India: Cartels

In summary

This chapter discusses recent Competition Commission of India (CCI) enforcement cases and its advocacy efforts with respect to cartels.

Discussion points

• CCI’s approach in recent cartel decisions
• CCI’s proactive engagement in undertaking various advocacy initiatives with respect to bid-rigging and public procurement
• CCI recognising changing market conditions due to covid-19

Referenced in this article

• The Competition Act 2002 (the Competition Act)
• The Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations 2009 (the Lesser Penalty Regulations)

The Competition Act regulates anticompetitive conduct in India. The CCI is the statutory authority in charge of competition law enforcement.^[1] The CCI is aided by its investigative arm, the Office of the Director General (DG), in achieving the objectives of the Competition Act, including preventing practices causing an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC), promoting and sustaining competition in markets, protecting the interests of consumers and ensuring freedom of trade.

The Competition Act regulates^[2] three types of conduct:

• anticompetitive agreements, including cartels;^[3]
• abuse of dominant position;^[4] and
• combinations (mergers, acquisitions and amalgamations).^[5]

More specifically, section 3 of the Competition Act prohibits anticompetitive agreements that cause or are likely to cause an AAEC in India. Anticompetitive agreements include agreements between or among competitors (ie, horizontal agreements, including cartels)^[6] and agreements between enterprises or persons at different stages or levels of the production chain (ie, vertical agreements).^[7]

As a first step in establishing the existence of a cartel, the CCI must show that competitors had entered into an agreement to fix prices, limit or control supply, production, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services, share or allocate markets or rig bids. The Competition Act defines ‘agreement’ widely. The CCI has also clarified (in its decisional practice) that the existence of an anti-­competitive agreement can be inferred from a number of ‘coincidences’ and ‘indicia’.^[8] The CCI and the DG also have wide powers to collect evidence, including the power to search and seize documents, and to collect evidence through dawn raids, to establish the existence of a cartel.^[9]

Once a horizontal agreement is found to exist,^[10] it is presumed to cause an AAEC unless the agreement relates to an efficiency-enhancing joint venture.^[11] This presumption is rebuttable.^[12] However, the CCI’s decisional practice indicates that this burden is onerous.

A violation of section 3(3) of the Competition Act may not arise if two or more entities are part of the same group and therefore, the companies are able to demonstrate that they are a Single Economic Entity (SEE) with common economic objectives. According to the well-recognised SEE principle, where two (or more) entities, part of the same group,^[13] are able to adequately demonstrate that they share common economic incentives^[14] and are under the common day-to-day control of either each other or a third common controlling enterprise, such entities cannot be said to compete with one another.^[15] However, in the Delhi Jal Board^[16] decision, the CCI rejected the applicability of the SEE doctrine, despite the fact that the related entities, Grasim Industries Limited and Aditya Birla Chemicals (India) Limited, both belonged to the Aditya Birla Group. The CCI drew a distinction on facts, holding that both parties had consciously decided to represent themselves as independent decision-making centres while participating in tenders floated by the Delhi Jal Board. This CCI order is currently under appeal before the NCLAT. More recently, CCI did not find three ‘related’ parties under the Companies Act 2013 with commonalities, inter se linkages, common directors but bidding separately to be guilty of bid rigging in the absence of evidence to demonstrate any manipulation of bids.^[17]

Leniency in India: a shot in the arm

The CCI’s leniency programme seeks to encourage cartel participants who admit to being involved in conduct that could result in contravention of the Competition Act to break rank and provide information against their fellow cartel members under the Lesser Penalty Regulations. As per the Competition Act, any member of a cartel (enterprise or individual) can file a leniency application with the CCI at any time prior to the DG submitting its investigation report to the CCI, seeking a reduction in penalty in exchange for ‘full, true and vital disclosure’ of information and evidence of substantial value (eg, regarding the existence of the cartel, its members and duration). The CCI is empowered to grant a reduction in penalty of up to 100 per cent to the first leniency applicant, up to 50 per cent to the second leniency applicant, and up to 30 per cent to any subsequent leniency applicant if the applicant provides additional valuable information that was previously unknown to the CCI. Similar to other mature jurisdictions, the benefit of CCI’s leniency programme is only available for cartel violations and does not extend to abuse of dominance and vertical restraint violations.

