Widening the Focus beyond China on both sides of the Atlantic

Governments across the globe have introduced, enhanced or sought greater enforcement of their regimes for the screening of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the grounds of national security and public order concerns. The review of inward investment from China was often cited as an important factor to establish why an FDI regime should be introduced or broadened in a particular jurisdiction and it is a frequent point of interest and supported by a number of well-publicised cases. However, recent developments in FDI enforcement and the underlying policy considerations reflect a widening focus beyond China. Moreover, FDI regulation seeks to pursue much broader objectives, accounting for the core contribution of FDI to economic growth and prosperity as well as the desire of governments to understand better ‘who invests and for what purpose’.[2]

This chapter examines how the broadened scope of FDI regimes on both sides of the Atlantic and the underlying policy considerations affect the approach to Chinese investment compared with investment from other ‘foreign’ investors, with case examples from selected jurisdictions.

FDI enforcement traditionally focused on Chinese investments

Past interventions on the basis of national security often involved Chinese investors. This is particularly so in the United States. In Europe, the European Commission and certain national governments have also encouraged additional monitoring and scrutiny of Chinese and other investors acquiring influence over strategic domestic companies or assets, as is illustrated below for Germany and the United Kingdom.

United States

US FDI laws represent one of the most mature regimes worldwide with a long-standing enforcement practice. The regime was substantially updated in 2018 through the Foreign Investment Risk Review and Modernisation Act (FIRRMA). Under FIRRMA, among other things, mandatory filing requirements were expanded and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) extended its jurisdiction over non-controlling investments in certain critical technology, critical infrastructure and sensitive personal data businesses. For Chinese investments in security relevant sectors, CFIUS approval may be challenging and require suitable guidance and advice to navigate.

Regardless of these difficulties, Chinese investors collectively ranked second for notices submitted to CFIUS in 2020 and this even despite indications of a trend towards a decline in Chinese inbound investment to the United States.[3] However, most of the presidential orders to block or unwind transactions made following a CFIUS review have concerned Chinese investors. For instance, in 2020, the divestment orders made by President Trump in relation to Chinese investment in StayNTouch, a hotel management services provider, and the video application Musical.ly highlighted concerns about Chinese access to US citizens’ personal data, as did a similar order made in 2017 in relation to the dating site, Gaydar.[4] Moreover, the proposed hostile acquisition by Broadcom of Qualcomm in 2018 was blocked for reasons, among others, relating to China and notwithstanding that Broadcom was a US-based acquirer.[5] In announcing the decision to block the transaction, concerns were noted by President Trump that the combination of the two semiconductor companies could stall advancements in 5G technology in the United States and leave space for China’s Huawei to become a market leader.

Notably, CFIUS proceedings have proven to have an effect beyond the United States. In 2016, the Chinese company Fujian Grand Chip Investment (FGCI) sought to acquire a majority stake of 50.1 per cent of the voting rights in the German electronics manufacturer Aixtron. FGCI had originally received a certificate of non-objection from the German authority (the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, also known as the BMWi), but this approval was later revoked after CFIUS highlighted its concerns about potential military uses of Aixtron’s products.[6] The transaction was ultimately abandoned after a US veto in the CFIUS proceedings.[7]


Most of the publicly known FDI interventions in Germany have concerned Chinese investors. In one particularly well reported case, in December 2020, the German government prohibited the acquisition of IMST, a German company active in satellite and radar communication and 5G technology, by Addsino, a defence company and subsidiary of the state-owned China Aerospace and Industry Group.[8] The German government found IMST to have critical know-how relating to defence and critical infrastructures. In the view of the BMWi, the acquisition would have risked a ‘floating abroad’ of know-how to China and had the potential to contribute to an upgrade of China’s military knowledge and capabilities.

Concerns about know-how drain have also arisen outside the military sector. In 2016, the private Chinese Midea Group announced its proposed acquisition of Kuka, a German company active in the development and manufacture of industrial robots. However, the BMWi granted a certificate of non-objection within a first phase review period and Midea ultimately acquired 95 per cent of the voting rights in Kuka.[9] In the longer term, cases such as this have served as a precedent and influenced public and political debate about know-how transfer and the need to tighten FDI regimes in Europe, as well as defining the boundaries for areas of interest.

