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This article presents the progress made in the past year by the National Institute for the Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (Indecopi) and the upcoming challenges of the Peruvian competition policy.
- The new Antitrust Merger Review Act
- Effects of covid-19 on the competition agency´s activities
- Advertising campaign on competition
- Dawn raids
Referenced in this article
- The National Center for Supply of Strategic Health Resources (Cenares)
- The Commission for the Defence of Free Competition of Indecopi (the Commission)
- Peruvian Health Social Security (Essalud)
- The Superintendency of Banking, Insurance and Private Pension Fund Administrators (SBS)
- Tribunal for the Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property of Indecopi (Tribunal of Indecopi)
- Supervisory Agency of Investment of Energy and Mining of Peru (Osinergmin)
Last year was an atypical year for competition agencies worldwide owing to the damage caused by the covid-19 pandemic, and Peru was no exception. The Peruvian competition agency had to redirect more resources to activities related to the health sector, for example, through the monitoring of possible anticompetitive conducts, market studies or opinions on legislative initiatives. Additionally, the agency’s activities had to be carried out remotely. At first glance, this does not appear to be insurmountable because the activities can be carried out virtually; in fact, today all files are processed electronically. However, its impact became more noticeable in the performance of dawn raids, since these are carried out physically at the company’s facilities.
If the competition agency visited those facilities during the most critical time of the pandemic, it was highly likely that it would not find any employees or any of their IT equipment, since many of the employees now work from home. Faced with this difficulty, the competition agency had to be especially creative and rely on virtual dawn raids, which require greater cooperation from the inspected parties.
Despite the difficulties, Indecopi has continued to uncover possible cases of anticompetitive behavior and has brought charges against several companies for the existence of evidence of collusion in key markets of the economy owing to their relationship with the basic family basket.
Likewise, between April and May, the Peruvian competition agency launched for the first time a mass media campaign with two clear objectives: to raise awareness in the business sector regarding the respect for the competition regulation; and to promote and advertise the Antitrust Rewards Program, which offers monetary compensation for those who can provide valuable information for the discovery of cartels.
Finally, on 14 June 2021, the Antitrust Merger Review Act became effective. This law was amended multiple times to gain approval for its entry into force. The Executive Decrees (Emergency Decree 013-2019 and Legislative Decree 1510 of 2020) that established a temporary authorisation regime were finally replaced by an Act of the Congress. Thus, through Act No. 31112 of 6 January 2021, the new permanent regime was approved, which, although it replicates most of the content of the Executive Decrees, also introduces some modifications such as the power of the competition authority to review transactions that do not exceed the thresholds. The entry into force of this Act was suspended until the issuance of a series of regulations necessary for its application. For this reason, it finally came into force on 14 June.
Prior to Act No. 31112, Indecopi was only empowered to review mergers and acquisitions in the electricity sector. Therefore, from now on, Indecopi will have all the legal tools for the defence and promotion of competition in all the markets. In fact, there is serious concern in Peru that the absence of this law in the past, could have led to greater concentration in the markets, some of which have a history of anticompetitive behaviour.
Under the merger control law in the electricity sector, Indecopi has resolved two notifications for authorisation in 2020. The first notification corresponded to the acquisition of the companies Luz del Sur S.A.A. (energy distributor) and Inland Energy S.A.C. (energy generator) by the economic group China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG). CTG already participated in the energy generation market with a hydroelectric plant and another plant under construction. The proposed transaction would allow the Chinese company to increase its participation in the energy generation market and enter the energy distribution market.
Luz del Sur is the Peruvian company responsible for the distribution and supply of electric energy in its concession area, which includes 65 districts of Lima, Huarochirí and Cañete. At the date of the notification, it was estimated to have approximately 1.17 million regulated users (residential and small business customers). In order to supply electric energy to its customers, it needs to purchase energy from generating companies, which makes it an important purchaser of energy.
In its analysis, Indecopi identified that the integration generated strong incentives for Luz del Sur to directly acquire energy from the generators part of its economic group, excluding competing generators; this analysis also considered the company’s previous behaviour.
Luz del Sur by contracting directly with the generators of its economic group without allowing the participation of competing generators would have limited competition in that market. In turn, less competition would generate less efficient contracting processes, which could be reflected in higher prices for electricity generation that would affect regulated users, considering that the electricity tariff includes the price of the energy purchase, as one of its factors.