In January 2017, the CCI issued its first order under the leniency regime in a case involving bid-rigging for tenders relating to the supply of fans to the Indian Railways (Brushless DC Fans).^[18] The CCI granted the leniency applicant a reduction in penalty of up to 75 per cent as:

• it was the first and only participant to accept the existence of a cartel;
• it was the first and only participant to submit adequate evidence to the CCI, hence revealing the modus operandi of the cartel; and
• it did so despite the application being made after the initiation of the investigation, and the CCI and DG already being in possession of some evidence against the cartel participants.

Shortly after this decision, the CCI amended the Lesser Penalty Regulations to streamline and strengthen its leniency programme (the Amendment).^[19] The Amendment expanded the scope of the Lesser Penalty Regulations by:

• allowing individuals to approach the CCI with evidence on collusion;
• abolishing the earlier upper limit on the number of leniency applicants who could benefit from the penalty waiver (ie, three);
• allowing the DG to disclose confidential information from a leniency application to the other members of the cartel for the purpose of investigation (subject to approval by the leniency applicant or, where the applicant has not agreed to such disclosure, the CCI); and
• requiring the leniency applicant to furnish an estimate of the volume of affected business in India.

The leniency regime appears to have been a success, given that the CCI has investigated and passed a number of orders pursuant to leniency applications. Further, the CCI decisions under the leniency regime provide additional clarity on how the CCI determines reduction of penalty. For instance, in a case involving bid rigging between two broadcasting companies, Globecast and Essel Shyam Communications Ltd (ESCL), the CCI found that the parties had contravened section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act by exchanging sensitive information related to bids for broadcasting of various sporting events such as cricket, Formula One and hockey. Importantly, the CCI granted a 100 per cent reduction in penalty to Globecast for submitting evidence that enabled the CCI to form a prima facie opinion regarding the existence of the cartel, including email correspondence in relation to the submission of bids in a concerted manner, sharing sensitive price information and a forensic report containing mirror images of confiscated laptops and mobiles. While ESCL also furnished certain additional information to the CCI in its leniency application, it was granted only a 30 per cent reduction in penalty as its application was received after the initiation of the investigation.

The CCI has granted a reduction in penalty even in cases where it already had some evidence regarding the existence of a cartel where the additional information or evidence submitted by the leniency applicant provided ‘significant value addition’ regarding the modus operandi of the cartel.^[20] The CCI granted 100 per cent immunity to Panasonic in three cases involving cartel conduct in the dry cell batteries market in India (the Batteries case).

In the first case,^[21] the CCI found the evidence provided by Panasonic in its leniency application to be crucial in identifying the names, locations and email accounts of key persons involved in the cartel. This information enabled the CCI to conduct a dawn raid at the premises of three alleged cartel participants, where it found incriminating evidence regarding the existence of the cartel. The CCI granted a 30 per cent reduction in penalty to Eveready for providing evidence indicating the involvement of Geep and the Association of Indian Dry Cell Manufacturers in the cartel. Additionally, the CCI granted a 20 per cent reduction on the penalty imposed on the third cartel participant for cooperating and admitting its involvement in the cartel. The CCI also penalised the individuals who played an active role in aiding the cartel, granting each of them a penalty reduction proportionate to that granted to their respective companies.

In the second case,^[22] the CCI granted 100 per cent immunity to Panasonic as the evidence provided by Panasonic enabled the CCI to order an investigation and establish a contravention of section 3(3) of the Competition Act. Notably, the CCI considers, inter alia, the evidentiary value of the contents of the leniency applications while determining penalty.

In another decision under the leniency regime concerning the electric power steering market,^[23] the CCI granted a 100 per cent reduction in penalty to NSK Limited Japan and its Indian subsidiary, Rane NSK Steering Systems Ltd as well its individual employees, for being the first to approach the CCI and providing complete evidence. The CCI further reduced the penalty of the second applicant for leniency, JTEKT Corporation, Japan (JTEKT), and its Indian subsidiary, JTEKT Sona Automotive India Ltd, including its individual employees, by 50 per cent for providing significant value addition.