Interventions on the basis of security concerns have also occurred in respect of Chinese investment in other sectors in Germany. In 2018, the government objected to the acquisition of Leifeld Metal Spinning by the Chinese investor Yantei Taihai Corporation. Leifeld develops pipe-formed metal parts, which are also used by the aerospace and nuclear industries.[10] In another case during the same year, the German government prevented the acquisition of a minority stake in the German electricity transmission operator 50Hertz by a Chinese state-owned company through the acquisition of the shares by the German state-owned development bank, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).

United Kingdom

Although Chinese investment has seemed to loom large as a concern in public discussions,[11] until recently (see below) there had been relatively few formal FDI proceedings concerning Chinese investors.[12]

In 2017, the UK government did intervene under public interest powers and on grounds of national security to review the acquisition of Sepura, a provider of communications network services to the UK emergency services, by China’s Hytera Communications. Although the transaction was permitted to proceed, conditions applied. Hytera gave undertakings for the purpose of ensuring that sensitive information and technology would be protected and that there would be continuity of supply and maintenance of services. Hytera and Sepura also agreed to have at least one UK national as a board member.[13] In the same and subsequent year, FDI reviews were commenced regarding the acquisition by Shaanxi Ligeance Mineral Resources Co Limited (SLMR, an entity listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) of Gardner Aerospace and then, via Gardner, of Northern Aerospace Limited. Both transactions were cleared with undertakings that SLMR would not access restricted information and that an independent auditor would be appointed to monitor such arrangements.[14]

During 2019, however, two transactions involving Chinese investors were abandoned following FDI proceedings. In the more straightforward case, China’s Aerostar withdrew from an attempted acquisition of Mettis Aerospace a short time after publication of a public interest intervention notice (PIIN).[15] More significantly, SLMR and Gardner Aerospace returned for a follow-on acquisition in the United Kingdom of Impcross, a UK-based manufacturer of aerospace parts including for military aircraft. This time, after a long first-phase FDI proceeding, Gardner walked away based on indications that the government intended to open a second-phase review and was likely to either require significant mitigation or block the transaction. Upon withdrawal, Gardner committed to the UK government that it would not seek to acquire Impcross for a period of one year.[16]

Very recently, indications of a possible shift and further hardening in the UK’s approach to Chinese investment is also emerging. Reports suggest that the UK will reopen prior investment decisions in relation to the Sizewell nuclear facility in a manner that may now exclude Chinese involvement,[17] and has issued a PIIN in relation to the proposed acquisition of the graphene research company Perpetuus Group by Taurus International or any company associated with the lead scientist at Perpetuus, Dr Zhongfu Zhou.[18]

FDI regimes usually do not distinguish between nationalities

Most of today’s FDI regimes focus in the first instance and in formal terms on the protection of technologies and other national capabilities and not particular investors.[19] As such, FDI filing requirements are considered to be ‘investor-blind’ in that they commonly apply to all investors alike that are considered ‘foreign’. In some regimes, nuances can arise and, for example, the determination of whether an investor is considered foreign may depend on the sector affected by the investment. Investments in particularly sensitive sectors, such as defence, often trigger a screening for all non-national investors. The EU FDI Regulation[20] refers to ‘third countries’ and indicates a focus on investors from non-Member States of the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) for investments in critical infrastructures, critical technologies and other sectors and technologies listed in Article 4(1) of the FDI Regulation.[21] The same approach is taken by many FDI regimes within the European Union that consider investors from countries that are not Members States of the EU, EEA or the European Free Trade Association as foreign for sectors outside defence and other particularly sensitive activities.[22]

Some countries have elected to screen investments from state-owned or state-controlled entities at lower thresholds.[23] In Spain, for example, following emergency measures adopted during the covid-19 pandemic, an FDI made by a company that is considered to be controlled by a government, whether directly or indirectly, is always subject to a mandatory screening procedure.[24] Australia applies specific screening obligations to ‘foreign government investors’. Beyond the question of whether an investment requires mandatory filing, an investor’s nationality and the fact of whether an investor is considered state-owned, state-backed or state-controlled is an important factor for the substantive assessment of likely effects on national security. This does not mean, though, that the origin of an investor would predetermine the outcome of an FDI screening procedure.

Regulatory amendments followed by calls for a policy shift

Although FDI regimes have traditionally focused on the defence and critical infrastructure sectors, CFIUS and, in its footsteps, the European regimes broadened the scope of their FDI regimes and tightened screening mechanisms. Driven by consultations with CFIUS, during 2017, Germany, France and Italy campaigned at the European level for a change in the EU legal framework to provide for the screening of FDI by non-EU countries.[25] Responding to the proposal and gathering evidence in a 2019 study,[26] the European Commission found that foreign ownership was remarkably high in sectors that the Commission considers at the heart of the economy.[27] At the same time, the Commission noted that the rate of acquisitions involving state-owned investors from Russia, China and the United Arab Emirates had increased rapidly. The Commission emphasised its concerns that state influence may result in the acquisition of EU companies for strategic rather than purely commercial reasons, and that foreign investors may benefit from state support.