In view of this, Indecopi authorised the transaction in March 2020, but under a condition to address the problem. The condition consisted for Luz del Sur to not be able to contract directly with the generating companies of its economic group to supply energy and attend the supply of its regulated users. Thus, if Luz del Sur needs to supply energy to its regulated users, and the generating companies of its economic group intend to sell energy to it, a bidding process or public tender must be carried out, which will have to be administered or supervised by the sector’s regulatory agency Osinergmin or by Indecopi.
The condition is intended to ensure equal participation conditions among the generating companies, and competitive prices for the acquisition of energy from Luz del Sur. It prevents Luz del Sur from excluding competing generators and thus affecting the competitive process, eliminating the potential problem identified by the transaction. In other words, the condition guarantees that the supply of energy to regulated users is carried out without affecting the conditions of competition, seeking a greater efficiency in the market reflected in a lower generation tariff and a greater welfare for regulated users. The company did not appeal Indecopi’s decision, so the condition imposed is effective to date.
The second notification was resolved in August 2020 and was filed by Interconexión Eléctrica Isa Perú S.A. (Isa Perú) for the authorisation of the acquisition of two companies in the energy transmission market. Indecopi evaluated the possible risks to the markets where Isa Perú participated directly or through its economic group (energy transmission and telecommunication services) and analysed the risks of possible horizontal and vertical restrictions. Indecopi concluded that the transaction had a low probability of generating restrictions in these markets, and therefore authorised the transaction without conditions.
The new Antitrust Merger Review Act
Few laws in Peru have had such a tortuous path as the new Antitrust Merger Review Act. The history dates back to 1997, when Peru enacted a merger control law, but inexplicably restricted to the electricity sector. Since then, Indecopi has analysed the possible effects on competition of mergers and acquisitions in the sector that exceed the legally established thresholds. In total, Indecopi has ruled on 27 notifications for authorization of mergers or acquisitions, of which three have been authorised under conditions and the rest have been approved without conditions. In any case, the authorisation has been denied.
In 2005, for the first time, Indecopi made public its intention to have a merger control law. In subsequent years, some congressmen have presented bills supporting this initiative, but the truth is that the Congress never approved the law, even though it was discussed within various parliamentary commissions and even the Plenary.
Many years later, in November 2019, the Executive Branch approved by means of an Emergency Decree the Merger Control regulation with a five-year term. The regulation was set to enter into force in August 2020, but the Executive Branch in May of that year, via Legislative Decree extended its entry into force to 1 March 2021. Some improvements were introduced with this legislative decree, such as the creation of a simplified notification proceeding, unfortunately this occasion was not used to give it a permanent character.
Before the foreseen date for the entry into force of the Executive Branch’s regulation, the Congress approved Act 31112, which was published on 6 January 2021, and established a merger control regime in charge of Indecopi, applicable to mergers and acquisitions in all economic sectors that exceed the legally established thresholds. The only exception provided for in the law operates in the banking and insurance sectors.
Although Indecopi will also be competent to know about mergers in these sectors, in those cases in which the regulatory agency SBS warns of relevant or imminent risks that compromise the soundness or stability of the financial and insurance systems, the SBS will be the only authority that will rule on the authorisation of the transaction.
Act 31112 was regulated by Supreme Decree 039-2021-PCM published on 4 March 2021. The Act essentially replicates the content of the Executive Branch decrees but introduces some changes with respect to the previous regulation. Among the most relevant modifications, is the incorporation of the value of assets as a factor for calculating the thresholds for transactions that must be notified. Previously, the only factor considered was the value of sales or annual gross income of the companies involved in the transaction. With this modification, companies whose value of sales or annual gross income or value of assets in the country exceed the aggregate threshold of US$131 million and the individual threshold of US$20 million must notify their transaction to Indecopi, provided that it meets the other legally established requirements. It is expected that the incorporation of the value of assets threshold will result in a higher number of notified transactions, as the value of assets is generally higher than the value of revenues for large companies in Peru.
Another important modification is the granting of Indecopi’s power to review ex officio transactions that do not exceed the legally established thresholds when there are reasonable indications that these transactions may generate a dominant position or affect effective competition in the relevant market.