Over the past year, the CCI has passed nine orders under section 27 of the Competition Act. Out of these, four cases^[24] involved successful leniency applications,^[25] and the CCI did not impose any monetary penalty in two cases of the four.^[26] In another, the CCI, while imposing a symbolic penalty on other parties, granted a full reduction to the leniency applicant.^[27] In In Re Alleged Anti-competitive conduct in Beer Market in India (Beer Cartel case), ^[28] the CCI granted a 100 per cent reduction in penalty to subsidiaries of Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (Crown Beers India Private Limited and SABMiller India Limited), for being the first to approach the CCI as well, full, continuous, and expeditious cooperation, enabling the CCI to establish contravention. The CCI also granted a 40 per cent reduction in penalty to United Breweries Limited, for being the second leniency applicant to approach the CCI and providing significant value addition.^[29]

Recent decisions have also clarified that the CCI will review effects in India when the parties involved and the information exchange is outside India. For instance, the CCI decided to close a case based on a leniency application regarding a cartel between suppliers of automotive components for supply of anti-vibration rubber products and automotive hoses. The grounds to close the case were that the involved companies did not sell the cartelised products in India, and the information exchange took place prior to the enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Competition Act.^[30]

Developments relating to bid-rigging and price-fixing

Bid-rigging refers to agreements between competitors or enterprises engaged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services that have the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding.^[31] Bid-rigging is prohibited under the Competition Act and is presumed to cause AAEC.^[32] In fact, section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act is applicable to all existing and prospective bidders with respect to any tender, regardless of whether they were engaged in the business of manufacture or sale of the purported infringing product at the time of bidding.^[33] However, the allegation of an agreement to rig bids cannot be sustained in the absence of any evidence of collusion among participating bidders and non-participating companies, or that participating bidders had prior knowledge regarding non-participation of other companies.^[34]

The CCI has been proactive in examining bid-rigging cases, especially those involving public procurement. This is evident from the fact that the CCI has initiated investigations into potential bid-rigging on its own volition in multiple instances.^[35] The CCI may rely on smoking-gun or circumstantial evidence to establish bid-rigging, as direct evidence of bid-rigging is not always easily traceable. For instance, in concluding the existence of bid-rigging with respect to the operation and management of solid waste in Pune,^[36] the CCI relied on the existence of proxy bidders, as well as technical and price bids that were scanned and uploaded from the same IP address. The circumstantial evidence that the CCI has relied on in its past decisional practice include:

• the quoting of unusually higher rates than previous tenders;^[37]
• a heightened frequency of calls and SMSs exchanged between bidders prior to the bid;^[38]
• the exchange of sensitive information prior to the bid;^[39]
• common mistakes in tender forms such as typographical errors;^[40]
• a common pattern in the bidders’ price increment despite different costs of production, taxes and so on;^[41]
• consecutive serial numbers for demand drafts;^[42]
• the quoting of identical freight charges;
• the total quantity tendered matching the total quantity collectively bid for by the bidders;^[43] and
• similarity in documentation submitted for the bids along with call detail records, screenshots of messages, etc.^[44]

Further, the CCI dismissed a complaint alleging bid-rigging by bidders circulating price information related to previous successful bids via a WhatsApp group.^[45] The CCI held that the mere circulation of price information, otherwise publicly available, cannot per se be considered exchange of price sensitive information unless:

• the circulation affects free play of the market forces with respect to prices; and
• there is meeting of minds among the parties being investigated to achieve such an effect. However, in the Beer Cartel case, the CCI noted that the mere exchange of commercially sensitive pricing information compromised the integrity of the bidding process, therefore likely stifling competition.^[46]

Price-fixing refers to an agreement between market participants to collectively raise, lower or stabilise prices to control supply and demand. Price-fixing is prohibited under the Competition Act and is presumed to cause AAEC. Similar to bid-rigging, the allegation of an agreement to fix prices among competitors cannot be sustained in the absence of any evidence of collusion among them.