In 2019, the European Union adopted its FDI Regulation, which entered into full effect on 11 October 2020. The Regulation provides for procedural standards for FDI screening in the EU Member States, contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be taken into account for the review of FDI and establishes a cooperation mechanism between the Commission and the Member States. As a result of the covid-19 crisis, the Commission published guidance for Member States on how to use FDI screening in times of public health crisis and economic vulnerability in March 2020.[28] The Commission called on Member States to make full use of existing FDI regimes, or to introduce new regimes where none was yet in place.

Member State rhetoric kept pace, in particular highlighting the need to foster industrial capability within Europe and perhaps even without involvement from allied investors. The German Minister of Economy, Peter Altmaier, stated in June 2020: ‘Especially innovative companies from the tech- and biotech industry need protection, as Internet giants from the US like Amazon have been strengthened during the Corona-crisis.’[29] Speaking alongside Mr Altmaier, the French Minister of Economy, Bruno Le Maire, went further, stating that the covid-19 crisis had increased the demand for a stronger government engagement against the supremacy from China and the United States and that Germany and France have been requiring for a long time to develop European industrial champions to protect economic interests against other parts of the world.[30]

By comparison, the rhetoric and policy of the UK government concerning foreign investment has appeared to be focused on ‘hostile actors’.[31] The UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy identifies both China and Russia in this capacity and notes in particular their potential to act across the UK economy and not just by way of traditional military threats to public security.[32] Most recently, the UK’s International Trade Secretary, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, has said that China is welcome to invest in the United Kingdom but not in strategic sectors.[33] Similarly, in the United States, the first few months of the Biden administration have indicated a continued reticence towards Chinese investment despite a renewed determination to formalise process and review. As such, it is noted that CFIUS continues to have a low appetite for risk in relation to transactions involving Chinese investors, although a slight increase in openness to mitigation in certain cases has begun to emerge.[34]

Beyond China – stricter FDI scrutiny for all foreign investors

In line with the developments described above, it has become increasingly clear that Chinese investors are by no means the only targets of FDI proceedings. Filing requirements and, in a number of reported instances, stricter scrutiny are also applied to investors from other countries. The following examples illustrate the broadened scope of scrutiny extending to non-Chinese investors.


In the most traditional FDI sector of all, US investors have been particularly active in the United Kingdom and not without encountering scrutiny and commitments. A particular trend is evident, beginning in 2018 when undertakings were volunteered to secure clearance for the acquisition of GKN by Melrose. A continuing series of high-profile transactions demonstrate that foreign investments in the defence sector appear capable of proceeding, provided that parties are prepared to engage with government concerns. Three sets of undertakings were agreed in Advent/Cobham[35] spanning national security and economic matters and something similar appears likely to be required in connection with the continuing review of Cobham’s acquisition of Ultra Electronics.[36] UK government officials are also reported to be in talks with Parker-Hannifin about possible commitments the US company could offer to ensure the UK’s continued access to Meggitt’s defence-related technology in connection with a proposed acquisition.[37]

By comparison, France has taken a stricter line on defence sector trans­actions, with the Minister of Economy exercising a veto in relation to the planned acquisition of Photonis International by US investor Teledyne during 2020. To secure the purchase of Photonis, a company conducting activities in the design of night-vision devices, Teledyne was asked to provide undertakings and offer a minority stake in Photonis to the French sovereign investment fund, but ultimately decided not to pursue the transaction.[38]

For Rolls-Royce, which is aiming to deliver a series of divestments and restructuring across its group, FDI considerations have been raised in relation to the sale of its subsidiary ITP Aero, a Spanish turbine blade manufacturer that provides engines for the Spanish armed forces. In a deal struck in late September 2021, ITP will be acquired by a consortium led by Bain Capital, a US private equity firm. Media reports had previously suggested that non-European bidders for ITP could face FDI risks and would need to engage seriously with the Spanish national authorities, which held a veto and may have been inclined to block transactions in the absence of clear reassurances about ITP’s future in Spain.[39]

