India: Merger Control

Introduction

Competition law in India is governed and regulated by the Competition Act, 2002 (the Competition Act) and its underlying regulations. On 1 June 2011, the merger control regime in India came into effect pursuant to notifications issued by the government of India. Additionally, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) issued the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combination) Regulations 2011 (Regulations), which were subsequently amended on 23 February 2012 and 4 April 2013.

Since coming into effect, the CCI has reviewed approximately 145 merger notifications, all but three of which have been approved unconditionally. In this article, we discuss various practical aspects of the merger control regime in India which have developed through the CCI’s jurisprudence.

Combinations

Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act prohibit a ‘combination’ (an acquisition, merger or amalgamation) which causes or is likely to cause an ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ (AAEC) in the relevant market in India, and treat such combinations as void. Transactions that cross the jurisdictional thresholds (based on assets and turnover) specified in the Competition Act¹ must be pre-notified to the CCI.

Importantly, the regime is suspensory and transactions subject to merger control review by the CCI cannot be concluded until merger clearance in India has been obtained or a review period of 210 calendar days has passed, whichever comes first.

Jurisdictional thresholds

The jurisdictional thresholds have been prescribed in section 5 of the Competition Act for parties and groups; these are set out below.

• parties test:
  • the parties have combined assets in India of 15 billion rupees or combined turnover in India of 45 billion rupees; or
  • the parties have combined worldwide assets of US$750 million including combined assets in India of 7.5 billion rupees or combined worldwide turnover of US$2.25 million including combined turnover in India of 22.5 billion rupees; or;
• group test:
  • the group has assets in India of 60 billion rupees; or turnover in India of 180 billion rupees; or
  • the group² has worldwide assets of US$3 billion including assets in India of 7.5 billion rupees or worldwide turnover of US$9 billion including turnover in India of 22.5 billion rupees.

The government of India, pursuant to notifications dated 4 March 2011 and 27 May 2011, introduced a target-based exemption. Where the target enterprise (ie, an enterprise whose control, shares, voting rights or assets are being acquired) has assets of not more than 2.5 billion rupees in India or turnover of not more than 7.5 billion rupees in India, no clearance from the CCI is required, irrespective of whether the parties test or the group test is met. However, it is important to bear in mind that the CCI is interpreting the target exemption only to apply in relation to transactions effected by way of an acquisition and not through mergers or amalgamations. Also, in the case of asset acquisitions, the CCI is viewing the ‘target’ to be the enterprise housing the assets and not the assets themselves.

Currently, the stated thresholds apply equally to all sectors; however, the government of India introduced the Competition (Amendment) Bill 2012, which, if enacted, will allow the Government to prescribe differentiated thresholds for particular sectors.³ This tool is likely to be used to scrutinise a greater number of transactions in particular sectors of national importance, such as pharmaceuticals, banking and telecommunications.

Entities to be considered for calculation of thresholds

The entities to be considered for the purposes of calculating the thresholds differ according to the type of combination.

In the case of an acquisition of an enterprise by means of acquisition of its assets, shares, voting rights or control under section 5(a) of the Competition Act, the entities are: the acquirer (including its subsidiaries, units or divisions) and the target enterprise (including its subsidiaries, units, or divisions); or the group, to which the target enterprise would belong after the acquisition.

In the case of an acquisition of control over an enterprise, where the acquirer already has direct or indirect control over another enterprise competing with the target enterprise under section 5(b) the relevant entities are, the target enterprise (including its subsidiaries, units, or divisions); and other enterprise(s) in the same or substitutable field over which the acquirer has direct or indirect control (each including its subsidiaries, units, or divisions) or the group to which the target enterprise would belong after the acquisition.

In the case of a merger or amalgamation under section 5(c), the relevant entity is the enterprise remaining after the merger or the enterprise created as a result of the amalgamation; or the group to which the enterprise remaining after the merger or created as a result of the amalgamation would belong after the merger or amalgamation.