In a decision involving fabric companies, the CCI observed that price parallelism between the fabric companies in their bid quotations did not in itself indicate collusion. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence indicating meeting of minds or an agreement, the CCI closed the complaint.^[47] Likewise, in a price-fixing allegation against five domestic airlines, the CCI noted that in the absence of any element of information exchange among the airlines, mere parallel conduct could not be sufficient to establish collusion.^[48] The CCI has dismissed several similar complaints due to lack of evidence submitted by the complainants.^[49] Notably, the CCI examined allegations of collusion by way of algorithms deployed by various airlines. The CCI dismissed allegations of cartelisation, noting that various airlines used different software for pricing tickets, algorithms differed since the inputs provided varied across airlines and the final call was taken by the airlines’ respective analysts.^[50] This is consistent with the CCI’s past decisions where it noted that while price parallelism by itself is insufficient to establish collusion, unexplained price parallelism and plus factors (as identified above) together are helpful in establishing collusive and concerted arrangements.^[51]

Requirement to show implementation of an anticompetitive agreement: a shifting trend

In a previous decision under the leniency regime, the CCI had clarified that it does not consider mere exchange of commercially sensitive information between competitors to be sufficient to establish contravention of section 3 of the Competition Act, in the absence of an agreement and its implementation.^[52] That said, in a recent decision involving five bearings manufacturers,^[53] the CCI adopted a different approach. The CCI found that five bearing manufacturers met to decide prices quoted to Original Equipment Manufacturers in the automotive bearings market. However, there was no evidence of any implementation of the exchanged information. The fact that the bearings manufacturers met to decide prices was considered sufficient by the CCI to establish a cartel violation. The CCI’s view was that the information exchange compromised the parties’ independence to quote rates that they would have quoted absent the coordination. While the CCI acknowledged that it was possible for the cartel not to have led to a collusive outcome, it did not consider ‘implementation’ of the arrangement to be necessary to establish the contravention. Therefore, the decision clarifies that the establishment of an anticompetitive agreement (without its implementation) would be sufficient to establish a cartel contravention under the Competition Act. Recently, the CCI took a similar approach In In Re Anti-competitive conduct in the paper manufacturing industry (Paper Cartel case), noting that where competitors meet and discuss prices, such conduct, at the minimum, is likely to cause an AAEC.^[54] Similarly, in the Beer Cartel case, the CCI noted that implementation of an anticompetitive agreement is not a sine qua non for establishing contravention.^[55]

Role of the Informant

The Supreme Court has settled the legal position on ‘locus standi’ of the Informant under the Competition Act in Samir Agrawal v Competition Commission of India and Ors,^[56] and held that anyone (even with no interest in the alleged conduct) can approach the CCI and from thereon to NCLAT in public interest to serve the purpose of the Competition Act. Following this, CCI has also clarified that the informant cannot consider itself as dominus litis (the master of the proceedings or the necessary party) in the in rem proceedings before the CCI.^[57]

Penalties

Section 27 of the Competition Act empowers the CCI to impose penalties in cartel cases using one of the following metrics:

• up to 10 per cent of the average turnover of the enterprise for the preceding three financial years; or
• up to the higher of three times the profits or 10 per cent of the turnover for each year of the continuation of the cartel.

While the CCI has not issued any guidance on the calculation of penalties, the Supreme Court’s decision in Excel Crop Care v. CCI and Ors^[58] (Excel Crop Care) has provided some clarity on the turnover to be considered while imposing a penalty. The Supreme Court clarified that there has to be a link between the damage caused and the profits that accrue from the cartel activity (ie, imposition of penalties under section 27(b) of the Competition Act should be based on the relevant turnover of the company). The Supreme Court defined relevant turnover as the ‘entity’s turnover pertaining to products and services that have been affected by such contravention’ and has set out guidelines on the steps to be followed to determine relevant turnover:

• looking at the entity’s audited financial statements or any other reliable records reflecting the entity’s relevant turnover, or estimating the relevant turnover based on available information;
• considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case to calculate the relevant turnover as and when it is seized with such matter; and
• once an initial determination of relevant turnover is done, calculating the appropriate percentage after considering the mitigating factors, such as:
• the nature, gravity and extent of the contravention;
• the role played by the infringer (ie, ringleader or follower);
• the duration of participation;
• the intensity of participation;
• loss or damage suffered as a result of such contravention;
• market circumstances in which the contravention took place;
• the nature of the product;
• the market share of the entity;
• barriers to entry in the market;
• the nature of involvement of the company;
• the bona fides of the company; and
• the profit derived from the contravention.