In Norway, Rolls-Royce also faced FDI challenges earlier in 2021 when the disposal of its marine engineering company Bergen Engines to a proposed Russian investor was blocked under Norway’s then new FDI screening rules.[40]

Critical infrastructure

Where critical infrastructure is concerned, an expansive range of activities can become susceptible to FDI review, regardless of an investor’s identity. The Spanish FDI authority, the National Securities Market Commission, recently approved an acquisition of a 22.7 per cent stake in the company Naturgy Energy Group by Australian Fund IFM, with mitigation.[41] The conditions pursued safeguard planned investments in energy expansion and infrastructure by Naturgy until 2025 and ensure that IFM does not sell assets in excess of levels already approved by the board. It was also agreed that Naturgy will not be delisted and taken into full private ownership for at least three years.

In the telecommunications sector in the Netherlands, shifting priorities around foreign investment in infrastructure are also observable and being acknowledged by targets and not just governments. It is reported that telecommunications provider Koninklijke KPN NV recently rejected a takeover offer from a US private equity consortium on the basis that the acquisition would not have added any value to its telecommunications strategy.[42] If the transaction had proceeded, it could have also been blocked by the Dutch government under new FDI laws.[43]

Critical technology

In 2019, the UK government reviewed the acquisition of satellite communications provider Inmarsat by the Connect Bidco consortium of private equity investors, which mostly originated from the United States and, shortly afterwards, lowered the applicable jurisdictional thresholds[44] for transactions involving critical technology. The review resulted in a comparatively extensive set of undertakings requiring, among other things, that the acquirers commit to behave as passive financial investors only and that other governance-related restrictions would apply, including having UK nationals appointed to a number of board and other senior positions.[45]

More recently, the UK government began a public interest intervention on national security grounds in relation to the acquisition of the semiconductor company Arm Ltd by the US company Nvidia Corporation.[46]

Indeed, the semiconductor sector highlights an important point that the specific nature of a target’s activities (and not the investor’s identity and characteristics) can be a determining factor for an FDI review. Although the United Kingdom has not elected, so far, to formally review the proposed acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab by Chinese-owned Nexperia and the AMD/Xillix trans­action is subject to review under competition laws only, the Nvidia/ARM trans­action was called in for FDI review probably because of the use of its technology in UK data infrastructure networks. Similarly, in Germany, the acquisition of Dialog Semiconductor by Renesas was cleared by the BMWi,[47] but a review of the proposed acquisition by Taiwan’s GlobalWafers of hyperpure silicon wafer manufacturer Siltronic is continuing amid speculation that mitigation will be required to obtain clearance. EU Member States are also understood to have used the EU Cooperation Mechanism under Article 6 of the FDI Regulation to comment on the Siltronic transaction.

Other essential supplies

The tensions that arose in regard to global supply chains with essential medical products have also provided noteworthy FDI interventions. In Germany, as a means of maintaining its strategic independence capabilities in healthcare, the federal government acquired a minority stake of 23 per cent in CureVac in 2020 through the German state-owned bank KfW.[48] It did so outside the German FDI regime but with the aim of retaining future covid-19 vaccines for the national healthcare system and to prevent the potential acquisition of CureVac by US investors.

In 2021, France rejected the takeover of the convenience store Carrefour by the Canadian supermarket group Couche-Tard. Even negotiations between the French Minister of Economy, Bruno Le Maire, and Couche-Tard regarding jobs and suppliers could not dispel concerns that the transaction would endanger national food safety. Mr Le Maire said that ‘what’s at stake is the food security of our country . . . food security is strategic for our country so that’s why we don’t sell a big French retailer’.[49] No formal FDI proceeding was commenced but the French government commented openly that it would veto the transaction using FDI laws shortly after the proposed transaction was announced.


Governments around the world remain interested in maintaining high levels of foreign investment and keeping their economies as favourable places to do business. Whereas the focus of FDI enforcement was traditionally on defence and critical infrastructure, in which the investor nationality seems to be a significant factor, its scope has broadened over a number of years alongside a wider concept of national security risk. The preparedness that many countries show to protect their industries, and national manufacturing capabilities for a range of critical technologies and products, appears to be more neutral about investor nationalities. It cannot be denied that FDI screening may also serve as a means to protect national interests in a wider sense against ‘foreign’ influence in these sectors.

