The European Antitrust Review 2015

Croatia: Overview

Croatian competition law is based on two legal sources: the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) together with the entire EU competition acquis which is now – Croatia being the 28th member state – a part of national law. Article 49 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia proclaims that entrepreneurial and market freedom shall be the basis of the domestic economic system, that the state shall ensure an equal legal status to all undertakings on the market and that abuse of monopolies shall be forbidden. Such constitutional provisions provide the basis for the development of domestic competition law rules aimed at the realisation of free market competition. The first Croatian Competition Act was enacted in 1995 and resulted in a systematic regulation of the Croatian competition law for the first time. In 2003, a new legislation was adopted that tried to deal with several recognised inconsistencies and shortcomings of the 1995 Act. Bearing in mind its strong determination to accede to EU membership, Croatia strived to harmonise its law with EU competition law. As a consequence, the 2003 Act has already been deemed to a large extent harmonised with the acquis communautaire. However, the largest shortfall of the 2003 legislation has been its slow and poor execution – namely the sanctioning of violations by the misdemeanour courts, which eventually resulted in inadequate protection of the free market competition.

The original Competition Act was adopted on 24 June 2009, in the course of the EU accession negotiations. The new Competition Act entered into force on 1 October 2010 and introduced a number of novelties in terms of the powers and tools that enable the Croatian Competition Agency (the Agency) to target its enforcement activity at areas that pose the most risk to consumers. Competition law would fall short of its intended goal – the effective protection of competition – if the Agency would not be authorised to directly sanction infringing undertakings, undertake actions to eliminate the consequences of anti-competitive activity and consequently deter other undertakings from engaging in such practices. So, in line with the new Competition Act, infringements of competition rules are no longer treated as misdemeanours – instead, they are considered sui generis violations and the Agency is finally empowered to impose fines for the infringements and not just to establish the infringement of the competition law. The Agency is now also empowered to carry out leniency programmes applicable to undertakings that cooperate within the investigation and detection of cartels. In addition, the Agency is empowered to conduct dawn raids on business premises, apartments, land and means of transport, and to temporarily seize objects. Furthermore, the right of defence has also been improved: in the course of investigative proceedings, and before the oral hearing or the final decision of the Competition Council, a statement of objections will be submitted to the parties. Also, in accordance with the new law, the damages claims relating to the infringements of the Competition Act will fall under the competence of the relevant commercial courts. This clearly and indisputably establishes the right to compensation for undertakings and consumers who suffered damages from the infringements of competition rules.

Prior to Croatia’s accession to the European Union on 1 July 2013, the Competition Act was further amended on 21 June 2013 to enable the direct application of articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and to empower the Agency to apply directly these articles together with the Council Regulation 1/2003 and Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, as well as to cooperate with the European Commission and other competition authorities within the Network of Competition Authorities.

Once the Agency has become entrusted with the aforementioned competencies, Croatian law in the field of competition will have been fully aligned and harmonised with the EU acquis and all the prerequisites of an effective enforcement will have been fulfilled.

Regulatory framework

Croatian competition rules today are embodied in the 2009 Competition Act, as amended in 2013. The Competition Act sets forth the competition rules and establishes the competition regime, and regulates the powers, duties, internal organisation and proceedings carried out by the Agency, the competent authority entrusted with its enforcement. It is applicable to all forms of prevention, restriction or distortion of competition by undertakings within the territory of Croatia or outside its territory, if such practices take effect in the territory of Croatia.

There are 12 regulations that constitute subordinate legislation for the purpose of enforcement of the Competition Act passed in 2010 and 2011 by the Croatian Government upon the proposal of the Agency, including:

  1. the Regulation on the definition of relevant market;
  2. the Regulation on agreements of minor importance;
  3. Regulations on block exemptions granted to certain agreements;
  4. the Regulation on block exemptions granted to agreements in the transport sector;
  5. the Regulation on block exemption granted to insurance agreements;
  6. the Regulation on block exemptions granted to certain categories of horizontal agreements;
  7. the Regulation on block exemptions granted to certain categories of vertical agreements;
  8. the Regulation on block exemptions granted to agreements on distribution and servicing of motor vehicles; and
  9. the Regulation on block exemptions granted to certain categories of technology transfer agreements.