Indecopi may initiate an ex officio review proceeding of a merger transaction up to one year after its formal closing and the Regulation of the Act has indicated that this power will be exercised in the following circumstances:
- horizontal merger transactions carried out in concentrated markets;
- horizontal merger transactions involving the acquisition of an economic agent with a small market share, but with growth potential, or of an innovative economic agent that has recently entered the market;
- horizontal merger transactions, in which the acquiring economic agent or its economic group has previously carried out merger transactions involving the acquisition of a competitor; and
- other merger transactions that have the potential to generate possible significant restrictive effects on competition.
Although the author recognises that this power to review transactions that do not exceed the thresholds exists in other jurisdictions and is a useful tool to address the problem of ‘killer and nascent acquisitions’, what is questionable is that this change was made without the reforms to the institutional design that would give Indecopi a greater autonomy, in order to avoid any attempt at political or economic interference. It is well known that mergers and acquisitions can generate the attention of politicians and government officials, especially if they involve the media or if they seek to introduce into the authority’s analysis, the protection of other types of interests unrelated to competition or consumer welfare, such as the protection of employment, industry or strategic national interests, among others.
Finally, in May 2021, Indecopi published two relevant documents to guide market agents in the notification of their transactions: the ‘Notification Forms’ and the ‘Guidelines for the Calculation of Notification Thresholds’.
The Notification Forms detail the information to be submitted by the economic agents that plan to carry out a merger transaction to be evaluated by Indecopi. Indecopi has approved two types of Notification Forms: Ordinary and Simplified.
The Simplified Notification Form provides for the submission of a smaller amount of information for those types of transactions that generally represent lower risks to competition and are defined in section 10 of the Regulation, that is, when the companies involved in the transaction do not carry out economic activities in the same market, or do not participate in the same production or value chain, or when the transaction results in one company acquiring exclusive control of another company over which it already had joint control. For all other transactions, economic agents must submit the information detailed in the Ordinary Notification Form.
The information contained in these Notification Forms will allow Indecopi to analyse the notified merger transaction.
Indecopi has foreseen the possibility that companies may be exempted from submitting certain documents, if these ar e not reasonably available, or the required information is not relevant to the specific case. In such cases, companies must submit a justified request for exemption of information with their notification for authorisation.
On the other hand, after a public consultation, Indecopi approved the ‘Guidelines for the Calculation of Notification Thresholds’, which aim to provide greater clarity to the agents on how to calculate the thresholds, by resorting to examples of various types of transactions that can serve as a guide for the agents. The Guidelines define the concept of income and sales, the way in which the value of assets should be calculated and, finally, include particular aspects to be considered in the case of financial entities, insurance companies, pension fund administrators and investment funds.
Advertising campaign on competition
In March and April of this year, Indecopi launched an advertising campaign named ‘No a la Concertación’ with two defined objectives: to raise awareness in the business sector regarding the respect for the rules of competition, and create an ethical behaviour that rejects any attempt of collusion between competitors; and to inform on the existence of the brand new antitrust rewards programme for whistle-blowers, which allows Indecopi to monetarily compensate up to approximately US$102,000 to the persons who can provide useful and revealing information about the existence of a cartel.
For this purpose, TV, radio and social media spots, posters for newspapers and magazines were elaborated, and a webpage was created: https://www.noalaconcertacion.com, which allows access to the spots and provides information on the leniency and rewards programmes and, in general, on antitrust matters. The campaign lasted five weeks.
Prior to the advertising campaign, Indecopi commissioned a specialised company to conduct a survey among first and second line executives from the commercial, sales, purchasing, business and operations areas of the 3,000 largest companies in the country. This survey that has just been made public by Indecopi will serve as a baseline to evaluate whether the advertising campaign helped to change the knowledge of the business sector on competition regulations, the leniency programme and the adoption of measures in companies to avoid being involved in anticompetitive behaviours (compliance programmes). This year, Indecopi will commission a new survey and will serve to contrast the results obtained in 2019.
Some 2019 data are particularly revealing: 73 per cent of respondents had never heard of the leniency programme. While 94 per cent recognise that price fixing with competitors is illegal, the same does not occur with other anticompetitive practices. 26 per cent were unaware that customer allocation is illegal, and 31 per cent are unaware that territorial allocation among companies to not compete in the same area is illegal.
