safeguards) and section 8C (China Specifc Safeguards) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (and relevant Safeguards Rules framed thereunder) is the primary Indian legislation for safeguards in general. As a general rule, safeguards measures are not country-specific and are levied against all imports of a particular product across the board.
India releases foreign trade policy document
India’s current foreign trade policy came into force from 27 August 2009 and is effective until 31 March 2014. The short-term objective of the policy was to arrest and reverse the declining trend of exports and to provide additional support especially to those sectors which have been hit badly by recession in the developed world. The central government delineated the policy objective of achieving an annual export growth of 15 per cent by 2011 with a view to achieve export growth path of around 25 per cent per annum by 2014, with the view of doubling India’s exports of goods and services by 2014. The long-term policy objective for the government was to double India’s share in global trade by 2020.
India’s experience in the WTO
India has been a member of the WTO since 1 January 1995 and has consistently played a leadership role in advocating the incorporation and adoption of pro-developmental policies in favour of the less developed economies with the objective of making the WTO a platform to promote a balanced developmental environment ensuring that the growth of indigenous industries in less developed economies are not sacrificed in the name of globalisation. To this effect, India has been a pivotal member of the G20, a bloc of developing nations established on 20 August 2003, and has been the forerunner in various policy initiatives having a major impact on the developing countries. In the recently concluded Bali Ministerial, India held firm on the issue of agricultural subsidies to enable developing and least developed members of the WTO to extend domestic food subsidies. India’s position initially attracted much crticism; however eventually was appreciated by several members who faced similar issues.
Antitrust law in India
The Competition Act – key enforcement and regulatory provisions
The focus and structure of the Competition Act is broadly in line with all modern antitrust legislations across the world. The CCI has three core enforcement/regulatory functions:
- prohibition on anti-competitive agreements;5
- prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position;6 and
- regulation of ‘combinations.’7
An additional yet equally crucial mandate discharged by the CCI is that of competition advocacy.8
The CCI’s enforcement/regulatory mandate is aimed at preventing practices from having an adverse effect on competition; promoting and sustaining competition in the markets; protecting the interest of consumers; and ensuring freedom of trade carried on by other participants in the markets, in India. As such, the provisions of the Competition Act are designed around the ‘effects doctrine’ which is, yet again, consistent with international legislations and empowers the CCI to examine the ‘conduct’ of market participants as well as proposed ‘structural changes’ in an industry using the appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) test which is guided by the provisions of sections 19(3) and 20(4). The AAEC test is the substantive legal standard which, when adopted by the CCI, allows it to undertake a detailed ex post assessment of ‘conduct’ related issues, as well as an ex ante analysis of ‘structural changes’ in a given relevant market.
The Competition Act – other key provisions
The Competition Act vests the CCI with the authority to undertake an inquiry into alleged contraventions of the ‘conduct’-related provisions on the basis of a reference made to it by the central government, a state government or a statutory authority; or on the basis of an information which is filed before it; or on its own (suo moto) motion.
In case the CCI arrives at a prima facie view that the conduct in question is likely to be in contravention of the provisions of the Competition Act, the CCI will issue directions to the Office of the Director General (DG Office), its investigating arm, to carry out a detailed investigation and submit a report thereon. After submission of the investigation report by the DG Office, the CCI will carry out a detailed inquiry into the matter and if the contravention is established, the CCI has been empowered under the Competition Act to, inter alia, pass certain orders, impose significant penalties, order the division of a dominant enterprise etc.9
Under the ‘combination’ provisions, any transaction that meets the statutorily prescribed thresholds10 has to be mandatorily pre-notified to the CCI for its approval prior to such transaction being given effect to.11 The CCI, after conducting an ex ante assessment of the proposed combination can approve the combination; or block the combination; or direct parties to make suitable modifications to such transactions.12
Appeals against the orders passed by the CCI can be filed before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT)13 with the final appeal being brought before the Supreme Court of India.