With the exception of (1), all contain conditions under which those agreements are exempted from the general ban as stipulated in the Competition Act.

The Regulation on the notification and assessment of concentrations provides rules for the concentration notification process as well as forms for a standard notification and simplified merger notification in its appendices 1 and 2, which contain a list of documents required to be submitted to the Agency by the undertakings along with the notification.

If the Agency in a proceeding against an undertaking determines an infringement of the competition rules, the Regulation on the method of setting fines stipulates the criteria that the Agency will take into account when defining the conditions for imposing fines on undertakings, while the Regulation on the immunity from fines and the reduction of fines stipulates the criteria which the Agency will take into account before it makes its decision on immunity from fines or its decision on the reduction of fines applicable to cartel members who come forward and inform the Agency on the existence of a cartel and supply evidence.

Regulatory bodies and enforcement

The Croatian Competition Agency

The competent entity responsible for implementing the competition regulation is the Agency: an independent legal entity with public authority that autonomously performs activities within its scope and powers regulated by the Competition Act. The Agency is responsible only to the Croatian Parliament, which ratifies the Statute of the Agency and appoints the members of the Competition Council, which is the managing body of the Agency. The Competition Act expressly prohibits any method or form of influence on the Agency which could impede its independence and autonomy. It further provides that members of the Competition Council may not be state officials, persons who perform duty in any administrative body of a political party, members of supervisory boards and executive bodies of undertakings, or members in any kind of interest associations, which could lead to conflict of interest.

The Competition Council consists of five members with adequate expertise and at least 10 years’ experience in the field of competition law. At the head of the Competition Council is the president, who represents the Agency and administers its every day affairs. The Competition Council’s competences include:

  • instructing the Agency’s team of experts to conduct preliminary investigation;
  • undertaking compatibility assessment proceedings and proceedings concerning the imposition of fines due to infringements of competition rules pursuant to the law;
  • issuing opinions and statements on the development of comparative practices in the area of competition law;
  • defining methodological principles for competition studies and market investigation, and promoting activities relating to the competition advocacy;
  • understanding of the benefits of competition; and
  • raising awareness on the role and significance of competition law and policy.

The Agency holds wide competences that enable it to effectively ensure a level playing field for all market participants.

As a general rule, a procedure of determining prohibited agreements and abuses of dominant position is initiated by the Agency ex officio, while in contrast, the procedure of the appraisal of the concentration is initiated by the undertakings being the parties of the concentration. However, there are exceptions to this rule, and if there is no notification of concentration the Agency can still initiate the procedure ex officio.

The Agency is authorised to sanction violations of competition law. Fines for severe infringements can be imposed in the amount of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the undertaking realised in the last year for which financial statements have been completed, specifically if an undertaking concludes a prohibited agreement or participates in any other way in the agreement that resulted in undue distortion of competition, abuses a dominant position, participates in the implementation of a prohibited concentration or does not act in compliance with the certain decisions of the Agency.

For less severe infringements, undertakings may be fined in the amount of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover in the past year for which financial statements have been completed if an undertaking:

  • fails to submit the obligatory prior notification of concentration to the Agency;
  • submits to the Agency incorrect or misleading information in the concentration appraisal proceedings;
  • fails to act in compliance with the request of the Agency; or
  • obstructs the enforcement of the injunction of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia.

When setting the fine, the Agency takes into account all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, such as the gravity of the infringement, the duration of the infringement and the damage caused to competing undertakings and consumers.

With a view to disclosing the most severe infringements of the provisions of the Competition Act or article 101 TFEU, the Agency may grant immunity from a fine to a cartel member who first comes forward and informs the Agency of the existence of a cartel and supplies evidence that will enable the Agency to initiate the proceeding in connection with the alleged cartel, or to the first cartel member who submits information and evidence that will enable the Agency to find the infringement in connection with the alleged cartel in the previously initiated proceedings where the Agency had no sufficient evidence to adopt a decision (ie, to detect the existence of a cartel). Immunity from a fine may not be granted to the undertaking who was the originator (leader) or instigator of the cartel.