In calculating the assets and turnover of the group, it is necessary to do so assuming that the combination has already taken place. This can be done by adding the assets and turnover of the target enterprise (in the case of acquisitions), or the remaining enterprise (in the case of mergers), or the created enterprise (in the case of amalgamations). Other considerations to bear in mind include:

• the CCI has interpreted ‘enterprise’ as referring to natural or legal persons and not unincorporated business divisions, units or standalone assets within such legal entity, even if they have an independent identity on the market.⁴ This assumes particular importance in the case of asset acquisitions, acquisitions of unincorporated businesses/units/divisions and hive-offs. The CCI has taken the view that, in relation to an acquisition of assets or an unincorporated business unit or division, for the purposes of the thresholds analysis (including application of the target exemption), the assets and turnover of the legal entity which houses the asset, business, unit or division which is being acquired, is to be considered. In effect, this means that where only assets are being sold, the CCI will not consider the value of those assets and the turnover arising from them, but the assets and turnover of the selling legal entity which houses the assets being sold, to determine whether the transaction is notifiable.
• Further, concerned with the fact that the enterprises may hive off assets into a step-down subsidiary to avail themselves of the target exemption, and thus avoid filing, the CCI has decided that, where assets are being hived off with the purpose of subsequently selling the same, the transferor parent entity’s assets and turnover are to be attributed to the step-down subsidiary when calculating the jurisdictional thresholds. This is particularly relevant in case of joint ventures (discussed below).
• It appears that the CCI is viewing demergers and slump sales of assets or divisions undertaken through court-approved schemes of arrangement as mergers, rather than acquisitions, for the determination of the jurisdictional thresholds and trigger events. It seems that the mere fact that these transactions are undertaken by way of a court process lends the CCI to treat them as mergers. This means that the target exemption is not applicable and the availability of the intra-group exemption is also narrowed (see below). This approach is questionable because, at its heart, a demerger and a slump sale is nothing but an acquisition of the assets or undertakings involved, where both the transferor and the transferee entities survive; it is not a merger, which has at its core the concept of extinguishment of an entity upon the completion of the merger.

Subject to the exceptions and exemptions explained below, a transaction qualifies as a combination that must be notified to the CCI, if either of the parties-based thresholds or the group-based thresholds, in addition to applicable target-based thresholds, are met. The thresholds need to be calculated carefully as the CCI will refuse to accept notifications where the jurisdictional thresholds are not met.

Combinations not requiring prior notification

Under the Competition Act, acquisitions, share subscription or financing facilities entered into by public financial institutions, registered foreign institutional investors, banks or registered venture capital funds, pursuant to a covenant in a loan agreement or an investment agreement, do not need to be pre-notified to the CCI. However, in such cases, the acquirer will need to notify the CCI of the acquisition on Form III within seven calendar days after completion. There have only been four notifications filed with the CCI under this provision.

‘Ordinarily exempt’ transactions

In order to prevent the merger control regime from becoming unduly onerous, the CCI has introduced, in schedule I of the Regulations, certain categories of transactions that are ‘ordinarily’ not likely to cause an AAEC in the relevant market in India and therefore do not ‘normally’ require pre-notification to the CCI. These categories are as follows:

• Direct or indirect acquisitions entitling the acquirer to hold less than 25 per cent of the shares or voting rights of a target company (including through shareholders’ agreements), solely for investment purposes or in the ordinary course of business, not leading to the acquisition of control.⁵(The word ‘entitle’ implies that options and convertible instruments would be notifiable. The decisions of the CCI, so far, do not provide much guidance on whether the grant of an option or a convertible instrument, or its exercise, or both, would require notification. Further, it is not clear whether in the absence of control-type rights, the appointment of an investor-director on the board of the target may be seen as being outside the ordinary course of business or not for investment purposes only.)
• An acquisition of additional shares or voting rights of an enterprise by the acquirer or its group, not resulting in gross acquisition of more than 5 per cent of the shares or voting rights of such enterprise in a financial year, where the acquirer or its group, prior to the acquisition, already holds 25 per cent or more of the shares or voting rights of the enterprise, but does not hold 50 per cent or more of the shares or voting rights of the enterprise, either prior to or after such acquisition. This exemption is not available if the acquisition results in the acquisition of sole or joint control of such enterprise by the acquirer or the group.
• Further acquisition of shares or voting rights by an acquirer who already holds 50 per cent or more of the shares or voting rights, except where the transaction results in a transfer from joint control to sole control.
• Acquisition of assets not directly related to the business of the acquirer or made solely as an investment or in the ordinary course of business, not leading to control of the target enterprise, except where the assets represent substantial business operations in a particular location or for a particular product or service of the target enterprise, irrespective of whether or not such assets are organised as a separate legal entity.
• Intra-group reorganisations, covering:
  • an acquisition of shares or voting rights or assets by one person or enterprise of another person or enterprise within the same group, except in cases where the acquired enterprise is jointly controlled by enterprises that are not part of the same group; and
  • a merger or amalgamation of two enterprises where one of the enterprises has more than 50 per cent of the shares or voting rights of the other enterprise, and/or a merger or amalgamation of enterprises in which more than 50 per cent of the shares or voting rights in each of such enterprises are held by enterprise(s) within the same group. This exemption is not available if the transaction results in transfer from joint control to sole control.
• Acquisition of stock-in-trade, raw materials, stores and spares, trade receivables and other similar current assets in the ordinary course of business.
• Acquisition of shares or voting rights pursuant to a buy-back or a bonus issue or a stock split or consolidation of face value of shares or subscription to rights issue, not leading to an acquisition of control.
• Amended or renewed tender offer where a notice to the CCI has been filed by the party making such an offer.
• Acquisition of shares or voting rights by a person acting as a securities underwriter or a registered stockbroker (on behalf of its clients), in the ordinary course of its business and in the process of underwriting or stockbroking.
• A combination taking place entirely outside India with insignificant local nexus and effect on markets in India.