Finally, 49 per cent of respondents indicated that their company had adopted measures to ensure compliance with the competition regulations. When asked what type of measures, the spontaneous answer was the appointment of a compliance officer, training, codes of conduct, channels for making anonymous complaints or other types of measures that are part of a compliance programme. The aforementioned result also reveals that 29 per cent stated that their companies had not adopted measures, so the survey is an indicator that Indecopi and the private sector must continue to make efforts to promote the adoption of compliance programmes in order to minimise the risks of non-compliance with the competition regulation within companies.
It is worth remembering that, in March 2020, Indecopi launched its ‘Guidelines on Antitrust Compliance Programs’, with the purpose of orientating companies on the most important elements to be taken into account when preparing their compliance programmes, so that they are effective in reducing the risks of incurring on anticompetitive behaviour.
Indecopi has prioritised its activities during the covid-19 pandemic to add more resources to the monitoring of the health sector, either to be alert to the existence of indications of possible anticompetitive behaviour or to formulate recommendations for the promotion of more competitive markets. In this regard, Indecopi conducted a market study on the medicinal oxygen market.
Peru was one of the most affected countries by the pandemic in terms of the number of people infected and the mortality rate. One of the factors that public health specialists believe influenced the high mortality rate was the shortage of medicinal oxygen for patients due to a substantial increase in demand.
Following an analysis of the market and government procurement, in October 2020, Indecopi developed several recommendations to various government agencies with the objective of improving the supply of oxygen. Fortunately, many of these recommendations have been accepted and, at the time of writing, the number of infections has decreased and the supply of oxygen has ostensibly improved.
Thus, Indecopi recommended modifying the purity level of oxygen required for oxygen purchases. Prior to the recommendation, oxygen was required to have a purity limit of 99 per cent, which constituted a barrier to the entry of new players into the market, who can generally produce medicinal oxygen safely for patients with a 93 per cent purity limit. In fact, the World Health Organization (WHO Guidelines for Safe Surgery 2009) recommends that the oxygen concentration can vary between 0.93 and 0.99. Indecopi’s recommendation was accepted by the Ministry of Health through Ministerial Resolution 918-2020-MINSA of 5 November 2020.
Additionally, it was recommended that the state centralise purchases of medicinal oxygen by aggregating demand to obtain a better purchase price. Indecopi’s analysis of the data on public purchases of oxygen was especially revealing. The price per m3 of oxygen was substantially reduced the greater the quantity demanded. For example, between January 2018 to September 2020 when the state purchased up to 50 thousand m3, the average price per m3 was S/. 9.69 (US$2.45); when purchasing between 50 thousand and 100 m3, the average price per m3 was S/. 4.53 (US$1.14); and when purchasing more than 100 thousand m3, the average price per m3 was S/. 2.48 (US$ 0.62). In other words, the price can be reduced by up to 74 per cent when demand is added.
Indecopi has verified that in the first months of 2021, oxygen purchases are being made in a centralised manner by aggregating demand. Thus, it can be seen that two central government entities (Essalud and Cenares) are the main purchasers of oxygen, as opposed to previous years when regional governments and hospitals purchased medical oxygen directly and in a diversified manner.
Finally, Indecopi recommended for facilities to be provided to companies importing medicinal oxygen, since some of them alleged difficulties in the process of obtaining permits to import the product. The Ministry of Transportation committed to provide guidance and facilities for the granting of authorisations to those who intend to import the product.
In recent years, the issuance of guidelines has occupied a particularly important place in Indecopi’s agenda to provide greater clarity to agents regarding the competition regulation, which we believe contributes to their compliance. In May 2020, Indecopi approved two particularly relevant documents: Dawn Raids Guidelines and the Informational Guidelines about anticompetitive agreements among companies in labour markets.
Dawn Raids Guidelines
Dawn raids have been, alongside the leniency programme, the most effective tools for detecting anticompetitive behaviour in recent years. The possibility of accessing company records without prior notice gives the authority the possibility of collecting evidence revealing competition infringements before the agents involved destroy them or they become inaccessible to the authority. However, owing to the intrusive nature of the dawn raids, it was also necessary for the authority to issue guidelines that would allow the inspected parties to know their rights in relation to these proceedings and, in addition, to know the authority’s powers and limits.
In this regard, the Guidelines describe the parameters for initiating these inspections, the powers of the inspectors, the rights and obligations of the companies or individuals involved in these investigations, the manner of completion of the visit and the treatment to be given to the information obtained by the authority, among others. This seeks to ensure a balance between the rights of the inspected parties and the effectiveness of Indecopi’s investigations, aimed at protecting competition in the markets, for the welfare of consumers.