For full leniency, an undertaking:

  • must provide decisive evidence;
  • must cooperate genuinely and fully on a continuous basis and expeditiously from the time it submits its application;
  • must end its involvement in the cartel immediately following its application to the Agency, except for what would, in the Agency’s view, be reasonably necessary to preserve the integrity of the surprise inspections; and
  • when contemplating making its application must not have destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence of the cartel, nor disclosed the fact or any of the content of its contemplated application to the Agency.

Judicial control

Against the decisions of the Agency establishing the infringements of the competition law and imposing fines, no appeal is allowed, but the injured party may bring a claim before the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The High Administrative Court, in a panel consisting of three judges, will examine and decide upon both elements of the decision: the part regarding infringement and the part regarding the fine. An undertaking may initiate this procedure under an enumerated number of reasons, including:

  • the misapplication or erroneous application of substantive provisions of competition law;
  • manifest errors in application of procedural provisions;
  • incorrect or incomplete facts of the case; and
  • inappropriate fines and other issues contained in the decisions of the Agency.

Private enforcement

Damages claims relating to infringements of the Competition Act or articles 101 and 102 TFEU shall fall under the competence of the relevant commercial court. The undertakings which made the infringements are liable for the damages caused by such infringements. The competent commercial court dealing with a damages claim shall take account of the final decision of the Agency establishing infringement of the Competition Act or article 101 or 102 TFEU, without prejudice to the article 267 TFEU. The commercial court may even interrupt the proceeding until the decision of the Agency, the European Commission or other competition authority in other member states has been final, and it shall inform the Agency without delay about the submitted damages claim regarding breach of competition law.

In such damages claims, civil litigation law shall be applicable to private litigators.

Prohibited agreements

The types of conduct that fall under the prohibitions of the Competition Act relate to the addressees of its provisions (ie, undertakings). The Competition Act defines undertakings as companies, sole traders, tradesmen and craftsmen and other legal and natural persons who are engaged in the production or trade of goods or the provision of services, and thereby participate in economic activity. The Competition Act also applies to state authorities and local and regional self-government units where they directly or indirectly participate in the market and all other natural or legal persons, such as associations, sports associations, institutions, copyright and related rights holders, and similar who are active in the market. Furthermore, undertakings are also considered as persons engaged in a direct or indirect, permanent, temporary or single participation in the market, irrespective of their legal form or ownership structure, form of financing and intent or effect to make profit, notwithstanding their place of establishment or residence within the territory of the Republic of Croatia or outside its territory. The Competition Act also applies to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly or which are, by special or exclusive rights granted to them, allowed to undertake certain economic activities, insofar as the application of the Competition Act does not obstruct, in law or in fact, the performance of the particular tasks assigned to them by separate rules or measures and for the performance of which they have been

Article 8 of the Competition Act provides that there shall be prohibited all agreements between two or more independent undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices, which have as their object or effect the distortion of competition in the relevant market, and in particular those which directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions, limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment, share markets or sources of supply, apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other undertakings, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

Such agreements particularly refer to:

  • contracts and particular provisions thereof;
  • implicitly oral or explicitly written down arrangements between undertakings;
  • concerted practices resulting from such arrangements;
  • decisions by undertakings or associations of undertakings;
  • general terms of business; and
  • other acts of undertakings which are or may constitute a part of these agreements and similar, notwithstanding if they are concluded between undertakings operating at the same level of the production or distribution chain (horizontal agreements) or between undertakings who do not operate at the same level of the production or distribution chain (vertical agreements).

Pursuant to the provisions in Competition Act or article 101 of TFEU regarding prohibited agreements, the decision of the Agency on the declaration of a prohibited agreement will first declare the existence of a prohibited agreement, participants in this agreement, the type of agreement, the goods or services to which the agreement has or may have an effect, the geographical area in which the agreement takes effect, the term of the agreement, the objective of the agreement and the manner of implementation of the agreement; and second, determine the extent, terms and conditions for the removal of the harmful effects of the prohibited agreement and finally impose an administrative fine in accordance with the provisions of Competition Act.

The provisions of the Competition Act regarding prohibited agreements are applicable to all sectors of the economy and online agreements. The Competition Act does not differentiate between the size of the businesses (this circumstance will be important in practice, when assessing the market share or abuse of possible dominance) nor does it differentiate between domestic and foreign businesses. The rule also addresses a pre-contractual behaviour by prohibiting aggressive practices, discrimination, abuse of bargaining power and the unfair breaking off of negotiation (which was actually introduced by case law).