As a general matter, section 32 of the Competition Act empowers the CCI to inquire into combinations that take place outside India or where a party to a combination is outside India, if such combination has or is likely to have an AAEC in India. However, the Regulations have sought to provide this exemption for wholly offshore transactions. Having said that, the approach taken by the CCI suggests that this exemption may be of very limited application.

While these ordinarily exempt categories provided much-needed relief from the requirement to file transactions unlikely to cause an AAEC, it is important to remember that these are not absolute exemptions. If in the parties’ or the CCI’s assessment the transaction is one that – despite qualifying under one of these categories – causes or is likely to cause an AAEC, then the parties would be expected to notify it. Accordingly, a qualitative competitive assessment may need to be made.

Meaning of ‘control’

Until recently it could be said that India did not have a strict ‘change in control’-based test for determining which transactions are combinations and hence notifiable to the CCI. The term ‘control’ in section 5 of the Competition Act has been defined to include controlling the affairs or management of one or more enterprises or group, either jointly or singly. The CCI, in its decisional practice, has clarified that the ‘ability to exercise decisive influence over the management or affairs’ of another enterprise (including its division(s)), is tantamount to ‘control’ over such enterprise, whether such influence is being exercised by way of majority shareholding, veto rights (attached to minority shareholding) or contractual covenants.

While control must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, it seems that the CCI is taking an expansive view, in that the ability to veto any strategic commercial operation, such as veto rights over the annual business plan, annual budget, annual operating plan, plans to enter new lines of business or locations, the appointment and compensation of senior management personnel, with or without shareholding, could be considered enough to confer sole or joint control. It is not yet clear from the CCI’s decisional practice how it would review the acquisition of a qualitative difference in control.

Due to this interpretation, the distinction between genuine minority protection rights and negative control has become blurred. As a result, many pure financial investment and private equity transactions involving acquisitions of entitlements to less than 25 per cent shareholdings in companies may now become subject to review by the CCI.

Treatment of joint ventures

The formation of a joint venture is not specifically covered by section 5 of the Competition Act, as it only covers the acquisition of an ‘enterprise’, mergers and amalgamations. As the definition of ‘enterprise’ under the Competition Act covers a going concern which is undertaking or has undertaken business, a purely ‘greenfield’ joint venture is unlikely to be considered as an ‘enterprise’, and would not fall within section 5. Moreover, in most cases, purely ‘greenfield’ joint ventures are unlikely to meet the thresholds under the target exemption.

By contrast, to the extent that the jurisdictional thresholds are met, the establishment of a ‘brownfield’ joint venture (ie, where parents are contributing their existing assets or businesses to the joint venture) would be notifiable, as it would relate to the acquisition of an ‘enterprise’ under section 5 of the Competition Act. Further, as discussed above, while calculating thresholds in relation to such a joint venture, the assets and turnover of the parents are also likely to be considered.

Currently, there is no clear guidance from the CCI in relation to the treatment of joint ventures or the attributes it would consider in determining if a transaction is greenfield or brownfield; or, for that matter, whether it would treat full-function joint ventures differently from non-full-function joint ventures.