International dimension of trade and antitrust laws in India
Trade laws are, by necessity, international in nature. The extra-territorial nature of any trade remedial inquiry emanates from WTO/GATT. In fact, trade remedial actions can only be initiated against imports from other countries. In a similar vein, the ‘effects doctrine’ encapsulated within the Competition Act allows the CCI to target conduct or structural changes which have or are likely to have an AAEC in the markets in India including conduct/combinations taking place outside the territorial limits of India which have an AAEC in the relevant market in India.14 This ‘long arm’ provision of the Competition Act will guide the exercise of jurisdiction by the CCI over international conduct and transactions, where it can be demonstrated that the relevant market in India has been affected.
As a corollary, the Competition Act also specifically provides that the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements under section 3 of the Competition Act shall not restrict the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent that the agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provisions of services for such export.15 Additionally, while applying section 32 to the pre-notification requirement of firms in merger control cases, schedule I of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combination) Regulations 2011 also exempts a combination from the mandatory pre-notification requirement in case the transaction in question takes place entirely outside India with insignificant ‘local nexus’ on markets in India. The local nexus in case of mergers is prescribed by way of thresholds, which are widely recognised as among the highest in the world.
From a jurisdictional point of view, a subtle yet significant difference between Indian trade and antitrust laws exists. Under trade laws, while the nature of inquiry for a trade remedy investigation is transnational, the jurisdiction of a trade remedial body is predominantly local ie, concerned only with the imports entering the country. In other words, while the investigation is international, the levy is only on those goods that are imported into India. Under the Competition Act, where the CCI exercises jurisdiction over international conduct or transactions that have an effect in India, the investigation will be local (ie, to determine the effect of such conduct or combination on the relevant market in India), the remedy (including penalties) does potentially target the international enterprise under investigation.
The real issue in cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the power of implementation and enforcement of sanctions. Unlike trade laws that have, to some extent, a supra-territorial body like the WTO, cross-border implementation or enforcement of sanctions in antitrust matters are generally guided by the principles of comity16 in the form of bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or as specific clauses in free trade agreements (FTAs). The Competition Act itself recognises this and in section 18 it empowers the CCI to enter into MOUs with other antitrust agencies. To date India has entered into MOUs with the following antitrust authorities:
|Antitrust Authority||Scope of MOU||Date of MOU|
|The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), Brazil||Delhi Accord in third BRICS International Competition Conference at New Delhi; exchange of views on technical cooperation; promotion of competition advocacy||22 November 2013|
|The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), Russia|
|The State Administration for Industry and Commerce, China|
|The Competition Commission of South Africa|
|The Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission||Exchange of non-confidential information;|
bilateral enforcement as per applicable antitrust law
|21 November 2013|
|The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)||Sharing of information; technical cooperation with respective antitrust agencies||3 June 2013|
|The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ), Antitrust Division||Cooperate on antitrust investigations; share information on investigations and consult on enforcement and policy issues||27 September 2012|
|FAS, Russia||Enhanced cooperation||16 December 2011|
Interface between trade and antitrust law in India
The analysis of the objectives of the two sets of laws as expressly stated in the legislation of the subject countries reveals that prevention of unfair business practices is the common interface between the two. While antitrust laws are primarily aimed at protecting and promoting competition in markets, anti-dumping laws are aimed at protecting the domestic industry from present or potential injury which may arise due to dumping or increased imports, which in essence amounts to protection of competitors. This difference in the objectives of the two laws did not exist when the anti-dumping laws were enacted initially and in fact the earliest anti-dumping laws (such as the Anti-dumping Law of 1916 in the US) were meant to address antitrust concerns arising out of the practice of ‘transnational price predation’. Until anti-dumping laws were enacted and meant to address such concerns, they were considered an extension of antitrust law and the two laws were grounded in common objectives.