The exemptions

Certain categories of agreements are granted exemption from general prohibition if, throughout their duration, they cumulatively comply with the conditions that they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or services, or to promoting technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and do not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions that are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives, and do not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of goods.

As mentioned above, the Croatian government passed, in 2011, a number of regulations providing exemptions to certain agreements. Those regulations all contain provisions that define content that such agreements must contain, and the restrictions or conditions that such agreements may not contain.

Agreements of minor importance

Moreover, certain agreements are not considered as prohibited due to the minor impact they are considered to have on the market. The Competition Act defines agreements of minor importance as agreements in which the parties to the agreement and the controlled undertakings have an insignificant common market share, provided that such agreements do not contain hard-core restrictions of competition that, in spite of the insignificant market share of the parties to the agreement, lead to the distortion of competition. The Regulation on agreements of minor importance sets the conditions with which agreements of minor importance must comply, and the restrictions or provisions that such agreements may not contain.

Case law – a cartel

Agency v Presečki grupa and others

The Agency imposed fines on the undertakings – bus operators in Međimurje County –  who infringed the provisions of the Competition Act by concluding a prohibited agreement in the passenger transport market. The members of the cartel included the following undertakings: Presečki grupa from Krapina; Rudi-express from Mihovljan; Jambrošić tours from Mursko Središće; and Autobusni prijevoznik ‘Turist’ from Sveti Martin na Muri. In the course of the proceeding, the Agency analysed two agreements: a business cooperation agreement concluded in February 2011, and a contract on joint provision of scheduled passenger bus transport service in Međimurje County, concluded on 1 March 2011. Those agreements contained clauses on direct price fixing in the provision of passenger bus transport service in Međimurje County, market sharing, continuous coordination of business policy, coordinated registration of bus lines as well as the coordination of conduct (joint bidding) in any future public tenders the subject of which is the provision of special scheduled and transport for elementary school children in Međimurje County. The undertakings concerned thereby concluded a prohibited agreement within the meaning of article 8 of the Croatian Competition Act, in effect from 1 February 2011 to 9 October 2012, restricting competition on the relevant markets of scheduled passenger transport in Međimurje County and special scheduled transport for elementary school children in the same territory.

In the course of the proceedings, the Agency established that the agreements in question were concluded on the initiative of Presečki grupa immediately after it was selected in the public tenders as the best bidder in competition with another five bus operators, including, among others, Rudi-express, Jambrošić Tours and Turist. By winning in the public tender, Presečki grupa got all 106 permits for the provision of passenger bus transport services in Međimurje County.

This cartel led to the elimination of competition in the relevant markets where former competitors became parties of the prohibited agreement. By including its competitors in the provision of public transport on the lines assigned to him at the tender, Presečki grupa removed the risk of potential competition from Rudi-express and Jambrošić tours, who could have at any moment requested the licence from Međimurje County, and thus could have posed a significant potential or even actual threat to the monopoly of Presečki grupa. On the other hand, by entering the said agreements, Rudi-express and Jambrošić tours ensured for themselves the provision of public bus transport on specific routes of Presečki grupa without the introduction of their own lines, thus avoiding the imminent business risk which would under normal market conditions exist as a result of the competition with Presečki grupa. At the same time, Željko Jakopić, the owner of Turist, has – by accepting a non-compete obligation with Presečki grupa, Rudi-express and Jambrošić tours – secured his present position on the market (ie, on the routes on which he had been performing public transport of passengers prior to the conclusion of the agreements concerned). It was evident that the undertakings concerned, contrary to the normal market behaviour, decided to fix prices and share the relevant markets at the expense of their clients, the citizens and school children of Međimurje County, who consequently paid the uniform price of transport set by the bus operators irrespective of their increased number and difference in quality of the service.