Interlinked transactions

The CCI held in the Vedanta restructuring case that, where a proposed combination comprises a series of interlinked and/or interdependent transactions, some of which may be ordinarily exempt and others notifiable, a single composite filing including the exempt transactions must be made by the parties.

Merger filing and review process

Timing of filing

The Competition Act prescribes that the notifying party (or parties) must file a notification with the CCI within 30 calendar days of either:

• the final approval of the proposal of merger or amalgamation by the board of directors of the enterprises concerned; or
• the execution of any agreement or other document for acquisition of shares, voting rights, assets or control.

The Regulations clarify that ‘other document’ shall mean any binding document, by whatever name it is called, conveying an agreement/decision to acquire control, shares, voting rights or assets.

The trigger event/document(s) must be of sufficient finality. Accordingly, interim arrangements, such as memoranda of understanding (even if they are binding on the parties), which are terminable and/or do not finally determine the exact scope of the proposed combination, will not be accepted as a trigger for filing by the CCI.

Failure to file

The CCI observes the requirement to file within the 30-day period quite strictly, although the Regulations allow for the CCI to accept a belated notice, at their discretion.

If the parties fail to notify a notifiable combination within 30 days from the trigger event, or at all, the CCI has the power to impose a penalty of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover or value of assets, whichever is higher, of the proposed combination. In addition, in the event the CCI believes the transaction will have, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India, the transaction will be treated as void, and all actions taken in pursuance of the void transaction shall also be void. In such a case, the CCI also has the power to unscramble the transaction, though this has not happened to date.

Penalties have been imposed only after the first year of operation of the merger control provisions. The CCI initially imposed a ‘relatively nominal’ penalty of 5 million rupees for a delayed filing where the parties argued that the reason for the delay in filing was incorrect legal advice. In Titan International Inc/Titan Europe PLC, the parties sought to justify a lengthy delay in filing on the grounds that the transaction was ‘foreign to foreign’, they were not aware of the filing requirement, the delay was unintentional and there was no bad faith. However, the CCI pointed to the 147-day delay and the fact that the combination had been completed by the time the filing had been made. The CCI could have imposed a maximum penalty of 1.45 billion rupees. However, since the transaction was a foreign-to-foreign acquisition, the parties were based outside India and, notwithstanding the delay, they had voluntarily filed the notification, the CCI accepted these as mitigating factors and imposed a lower penalty of 10 million rupees. In Temasek/DBSH, in imposing a penalty of 5 million rupees the CCI noted that the failure to file on time was extremely serious and it did not matter that the underlying transaction (on the basis of which the CCI’s jurisdiction arose) was itself called off.

Responsibility to file

In case of an acquisition or acquiring of control of an enterprise, the acquirer is required to file the notice. In case of a merger or an amalgamation, all the parties to the combination are jointly required to file the notice.

Form of notifications

The Regulations prescribe three forms for filing a merger notification. All notifications are ordinarily required to be filed in Form I (that is, the short form). Most combinations notified to the CCI so far have been made in Form I only. Form I is accompanied by a fee of 1 million rupees.

The parties, however, remain free to file the merger notification on Form II (ie, the long form) based on their own self-assessment of the competitive overlaps and Form II is ‘recommended’ to be filed for transactions where:

• the parties to the combination are competitors and have a combined market share in the same market exceeding 15 per cent; or
• the parties to the combination are active in vertically linked markets and the combined or individual market share in any of these markets is greater than 25 per cent.

Form II requires extremely detailed information – far more than that required by the (long-form) Form CO under the EU Merger Regulation or a ‘second request’ pursuant to the US Hart-Scott-Rodino Act – and is to be accompanied by a filing fee of 4 million rupees.

In cases where parties have filed a Form I, and if the CCI believes that it requires information in Form II, it may require parties to file the notification in Form II. The Regulations clarify that, in such a case, the clock will restart once Form II is filed; this can severely impact deal timelines. Accordingly, the decision of which notification form to file needs to be taken carefully. Further, in cases where there is a material change to the transaction or the parties while the review is under way, which significantly changes the CCI’s determination of whether there is an AAEC, the CCI can and in fact has rejected a notification and asked the parties to re-file within 30 days (with the timetable starting afresh).