However, with the advent of the WTO and the mutual agreement of all signatories to reduce tariff margins, there was a growing concern that the domestic industry of a recently opened economy would be vulnerable to various unfair trade practices such as dumping. The objectives surrounding the use of anti-dumping laws have therefore evolved and modern trade remedies now seek to prevent unfair trade practices that a country may engage in, given that it is now easier to exploit the steady reduction of tariff rates pursuant to the GATT. In some jurisdictions, however, the anti-dumping laws still continue to be aligned with their antitrust law. For instance, in the European Union the anti-dumping law, though meant to remedy injury to the community industries, does take into account wider public interest considerations through the ‘community interest’ requirement and the analysis of the case law indicates that it addresses antitrust concerns as well. In India, there are several cases where monopoly producers are granted protection under the anti-dumping laws.
There is an understanding that trade laws are, generally, protectionist in nature and operate in a fashion to favour the domestic industry over the exporters and thereby distort competition.
The CCI has been created with a mandate to ‘eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition [...] in India’.17Moreover, according to section 60 of the Competition Act, the provisions of said Act would have an overriding effect on any other law in India. This clearly shows that the CCI has the sole mandate to decide on antitrust issues. As discussed above, the issue of inherent conflict between the antitrust authority and the designated authority for anti-dumping (DGAD) was analysed by the Supreme Court in Haridas Exports v All India Float Glass Manufacturers Association & Oths.18 The Supreme Court observed:
The jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission, in our opinion, is not ousted by the Antidumping provisions in the Customs Act. The two Acts operate in different fields and have different purposes... The grievance of the respondents is that import is being made at predatory prices. The challenge is to the actual import. But allowing such a challenge will amount to giving the MRTP Commission jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legal validity of the provisions relating to import, which jurisdiction the Commission does not have. It is not a Court with power of judicial review over legislative action. Therefore, it would have no jurisdiction todecide whether the action of the Government in permitting import of float glass even at predatory prices is valid or not. The Commission cannot prohibit import, its jurisdiction commences after import is completed and any restrictive trade practice takes place.
Though the above judgment in Haridas19 was with respect to the erstwhile MRTP Act, this has now changed in the Competition Act. According to section 62 of the Competition Act, the provisions of the Competition Act would be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. This could arguably set the two statutes on a collision course.
Purely from an academic perspective, it is interesting to note that, prior to certain amendments to the Competition Act that were carried out in 2007, the Competition Act had a provision under section 33(2) whereby the CCI had power to grant temporary injunction to restrain imports into the country when it suspects that such import could result in the contravention of the Competition Act. This indicates the legislative intent underlying the repeal and removal of said provision is clearly in favour of the operation of trade and antitrust laws separately as prescribed by Haridas.20
The CCI has also, to date, taken a stand consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling laid down in Haridas.21For instance, in Merino Panel Products Limited v Gujarat State Fertilisers and Chemicals Limiters & Ors,22 the CCI observed:
Any party aggrieved by the imposition of anti-dumping duty has a remedy available under law and can approach the Appellate Authority, namely, Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) against the order imposing the anti-dumping duty.
Clarifying this stand still further, the CCI in Shailesh Kumar vs M/s Tata Chemicals Limited & Ors23 observed:
The proceedings before DGAD and DG Safeguards are quasi-judicial in nature and the correctness or otherwise of the rulings of such authorities cannot be examined in collateral proceedings before the Commission unless it is further shown that once insulated from the cross border competition, the domestic players colluded to fix the prices or to limit the output with a view to raise the prices to the detriment of the consumers and the competition.
In line with the prevalent notion of harmonious coexistence, the Competition Act in section 21 further provides for additional provisions whereby any antitrust-related matter could be brought before the CCI as reference from any statutory authority like DGAD. Further, as per section 21A, if during any proceeding before the CCI an issue is raised by any party, the implementation of which is entrusted to a statutory authority, then the CCI can refer the matter to such statutory authority. Additionally the application of section 21 and 21A could be taken up by the CCI suo moto.