The trend for national governments to reserve their right to watch over investment in strategic assets has created some fresh obligations (to file) and uncertainty that may contribute to an atmosphere of protectionism.[50] However, all investors (not only those from China) face closer FDI scrutiny and must learn to live with the burden of increasingly complex FDI proceedings, even if, for most of them, no direct or long-term consequences will flow from a substantive FDI review. Not only for Chinese investors or those that are found to be state-owned, state-controlled or state-backed, the pattern of more significant FDI decisions must be reasonably taken into account and suggests the need for care in planning investment choices, particularly in sectors that concern critical technologies. The risks concerning FDI require appropriate stewarding throughout the transaction process and even beyond the completion of each transaction. This is only underscored by surrounding developments, such as the intended introduction of a new and potentially far-reaching EU regime on foreign subsidies.

During 2021, and even up to the time of writing this chapter, potentially important shifts in geopolitics are occurring – including, for example, the invitation from the European Union to the United States, Canada and Norway to join its exclusive defence cooperation mechanism (PESCO (permanent structured cooperation)) in June, the new Atlantic charter launched by President Biden and UK Prime Minister Johnson in the summer, and the signing of the AUKUS agreement (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) in September – in a manner that may bring (again) an even closer assessment of Chinese investment near the Atlantic. Against this backdrop, although the focus of FDI regulation most certainly concerns matters wider than Chinese investment alone, it also appears that China is likely to remain one of the central areas of interest.


1 Peter Camesasca is a partner, Horst Henschen is of counsel, Katherine Kingsbury is special counsel and Martin Juhasz is an associate at Covington & Burling. The authors thank Rosalia Mulara and Paraskevi Gkaidatzi for their valuable contributions to this article.

2 Phil Hogan, former EU Trade Commissioner on 25 March 2020.

3 If declarations to CFIUS are included, then Chinese investors rank lower overall in 2020. For more information, see the CFIUS annual report, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2020.pdf.

4 Although President Biden repealed these orders, the focus on foreign access to data about US citizens remains a prominent issue and is being pursued under other executive orders. For further information, go to https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2021/06/president-issues-executive-order-revoking-tiktok-and-wechat-executive-orders-and-addressing-access-by-foreign-adversaries-to-us-personal-data.

5 Covington & Burling’s market-leading CFIUS practice advised Qualcomm on the defence of this takeover.

6 ‘Germany withdraws approval of Chinese Takeover of Aixtron’, The Wall Street Journal (24 October 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/german-withdraws-approval-of-chinese-takeover-of-aixtron-1477297215 (last accessed 22 October 2021).

7 Plotkin, Fagan, et al., ‘President Obama Blocks Chinese Acquisition of Aixtron SE’ (5 December 2016), https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2016/12/president-obama-blocks-chinese-acquisition-of-aixtron-se (last accessed 22 October 2021).

8 A draft prohibition decision dated 26 November 2020 has been leaked and provides detailed insights.

9 Roland M Stein and Leonard von Rummel, ‘Germany’ in Lexology Getting the Deal Through: Foreign Investment Review 2021, https://www.lexology.com/gtdt/tool/workareas/report/foreign-investment-review/chapter/germany (last accessed 1 November 2021).

10 ibid.

11 Public debate has focused, for example, on the subject of Huawei’s involvement in the UK telecommunications supply chain, which has resulted in orders made in 2020 (under other, non-FDI, powers) to ban Huawei from the 5G mobile phone network.

12 Under current FDI powers in the United Kingdom, public announcements and reports (although usually redacted) are made public in respect of each FDI (or ‘public interest’) intervention. This has facilitated the number of references to UK FDI matters in this chapter.

13 On 28 September 2021, it was announced that these undertakings will be renewed (on what appears to be a similar basis in substance) in connection with a restructuring of the Airwave emergency communications service, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/business-department-to-consult-on-revised-undertakings-from-sepura-plc-and-hytera-communications-corporation.

14 For further information, see ‘Proposed acquisition of Northern Aerospace Limited by Gardner Aerospace Holdings Limited: decision notice’, Report at para. 86, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proposed-acquisition-of-northern-aerospace-limited-by-gardner-aerospace-holdings-limited-decision-notice.

17 ‘UK plans to force sale of Chinese-owned nuclear stake to investors’, Financial Times (London) (29 September 2021), at https://www.ft.com/content/a92bad50-ba5a-44e5-883b-29fac8a4571e.

19 However, certain regimes target investors from specific countries. India, for example, introduced stricter rules for all investors from border nations. See Press Note No. 3 (2020 Series) dated 17 April 2020, at https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/pn3_2020.pdf.