In cases of an acquisition, share subscription or financing facility entered into by a public financial institution, registered foreign institutional investor, bank or registered venture capital fund, under a covenant in a loan agreement or an investment agreement, the acquirer is required to inform the CCI of the acquisition in Form III within seven days of completion. There are no filing fees associated with filing Form III.

Pre-notification consultations

It is possible to have oral, informal, binding pre-notification consultations with the CCI, which are limited largely to the procedural aspects of filing a notification with the CCI. The CCI does not offer guidance on jurisdictional or substantive issues during pre-notification discussions.

Phase I review

On receipt of a notification, the CCI is required to form a prima facie opinion on whether the combination causes or is likely to cause an AAEC within the relevant market in India within a period of 30 calendar days, referred to as the Phase I review process. There is no deemed approval at the end of this 30-day period. If the CCI requests the parties for additional information, it stops the clock until the additional information is provided. The CCI has been known to ask for very detailed information in several cases where Form I has been filed, and often this information is of the nature that is usually required to be submitted in Form II. In practical terms, due to the stop of the clock, the review period has exceeded 30 calendar days in certain cases and transactions are taking, on average, between 50 and 80 calendar days to clear. However, almost all combinations notified to the CCI to date have been cleared unconditionally in Phase I of the review process.

The Regulations also allow the parties to a combination to propose ‘modifications’ to the combination up-front in Phase I in order to satisfy the CCI that the combination will not cause an AAEC in the relevant market in India. In such a scenario, the CCI will have an additional period of up to 15 calendar days to form its prima facie opinion. Since the merger control regime came into effect, parties have offered modifications only in three cases (reduction in the period of non-compete obligation and submission of a competition compliance report in respect of certain laws and contracts), which were accepted and the transactions were cleared in Phase I.

Phase II investigation

At the end of the Phase I review period, if the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that a combination causes or is likely to cause an AAEC, a detailed investigation will follow and the standstill obligation will continue until a final decision is reached by the CCI or a review period of 210 calendar days has passed. This is Phase II of the investigation process. The proposed amendment to the Competition Act contemplates reducing the overall review period from 210 to 180 calendar days.⁶

During Phase II of the investigation process, the CCI will ask the parties to explain, within 30 days, why an in-depth investigation in respect of the combination should not be conducted. The CCI may then choose to direct the DG to investigate the combination or do so on its own. Following the receipt of the response of the parties or the DG’s report (whichever is later), the CCI directs the parties to publish the details of the combination in four national dailies (including at least two business dailies) and on the respective parties’ websites, inviting any person or member of public who is likely to be affected by the combination to file written objections within 15 working days from the date of publication. Thereafter, the CCI may call for additional information from the parties within 15 working days of the completion of this period. After receipt of the additional information, the CCI has 45 working days to clear or prohibit the transaction or to propose modifications.

During the course of the Phase II investigation, if the CCI is of the opinion that the combination has or is likely to have an AAEC, but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification(s) to the combination, it may propose appropriate modification(s) to address such concerns.

Substantive review

While determining whether a particular transaction has an impact on competition, the CCI looks at the various factors listed under section 20(4) of the Competition Act.

The CCI will consider the individual and combined market shares of the parties to the combination as a rough guide to establish whether they have the ability to exercise market power in the relevant market. The higher the individual and combined market shares of the parties, the more likely it is that the combination can cause an AAEC. The CCI will also consider the existence of barriers to entry, such as sunk costs, regulations and intellectual property rights protection, and whether a combination of two enterprises may result in them being able to increase prices or profit margins significantly and sustainably without being adequately constrained by competitors, customers or suppliers. The CCI shall also be concerned with combinations which result in competition in the relevant market decreasing appreciably post-combination.

To assess the appreciability of any adverse effect, section 20(4) allows the CCI to consider the benefits of the combination as well. There have been no cases decided by the CCI so far that discuss such efficiencies in any detail. In addition, parties may also be able to demonstrate competitiveness post-combination by ensuring open and non-discriminatory access is offered to third parties, especially where essential facilities are involved.⁷ In addition, the CCI can and has (in Nestlé/Pfizer) looked into the possibility of loss of potential competition by removal of an effective potential competitor from the market. While in this case the CCI found no concerns in relation to potential competition, the buying out of a potentially viable competitor that planned to enter into a market could be a reason for finding that a combination causes or is likely to cause an AAEC.