It should, however, be noted that as of the present time such cross-referencing is not compulsory and neither the CCI nor the trade remedial authority is bound by the findings of each other. This has been dealt with by the Madras High Court in Vikash Trading Company v Designated Authority.24 The Madras High Court observed:
[T]he contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners that the Designated Authority ought to have referred the matter to the Competition Commission, under Section 21 of the Competition Act, 2002, cannot be accepted. It is noted that Section 62 of the Competition Act, 2002, makes it clear that the provisions of the said Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other provision or any other law for the time being in force. As such, it cannot be said that it would be mandatory on the part of the Designated Authority to refer the matter to the Competition Commission, under Section 21 of the said Act, especially, in view of the fact that specific time limits have been prescribed for the Designated Authority to perform its functions, as per the provisions of Rule 16 of Anti-Dumping Rules.
In a recent cartel inquiry before the CCI involving automobile tyres,25 one of the allegations inquired into by the director general was the collusive steps taken to file an anti-dumping petition during the period in which the alleged cartel was operating. In order to file an anti-dumping case, the applications need to be filed on behalf of ‘domestic industry’ which requires substantial sales, marketing and financial data. This was used as evidence to show an operating cartel by the complainants. The CCI took the view that:
The lobbying for welfare of tyre industry is the prime objective of ATMA and the same cannot be viewed as anti-competitive. The discussion and joint application for levy of anti-dumping duty also seem necessitated, given the procedure specified. Moreover since the costing data was confidential to each company the possibility of sharing such sensitive information is most unlikely.
The jurisprudence, as it stands today on the interface between trade and antitrust laws in India, is that both the laws operate in their individual capacities and the scope of mutual support is embedded itself in the Competition Act through the operations of section 21 and 21A. However, a deeper analysis into some of the fundamental concepts that are (seemingly) common to both trade and antitrust law would reveal that the standards and operations of these concepts in India, as discussed below, are actually quite different.
Treatment of undertakings under trade and antitrust laws
Under article 8 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement,26 companies being investigated for dumping into another country can provide a price undertaking, which would involve an agreement not to sell below a particular price. Typically, in the Indian context this would involve an agreement not to export below the non-injurious price of the domestic industry in India. As suggested, this non-injurious price is based on the data provided by the domestic industry itself. The question that then begs consideration is whether this violates section 3 of the Competition Act, which absolutely prohibits horizontal cartels.
Predatory pricing versus dumping
The concept of ‘predatory pricing’, as understood in antitrust parlance, is often equated with the concept of ‘dumping’. Clause (b) to the explanation under section 4 of the Competition Act, read with the Competition Commission of India (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations, 2009, states that, generally, any price charged that is below the average variable cost incurred by a dominant enterprise with the objective of reducing competition or eliminating competitors would amount to predatory pricing. On the other hand, section 9(A) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 defines ‘margin of dumping’, in relation to an article, as the difference between its export price and its normal value (normal value being the price at which the product under consideration is sold in the domestic market). Inherent in the ‘normal value’ analysis is the fact that a value can only be ‘normal’ if it is above the cost of production (with an exception for start-up companies).
Examination of market and industry
Under trade remedial law a sanction can be imposed against imports only when they cause or are likely to cause ‘injury’ to the ‘domestic industry’. Similarly under antitrust law, sanctions are imposed on alleged anti-competitive practices when they cause or are likely to cause an AAEC in the ‘relevant market’ in India. Thus it can be said that under both systems of law, sanctions are attached to the alleged unfair practice or the anti-competitive practice (as the case may be) depending upon their impact on ‘domestic industry’ or the competition in the ‘relevant market’ respectively.
However, these very terms also bring forth the stark difference in the examinations for trade and antitrust respectively. In trade law, the impact on the ‘domestic industry’ obviously relates only to the impact on the domestic producers. On the other hand, the impact on the ‘relevant market’ in antitrust law includes both producers as well as consumers of the subject product. This difference goes to the root of the objectives of both laws, where one is trying to preserve the competitiveness of a local market while the other is trying to ensure that an unfair trade practice does not harm the domestic industry of the country. Hence, the object of protection also becomes the subject of examination for injury.