Abuse of dominant position

While anti-competitive agreements are based upon some form of prohibited cooperation between mutually independent competitors, abuse of a dominant position is generally based on the prohibited and independent activity of a sole (rarely more) undertaking fuelled by its dominant strength on the relevant market. Pursuant to article 13 of the Competition Act, any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the relevant market shall be prohibited. The existence of dominant positions and abuse of such positions are cumulative in effect, meaning that the attainment of a dominant position is not prohibited in itself. Solely prohibiting the attainment of a dominant market position would not only be contrary to the accepted principles of entrepreneurial freedom, but would also hinder economic development and ultimately cause negative effects for market competition. Therefore, the abuse of a dominant market position actually means that market participants in such a position assume special liability toward the market and its participants. This means that such undertakings cannot act unilaterally without consideration of the effects of their business activity on the overall market, their competitors and consumers. In other words, an undertaking holding a dominant position on the market cannot undertake activities that have a distorting effect on the market competition which also includes business activities that are considered legal (eg, a decision not to sell products to an undertaking that will have a distorting effect on the market). An undertaking that does not hold a dominant position on the market can freely choose its business partners since such decision does not have a distorting effect on market competition due to the undertaking’s insignificant market position. What is permitted to an undertaking with a smaller (insignificant) market share is not always permitted to an undertaking in a dominant position.

As defined by the Competition Act, an undertaking can be presumed to be in a dominant position when, due to its market power, it can act in the relevant market to a considerable extent independently of its actual or potential competitors, consumers, buyers or suppliers, and this is particularly the case when an undertaking has no significant competitors in the relevant market or holds significant market power in relation to its actual or potential competitors, particularly relating to:

  • its market share and a period of time in which this market position has been held;
  • its financial power;
  • access to sources of supply or to the market itself;
  • connected undertakings;
  • legal or factual barriers for other undertakings to enter the market;
  • the capability to dictate market conditions considering its supply or demand; or
  • the capacity of foreclosure against competitors by redirecting them to other undertakings.

An undertaking which holds more than 40 per cent of the market share in the relevant market may hold a dominant position.

The first step for the Agency to explain how the allegedly abusive conduct is likely to restrict competition and thereby harm consumers is to analyse the conditions on the market, including

  • the relevance of entry barriers;
  • the position of and counter-strategies available to competitors;
  • the part of the market affected by the conduct; and
  • possible evidence of actual foreclosure and implementation of an exclusionary strategy.

In the case of pricing conduct, the Agency will, as part of its general assessment, investigate whether the conduct is capable of also excluding equally efficient competitors, in which case the conduct can restrict effective competition and harm consumer welfare. The second step is for the undertaking to rebut this finding of a likely negative effect by showing that it is likely to create efficiencies that leave consumers better off overall.

Upon establishing the abuse of dominance, the Agency issues a decision establishing a dominant position whereby it determines whether an undertaking is dominant and the practices of the undertaking abusing this position and consequently distorting competition, including the duration of the abusive practices concerned, then immediately order a cessation of any abusive practices by the undertaking, finally imposing the measures, conditions and deadlines for the removal of adverse effects of such practices as well as fines for the infringements. The Agency also imposes structural remedies and behavioural remedies. Structural remedies are imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.

Case law: abuse of dominant position

The Agency received a request from Dubrovnik Airline to open proceedings on the establishment of the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition against INA. The claimant cited that INA, as the sole supplier of airplane fuel in Croatia, abuses its dominant position in the market in such a manner that, compared to the foreign suppliers of airplane fuel with whom Dubrovnik Airline cooperates abroad, it ambiguously decides the prices of airplane fuel, which is then supplied to Dubrovnik Airline. The airline further cited that INA uses different criteria when defining the price of airplane fuels for Dubrovnik Airline compared with the criteria it uses when defining the price of airplane fuels for other air carriers, causing Dubrovnik Airline to be in an unfavourable position in terms of competition. Based on received documentation and assessed procedural aspects, comprehensive economic and legal analysis, the Agency decided that undertaking INA had restricted competition by abusing its dominant position on the relevant market of wholesale jet fuel JET A-1 and the supply market of jet fuel JET A-1 in airports in the Republic of Croatia. The Agency decided that INA – by stipulating the price of jet fuel JET A-1 in an ambiguous way in contract with Dubrovnik Airline, or by applying dissimilar conditions when calculating the price of jet fuel by which it supplies the undertaking Dubrovnik Airline from the conditions which it applies when forming the price of the same jet fuel for foreign buyers – has placed that undertaking, at a competitive disadvantage. The Agency brought a decision which orders INA to change the restrictive provisions of jet fuel price from the sales agreements with domestic buyers of jet fuel JET A-1.