The CCI has levied lesser penalties on enterprises on account of their not being in a position to influence and dictate the terms of the anticompetitive agreement or due to having insignificant market shares in the relevant market in contrast with other competitors.^[59] In the absence of any guidance on penalties, such decisions are likely to pave the path in understanding the CCI’s rationale in computation of penalties. For instance, in Matrimony.com v. Google LLC and Ors,^[60] the CCI applied the criteria of ‘relevant turnover’ from the decision in Excel Crop Care and imposed the penalty on Google on its relevant turnover generated in India, and not its global turnover.

One such decision was where the guidelines provided by Excel Crop Care were discussed in a writ before the High Court of Delhi (DHC) challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of section 27 of the Competition Act. The challenge was on the ground that section 27 of the Competition Act lacked guidelines with respect to the scale of penalty that is to be imposed in any given case. This omission renders it vague and clothes the CCI with uncanalised power. The DHC, while rejecting the challenge to the constitutionality of section 27, held that the Supreme Court in Excel Corp Care has already indicated the path and course that guides the CCI, as well as the relevant considerations to be kept in mind, while imposing a penalty. The DHC further held that it is in the CCI’s domain to decide whether and to what extent to impose a penalty and it is bound to exercise this discretion, bearing in mind the factors (deemed not exhaustive) in Excel Corp Care, as well as the general objects and purposes of the Competition Act. Following these observations, the DHC directed that in all cases, at the final hearing stage, the parties have to address arguments taking into consideration the factors indicated by the Supreme Court in Excel Crop Care and any other relevant factors; and make submissions on imposition of penalty and mitigating factors without prejudice to the other submissions.

The CCI has exhibited restraint in imposing penalties on the account of the covid-19 pandemic. For instance, in a contravention decision involving a cartel in the supply of composite brake blocks (CBBs) to Indian Railways,^[61] the CCI did not impose a penalty despite finding a contravention because of several reasons, including the effect of covid-19 during 2019 on the credit needs and liquidity of micro, small and medium enterprises. Other factors that the CCI considered were: the continued cooperation of the CBB manufacturers during the investigation; the fact that the CBB manufacturers confessed to the cartel arrangement, which led to an expedited inquiry; and the low turnover of most CBB manufacturers in this segment. Recently, in the Paper Cartels case, the CCI imposed only a ‘symbolic penalty’ of 5 million rupees on each of the cartelising paper manufacturers, and 2.5 million rupees on their trade association. This was done taking into account the severe impact of the pandemic on the paper business.^[62] The CCI has imposed reduced or symbolic penalties considering the severe impact of covid-19 on the market, including but not limited to small and medium-scale entities in various other cases, such as: GAIL (India) Limited v PMP Infratech Private Ltd and Anr,^[63] Railway, Kolkata v M/s Chandra Brothers and Ors^[64]; Food Corporation of India v Shivalik Agro Poly Products Ltd and Ors,^[65] and Mr Rizwanul Haq Khan, Dy Chief Material Manager, Office of the Controller of Stores, Southern Railway v Mersen (India) Pvt Ltd and Anr.^[66]

CCI imposes highest penalty to date

The CCI imposed a combined penalty of approximately 87.1 billion rupees (net of leniency reductions) in the Beer Cartel case. This penalty was levied against various alcohol manufacturers for bid rigging, price fixing and limiting of supply in the market for supply of beer, as well as purchase of second hand beer bottles, in contravention of section 3(1), read with sections 3(3)(a), 3(3)(b), 3(3)(c) and 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act. The penalty imposed on United Breweries Limited has been stayed by the NCLAT.^[67]

The penalty of approximately 63.2 billion rupees levied by the CCI in the Cement cartel case was previously the highest penalty imposed by the CCI. This penalty was levied against cement manufacturing companies for fixing cement prices and limiting and controlling the production and supply of cement in the market in contravention of section 3(1), read with sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the Competition Act.