20 Regulation (EU) No. 452/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, OJ LI 79/1 [EU FDI Regulation].

21 Even though Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 452/2019 also includes defence as a critical infrastructure and critical technology.

22 For example, Austria, Germany, Hungary and Spain.

23 For example, Australia, Canada and (as further outlined in the chapter) Spain.

24 Callol, Coca & Asociados, 2 February 2021: FDI Advisory Compilation.

25 ‘France, Germany, Italy urge rethink of foreign investment in EU’, Reuters (14 February 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-trade-france-idUKKBN15T1ND.

26 European Commission, Study and Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2019) 108 final) on Foreign Direct Investment in the EU (13 March 2019), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/march/tradoc_157724.pdf.

27 After the financial crisis in 2009, Chinese investment was a welcome source of capital for many European countries. For example, the Greek government sold its majority stake in the Piraeus Port Authority to a Chinese state-owned investor. In addition, jurisdictions such as Portugal have maintained an open policy towards all FDI.

28 Communication from the Commission (C(2020) 1981 final (25 March 2020), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158676.pdf.

29 Peter Altmaier on 22 June 2020 at the French-German bilateral meeting in Berlin.

30 Bruno le Maire on 22 June 2020 at the French-German bilateral meeting in Berlin.

31 Consultation and draft statutory (section 3) statement on the exercise of call-in powers under the National Security and Investment Act 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/national-security-and-investment-act-2021-statement-on-the-use-of-the-power-to-call-in-acquisitions.

32 ‘Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ (March 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.

33 ‘UK says China is welcome to invest in non-strategic parts of economy’, Financial Times (17 October 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/09e4cbf3-9cf0-4447-aa68-428ac2b4ba37. See also, above, with regard to recent actions by the UK in relation to Sizewell C and Perpetuus Group.

34 Plotkin, Fagan, Finstuen, et al., ‘CFIUS Annual Report Offers Picture of Committee’s Evolution and Enhanced Capabilities’ (9 August 2021), https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2021/08/cfius-annual-report-offers-picture-of-committees-evolution-and-enhanced-capabilities.

37 On 18 October 2021 the UK government issued a public interest intervention notice, commencing a formal FDI proceeding, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proposed-acquisition-of-meggitt-plc-by-parker-hannifin-corporation-public-interest-intervention-notice.

38 Teledyne Technologies Inc: Other Events (form 8-k) (28 September 2020), https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/ TELEDYNE-TECHNOLOGIES-INC-14569/news/TELEDYNE-TECHNOLOGIES-INC-Other-Events-form-8-K-31369322/ (last accessed 1 November 2021).

39 Rolls-Royce press release, ‘Rolls-Royce signs agreement to sell ITP Aero’ (27 September 2021), https://www.rolls-royce.com/media/press-releases/2021/27-09-2021-rr-signs-agreement-to-sell-itp-aero.aspx.

40 ‘Norway blocks Rolls-Royce’s plan to sell engine maker to Russia’, Reuters (23 March 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rolls-royce-hldg-norway-russia-idUSKBN2BF11U.

41 ‘Spain approves IFM’s Naturgy bid with conditions’, Reuters (3 August 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/spain-approves-ifms-naturgy-bid-with-conditions-2021-08-03/.

42 ‘KPN rejects takeover bids from EQT-Stonepeak consortium and KKR’, Reuters (2 May 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kpn-m-a-eqt-idINKBN2CJ0D3.

43 ibid.

44 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, June 2020: Enterprise Act 2002: guidance on changes to the turnover and share of supply tests for mergers (Orders 2020).

47 See Renesas notification of 31 August 2021, ‘Renesas completes acquisition of Dialog Semiconductor’, https://www.renesas.com/us/en/about/press-room/renesas-completes-acquisition-dialog-semiconductor (last accessed 1 November 2021).

48 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), press release, ‘Federal Government to contribute 300 million euros to CureVac’ (15 June 2020), https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2020/20200615-federal-government-to-contribute-300-million-euros-to-curevac.html (last accessed 1 November 2021).

49 ‘French “no” to Canada’s Couche-Tard regarding Carrefour is “final” -minister’, Reuters (15 January 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/french-no-canadas-couche-tard-regarding-carrefour-is-final-minister-2021-01-15/.

50 See also Veronica Roberts and Ali MacGregor, ‘Navigating fluid and uncertain changes to FDI regulation in the era of global protectionism’ (17 August 2021), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/navigating-fluid-and-uncertain-changes-to-fdi-regulation-in-the-era-of-global.

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