The CCI has not defined a specific product or geographic ‘market’ when assessing the potential impact of proposed combinations where the transaction is unlikely to impact competition in any candidate market. Since the CCI is looking to determine whether the combination has an AAEC in India, it has examined the impact of most transactions in India, while leaving the potential geographic market definition open.

Other practical aspects of merger control in India

Filing formalities

The combination registry officials at the CCI have a formalistic approach in terms of filing formalities, and each filing is checked extensively before being accepted. The CCI has adopted a fairly narrow position in respect of the persons authorised to verify the notification, and only allows a director (on the board of directors) or the company secretary to sign, after due authorisation by the board of directors. It is also necessary to provide the authorisation documents for such signatory, specifically in relation to regulatory filings connected with the proposed transaction. Particular care also needs to be taken in case of filings by non-Indian entities, due to notarisation and legalisation (apostille) requirements. Absence of such documents or failure to follow such requirements could lead to a filing being not accepted by the CCI.

Confidentiality

The CCI allows requests for confidentiality by parties, when these requests are specifically made in writing along with the notification form. The CCI, however, requires that the parties must submit detailed reasons and justifications in support of their confidentiality claims. Once accepted, the CCI will not publish information for which the parties have claimed confidentiality, without first obtaining the permission of the parties. As a general matter, the CCI will grant confidentiality for three years.

Conclusion

Since the enforcement of the merger control regime in June 2011, the CCI has been commendably swift in granting approvals, thus allaying concerns about the timing and the adverse impact that the clearance process may have on the merger and acquisition activity. Additionally, the CCI has been quick and responsive to the concerns raised by various stakeholders by bringing in amendments to the Regulations which clarify certain aspects of the scope of the CCI’s review process.

However, the notification process involves a lot of red tape and the information requirements can be onerous. The notification form requires parties to provide a large amount of data, and the CCI frequently requests additional information, which often has little bearing on the competition assessment to be made.

It is not always clear from the CCI’s orders why it considers a given transaction to be notifiable. Greater clarity upfront would assist parties in knowing whether or not they need to notify, and could assist in the process of economic development, including the current government’s policy of encouraging foreign investment. Even though it may be premature to issue comprehensive guidance akin to the EU Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice, some published guidance would be welcome in areas such as acquiring control (including negative control), foreign-to-foreign mergers, joint ventures and the calculation of turnover.

Finally, there could be more clarity in relation to the substantive review of transactions. Although the Competition Act lists the various factors to be considered in determining any impact on competition, the thinking of the CCI is usually not spelled out in its orders. While its position may become clearer in time – especially where there have been Phase II investigations – it would help notifying parties even now to have more detailed guidance on the approach the CCI takes to making its competition assessment.

Notes

1. The government of India may revise these thresholds on the basis of changes in the wholesale price index or exchange rate fluctuations.
2. Under the Competition Act, as modified by the Government of India Notification dated 4 March 2011 for the purposes of merger control assessment, ‘group’ is defined to mean two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are in a position to:
   
   exercise 50 per cent or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise; or
   appoint more than 50 per cent of the members of the board of directors in the other enterprise; or
   control the management or affairs of the other enterprise.
3. http://164.100.24.219/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/asintroduced/136_2012_ENG_LS.pdf.
4. An enterprise has been defined in section 2(h) of the Competition Act as:
   
   ...a person or a department of the Government, who or which is, or has been, engaged in any activity, relating to the production, storage, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of articles or goods, or the provision of services, of any kind, or in investment, or in the business of acquiring, holding, underwriting or dealing with shares, debentures or other securities of any other body corporate, either directly or through one or more of its units or divisions or subsidiaries, whether such unit or division or subsidiary is located at the same place where the enterprise is located or at a different place or at different places, but does not include any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with atomic energy, currency, defence and space.
   
   Therefore, in assessing the requirement of notifiability of an acquisition of an ‘enterprise’, the presence of a division, unit or subsidiary in India will also have to be considered.
5. While the Amendment Regulations have increased this threshold from 15 per cent to 25 per cent, bringing it in line with the SEBI Takeover Regulations, the CCI now considers instruments that entitle the acquirer to hold 25 per cent or more at a future date, at the time of their issuance, in assessing the 25 per cent threshold.
6. http://164.100.24.219/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/asintroduced/136_2012_ENG_LS.pdf.
7. GSPC Distribution Networks/Gujarat Gas Company (C-2012/12/88).