An example of these limits is that the Guidelines recognise that the authority may only undertake dawn raids when there is suspicion of possible anticompetitive behaviour, so that ‘fishing expeditions’ are forbidden. Likewise, it is established that the dawn raid order must have a minimum content that allows the inspected party to know the scope of the investigation and its condition, among others:
- the identification of the company and the establishment where the dawn raid will take place;
- the identification of the inspectors in charge of the dawn raid;
- the date of the beginning of the dawn raid;
- the legal basis for the inspection as well as the documents to be obtained and evaluated;
- the duties and obligations of the inspected parties, including the sanctions and consequences for possible cases of non-compliance; and
- the basic characteristics of the conduct and the market under investigation.
Informational Guidelines about anticompetitive agreements among companies in labour markets
As is well known, the covid-19 pandemic has hit the global economy hard and affected companies everywhere, which in many cases have seen their revenues decrease. Faced with this situation, especially in the initial phase of the pandemic, companies have adopted several measures in relation to their workers: layoffs, suspensions, salary cuts, among others. In this context, Indecopi had a valid concern that salary cuts or other types of labour conditions might be the subject of discussion among companies as a result of the crisis. Indecopi was also aware that in some cases there could be ignorance of the scope of application of the competition law in labour markets.
For this reason, the ‘Informational Guidelines about anticompetitive agreements among companies in labour markets’, aims to provide information for companies, employers and human resources areas about the importance of respecting competition in the labour market and avoiding the adoption of agreements on hiring or remuneration policies that could infringe competition regulation.
The Guidelines describe the particularities of competition in labour markets and clarifies that companies not only compete to offer goods or services to consumers, but also compete to hire or retain workers. Competition generates multiple benefits for workers, such as more and better job opportunities and working conditions. Competition in the labour market can even motivate workers to perform their jobs in the best possible way, which also benefits consumers who will be able to access better services, and companies that will see their reputation and market share strengthened.
In a manner, the Guidelines cites a number of examples and cases related to certain anticompetitive agreements that substantially restrict competition in the labour market, either through the conclusion of agreements between companies to avoid hiring workers among each other or through the implementation of agreements to fix wages or other employment benefits for their employees.
Enforcement of competition regulation
School textbook case
Of the cases resolved by the competition agency in the last year, probably the most emblematic case is the price fixing in school textbook procurements. Between 2009 and 2016, four companies shared the public tenders called by the Ministry of Education for the printing of school textbooks delivered to students in kindergarten, primary and secondary education corresponding to the courses of mathematics, communications, science and environment, reading comprehension, among others, as well as the work guides of such courses intended for teachers.
The agreements were reached in secret meetings in hotels or restaurants in the city of Lima, on dates prior to the presentation of the proposals in the tenders called by the Ministry of Education In these meetings and in subsequent coordination, the winners were chosen by dividing the items offered in the public tenders. The companies that were not chosen as winners did not submit proposals or offered proposals that were destined to lose in order to simulate competition.
The case was initiated thanks to the disclosure of one of the companies that revealed the existence of the cartel and was therefore exonerated from the sanction. The remaining companies were fined a total of approximately US$6.330 million. Eight executives were fined a total of approximately US$166,000.
This case is a good example of the relevance of the leniency programme for the detection of anticompetitive behaviour and the sanctioning of the rest of the companies involved in this type of illegal agreement. Of the three sanctioned companies, one has consented to the decision and the other two have appealed before the Tribunal of Indecopi, so the case is currently being challenged in the second administrative instance.
Commercial printing services case
In May 2020, the Commission for the Defence of Free Competition of Indecopi concluded the sanctioning proceeding against two companies for having participated in a customer allocation agreement in the commercial printing services market in the country between the years 2011 and 2016. These services are generally contracted by companies in various sectors (eg, department stores or supermarkets) that advertise their products and services through catalogues, magazines, brochures, leaflets, brochures, leaflets, flyers, among others.
The agreement implied that each of the companies would maintain a specific group of clients without the other competing with better offers for those clients. The case was initiated by a whistle-blower from one of the companies. The other company agreed to sign a settlement agreement with the investigating authority, whereby it assumed its responsibility for the alleged conduct and the payment of a corrective measure (calculated on the fine that would have corresponded to it) of approximately US$2.75 million; additionally, it also committed to implement a compliance programme for three years.