There is no uniform view on the relationship between trade remedies and antitrust law. While some authors argue that trade remedial law is an extension of antitrust law, to the extent that it addresses the issue of ‘international predation’, others argue that the body of trade law, as it exists and as it is applied, is inherently protectionist in nature and is thereby antithetical to the principles of antitrust law. In such instances, the necessity for an anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duty may be justified because other countries being able to leverage entry restrictions in their own home markets into an ‘unfair’ competitive advantage in export markets, especially in light of the falling tariff obstacles pursuant to the WTO. In such cases, in the absence of common rules on antitrust law disciplines, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules are required to ‘level the playing field’. Indeed, some members sought to include antitrust issues in the WTO agenda, but it was virtually a non-starter.27
It is also necessary to take into consideration the subtle but distinct variations in the objective of a ‘level playing field’ in the context of trade remedies and antitrust law. A ‘level playing field’, from an antitrust law perspective, relates to the relevant local market and fair competition therein. On the other hand, a ‘level playing field’, from a WTO and trade remedial perspective, refers to a global reduction in tariffs to promote free and fair trade to the extent possible. Maintaining this balance of fair trade to the objective of free trade requires the exercise of measures that, taken without the context of the larger goal of free trade, may seem incompatible with the objectives of antitrust law.
Furthermore, the principles of trade remedial laws may differ significantly from the implementation of trade remedial laws. While in principle trade remedies may be designed to preserve fair trade globally, they are often found vulnerable to exploitation by well-positioned domestic producers who seek to eliminate competition by seeking refuge under anti-dumping and safeguards measures.
- CAGR calculated based on data from Economic Survey of India, available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/statdata.asp.
- CAGR calculated based on data from Economic Survey of India, available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/statdata.asp.
- OECD (2009), Investment Policy Reviews: India.
- Haridas v Float Glass Manufacturers Association [(2002) 111 CompCas 617].
- Section 3 of the Competition Act.
- Section 4 of the Competition Act.
- Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act.
- Section 49 of the Competition Act allows the central government or state government to make a reference to the CCI for an opinion, when formulating a policy on competition. Additionally, the CCI under section 49(3) is mandated to take suitable measures for the promotion of competition advocacy, creating awareness and imparting training about competition issues.
- Sections 27 and 28 of the Competition Act.
- Section 5 read with the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulation, 2011 (Combination Regulations) and Notification dated March 04, 2011 issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Govt. of India vide S.O. 482(E). issued (de minimus Exemption Notification) in exercise of the powers under section 54 of the Act.
- Section 6(2) of the Competition Act.
- Section 31 of the Competition Act.
- Section 53B of the Competition Act.
- Section 32 of the Competition Act.
- Section 3(5)(ii) of the Competition Act.
- The principles of comity suggest that a country should give full and sympathetic consideration to another country’s request that it open or expand a law enforcement proceeding in competition cases in order to remedy conduct in its territory that is substantially and adversely affecting another country’s interests. In addition, the requested country is urged to take whatever remedial action it deems appropriate on a voluntary basis and in consideration of its own legitimate interests. [Report of the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy – Making International Markets more efficient through ‘Positive Comity’ in Competition Law Enforcement (Document ID: DAFFE/CLP(99)19)].
- Section 18 of the Competition Act.
- (2002) 111 CompCas 617.
- Case No: 54/2012.
- Case No: 66/2011.
- (2013) 1 MLJ 907.
- All India Tyre Dealers Federation v Tyre Manufacturers [MRTP Case RTPE No. 20/2008] dated 17 January 2013.
- Enacted in Indian law at section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975
- At the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996 a working group was set up to look at the interface between Trade and Competition Policy, but in face of stiff opposition from some members, including India, the General Council decided to abandon this issue in July 2004.