Individual penalties

Section 48 of the Competition Act empowers the CCI to impose penalties on the officials of an infringing enterprise. Penalties can be imposed on individuals in two circumstances:

• where the individual was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company at the time of contravention of the Competition Act;^[68] and
• where an infringement occurs with the consent, connivance or negligence of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of such company.^[69]

Therefore, an official may be held liable for the anticompetitive conduct of an enterprise either on account of the position held by such an official or participation in the alleged anticompetitive conduct.^[70]

The penalty that the CCI may impose extends to up to 10 per cent of the average total income derived by the individual in the previous three financial years.^[71] However, the CCI penalises individuals who hold designations at more than one of the accused enterprises only once, and generally at the same rate where there are more than one individual guilty of a contravention under the Competition Act.^[72] Further, where the CCI grants leniency-related penalty reductions to enterprises, it also extends the same percentage of leniency to accused individuals.^[73]

Balancing the jurisdiction of the CCI and other sectoral regulators

In 2018, the Supreme Court set out the law on balancing CCI’s jurisdiction with respect to other sectoral regulators such as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) in CCI v. Bharti Airtel.^[74] Initially, Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (Jio)^[75] filed a complaint with the CCI alleging that other competing telecommunication service providers (ie, Bharti Airtel Limited, Vodafone India Limited and Idea Cellular Limited) (the incumbent operators) had agreed to deny Jio access to adequate points of interconnection.^[76] Based on the complaint, the CCI initiated an investigation into the incumbent operators’ alleged conduct.

Following the CCI’s initiation decision, one of the incumbent operators approached the Bombay High Court (BHC) challenging the CCI’s jurisdiction. The BHC concluded that the telecom sector is governed, regulated and controlled by certain special authorities, and that the CCI doesn’t have the jurisdiction to deal with interpretation or clarification of certain aspects of access to points of inter­connection, which are to be settled by the TRAI. The BHC further held that the powers of the CCI are not sufficient to deal with the technical aspects associated with the telecom sector that solely arise out of the TRAI Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the BHC’s order. According to the Supreme Court, the CCI can only exercise its jurisdiction after the TRAI determines the jurisdictional facts arising from the TRAI Act and reaches a prima facie conclusion that the incumbent operators have indulged in anticompetitive practices.

The Supreme Court’s decision was relied on by the BHC in the context of a case involving broadcasters’ conduct.^[77] The BHC considered a challenge to the CCI’s decision to initiate an investigation into certain practices of Star India Private Limited and Sony Pictures Network India Private Limited. The BHC followed the judgment in CCI v Bharti Airtel and set aside the CCI’s initiation order for lack of determination of jurisdictional facts by TRAI.

CCI’s advisory to businesses during covid-19^[78]

In the first year of covid-19, the CCI acknowledged the need for businesses to ‘join hands’ to address the technical and economic challenges caused by covid-19, such as disruptions in supply chains, rationalisation of product ranges, halting of pipeline products and future supply concerns. In this regard, the CCI had issued an advisory to businesses recognising the need of businesses (including those dealing in critical healthcare and essential commodities) to coordinate certain activities, including formation of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures.

The advisory clarified that such activities may include sharing data on stock levels, timings of operation, sharing of distribution network and infrastructure and production, R&D, transport and logistics.

However, the CCI had emphasised that the Competition Act has in-built safeguards to assess such coordinated activity; for example, its treatment of efficiency-enhancing joint ventures or factors it will consider for competition assessment (such as accrual of benefits to consumers and improvement in production or distribution and provision of goods and services). Further, the CCI clarified that it will only consider coordinated activity that is necessary and proportionate to address concerns arising from covid-19. The advisory cautions that businesses taking advantage of covid-19 to contravene the provisions of the Competition Act will not be able to claim protection from the sanctions.

In a recent address,^[79] CCI’s chair reiterated that the business advisory for covid-19 ‘enabled businesses in taking swift commercial decisions without unduly worrying about the regulatory ire’. He also noted that due to the impact of covid-19, CCI took ‘a balanced approach in its enforcement decisions focussing on faster market corrections and a nuanced view in levying penalties, particularly for MSMEs [micro, small and medium-sized enterprises] considering their financial distress’.

Conclusion

Over the past year, given the covid-19 pandemic, the CCI has shown restraint in imposing penalties, particularly on small and medium-scale companies that might have been affected by the pandemic. However, the CCI has ensured continued vigilance into cartel conduct by continuing to pass cease and desist orders and undertaking several dawn raids. It has also continued to be proactive in creating a culture of compliance by undertaking various advocacy initiatives with respect to bid-rigging and public procurement.^[80]

The CCI also published the findings of its market study on the pharmaceutical sector in India.^[81] This market study makes various suggestions to address concerns relating to collusion on trade margins, information asymmetry and the role of trade associations.

Notes