Chimbote’s gasoline case
In October 2020, the Tribunal of Indecopi confirmed in second instance the sanction imposed by the Commission for the Defence of Free Competition to 21 companies for participating in an agreement to fix the sale price of diesel and gasohol of 84, 90 and 95 octanes in the city of Chimbote between 2012 and 2014. The cartel charged its customers overprices estimated at up to 7 per cent. The companies were fined a total of approximately US$2.1 million. In addition to the fines, the measure imposed by the Commission for the Defence of Free Competition was confirmed, requiring the companies to implement an Antitrust Compliance Programme for a period of three years, with the purpose of counteracting those conditions that may promote or allow the creation of new anticompetitive conducts.
The main initiated case corresponds to the indictment filed in December 2020 for an alleged case of concertation between four companies that own supermarket chains, for having fixed the sales prices of whole turkey in the country between 2009 and 2016. The alleged agreement would have been executed based on the establishment of a ‘minimum suggested retail price’ by the turkey supplying companies during the end-of-year holiday campaigns.
The supermarket chains would have allegedly agreed to eliminate competition among themselves, avoiding setting prices independently and below the ‘minimum suggested retail price’ established by the supplying companies of the product.
To achieve this alleged anticompetitive practice, the supermarket chains would have relied on the participation of the suppliers by resorting to them through claims or complaints, when any of the competitors established a price below the ‘minimum suggested retail price’. In this way, the supplier companies would have played the role of facilitators of the agreement, for allegedly having taken actions to ensure that the supermarket chains respected the ‘minimum suggested retail price’, which is the reason they are also included in the indictment.
Consumption of whole turkey in the market is seasonal, since approximately 60 per cent of annual production is marketed in the month of December, for the Christmas and New Year holidays. Sales have exceeded 2 million units in recent years, according to data from the Ministry of Agriculture.
Indecopi’s agenda for the remainder of the year will continue to be marked mainly by the health emergency derived from covid-19. As indicated above, Indecopi has redirected a large part of its resources to the surveillance of possible anticompetitive behaviour or the formulation of pro-competitive recommendations in the health sector in the exercise of its power of competition advocacy. In this context, Indecopi will soon make public two studies with recommendations: one on the sale of medicines in private clinics and the other on the sanitary registration of medicines, that must be obtained for their commercialisation.
Similarly, in the following weeks, three new market studies will be launched: in the fintech market, in the milk market and the last one in the fuel market (specifically at the production, import and wholesale commercialisation level of the chain).
Additionally, in the next few months, the legally established period for resolving the sanctioning proceedings initiated in the public construction market and in the electricity sector market, should be coming to an end, thus, it is expected for the Commission for the Defence of Free Competition to resolve these proceedings in a timely manner.
Since the Antitrust Merger Review Act came into force on 14 June, Indecopi’s agenda in the following weeks will be marked by the process of implementation of the Act. As indicated, Indecopi has issued guidelines and has reported on the information and documentation that companies must submit for Indecopi to evaluate their notification and the effects on competition of the transaction. At the time of writing, Indecopi has launched a section on merger control on its web page, where interested parties can find a variety of useful information for a better understanding of the Act, such as, for example, the queries answered in the framework of the guidance provided by the entity to agents involved in a merger or acquisition.
Finally, the new congressmen and the president of Peru, elected in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, will begin their terms of office in the next few days. As an official of the competition agency, I can only hope that further progress will be made in reforms that will help to the strengthening the agency, such as those related to the improvement of the institutional design that will contribute to the reinforcement of its autonomy, correct some of the mistakes made by the previous parliament that affect the leniency programme, and provide the agency with greater resources for a more effective defence and promotion of competition in the markets.
 Exchange rate of 8 July 2021.
 As at 2 June 2021, 1,965,432 people tested positive for covid-19, of which 184,942 people have died, which means a case fatality rate of 9.41 per cent. See Covid-19 Situation Room of the Ministry of Health. Available at: https://covid19.minsa.gob.pe/sala_situacional.asp
 Available at: https://www.indecopi.gob.pe/control-de-concentraciones.
 See Espinoza Lozada, Jesús, Perú: Indecopi, in Americas Antitrust Review 2021, Global Competition Review, page 252.