Business transactions that may have the characteristics of a concentration are often beneficial for the market. These positive effects may include an increase in competitiveness, a strengthening of economies of scale and the providing of benefits to consumers, because, as a rule, they bring lower prices, better quality and more diverse offerings. However, concentrations as defined by competition law (mergers) may also have adverse impacts for competition in the longer term, and for the best interests of consumers, as they may reduce the number of competitors on the market.

Pursuant to the Competition Act, a concentration between undertakings is deemed to arise where there is a lasting change of control that results from a merger of two or more independent undertakings or parts thereof, or there is acquiring control or decisive influence of one or more undertakings over one or more other undertakings, or of one or more undertakings or part of an undertaking, or parts of other undertakings, in particular by the acquisition of the majority of shares or share capital, or obtaining the majority of voting rights, or in any other way in compliance with the provisions of the Company Law and other rules.

Acquisition of control may be effected through the transfer of rights or contracts, or by other means, by which one or more undertakings, either separately or jointly, taking into consideration all legal and factual circumstances, acquires the possibility to exercise decisive influence over one or more other undertakings on a lasting basis.

The creation of a joint venture by two or more independent undertakings performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic also constitutes a concentration.

However, not every merger described by the relevant provisions of the Competition Act is considered a merger control before the Agency, only those that pass a certain turnover threshold. Such threshold aims to cover only mergers that can have an effect on the relevant market.

Consequently, the undertaking is obliged to notify the Agency of any intention of a merger, provided the following conditions are cumulatively met:

  • if the total annual consolidated turnover of all parties to the concentration generated from the sale of goods or services on the world market amounts to at least 1 billion kuna according to the financial statements for the financial year preceding the merger; and
  • if at least one participant of the merger has a seat or its affiliate has a seat in Croatia and if the total income of at least two parties to the concentration in Croatia according to financial reports amounts to at least 100 million kuna in the financial year preceding the merger.

Although the Competition Act stipulates that a concentration is considered permissible if the Agency does not adopt a conclusion about instituting proceedings for the assessment of concentrations within 30 days from receiving a complete notification of intended merger, it is the practice of the Agency that the parties are submitted a certificate of permissibility of concentration at the first level and to inform the public to that effect on the Agency website.

The participants of the concentration are obliged to submit an application to the Agency without delay, and no later than eight days after the conclusion of the contract which formed the concentration and before the implementation of the contract. The content of the notification of concentration is thoroughly described in the Regulation on the notification and assessment of concentrations between undertakings, but the Agency can demand any documents considered necessary for the assessment of the concentration.

If the Agency decides to thoroughly asses the concentration, three possible decisions may be brought within the statutory time limit of three months from the date of the notification of the concentration:

  • a decision declaring the concentration compatible;
  • a decision declaring the concentration conditionally compatible if certain conditions and measures within the time frame specified by the Agency are met; and
  • a decision declaring the concentration incompatible.

Posavec, Rašica & Liszt

Junija Palmotića 41
10000 Zagreb
Tel: +385 1 4618810
Fax: +385 1 4636870

Marijana Liszt

Posavec, Rašica & Liszt is a law firm headquartered in Zagreb, with its branch office in Dubrovnik. The partnership between attorneys Srećko Posavec, Marko Rašica and Marijana Liszt formally began on 1 January 2003, and today, after 11 years of solid foundation, is a medium-sized law office with three partners, two associate lawyers, four junior lawyers and an office administrator.

Mr Posavec is an experienced litigator and an expert in labour law and public procurement procedures; Mr Rašica is a trademark attorney who successfully manages the newly opened branch in the very south of Croatia, Dubrovnik, covering also a variety of legal areas; while Mrs Liszt is focused on competition and state aid law with permanent affection for commercial and company law. Upon taking her master’s degrees in European law both in Madrid and Zagreb, she acted as head of the Working Group on Chapter 8 during the accession negotiations between Croatia and the European Union. The law firm provides services in various legal fields, including company and commercial law, civil law, sports law, labour law, competition and state aid law, intellectual property law, media law and insurance law, all pursuant to the interests and competences of its founders.

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