The European Antitrust Review 2014 Section 2: EU industry sectors


Market Demarcation in the Food Retail Sector

Food retail sector under the spotlight of competition authorities

The food retail sector is under the spotlight of competition authorities both in the European Union as well as in many member states. Ongoing concentration in the food retail sector is considered responsible not only for increasing buyer bargaining power in relation to industry, but also for interruption in the entire distribution chain up to revenue and income problems in agriculture.1 Also in Germany, the food retail sector is continuously in the focus of the competition policy discussions that have been ongoing since the mid-1970s.2

The question that arises is whether the structure of the market allows abusive conduct or whether the pressure on prices and conditions of suppliers at issue are inherent features of the market attributable to overcapacity in agriculture, industry and the wholesale trade (‘overstoring’). With this in mind, the relevant market needs to be demarcated and such demarcation is formulated below. The question that needs to be asked in relation to the food retail sector is whether it represents an autonomous market per se or whether special retail sector enterprises and other providers (such as direct marketers from industry and agriculture) should be incorporated.

The definition of the market serves to precisely define the area in which companies compete with each other. The scope within which competition law is applied can thus be determined.3 The relevant product marker encompasses all products and services that are regarded as substitutes by their consumers with regards to the products’ features, prices and purpose. The geographical relevant market hence comprises the area in which the companies offer their products or services and in which the competitive conditions are duly homogenous, and which differs from neighbouring regions due to substantially different competitive conditions; this will not be taken into account in this chapter.

First, the respective positions of the EU Commission and the Federal Cartel Office should be considered before the framework for a robust analysis of the market and competition is presented by reference to internal findings from a German merger control procedure.

Definitions and starting points

The food retail sector buys and sells what we will refer to as ‘fast-moving consumer goods’ (FMCG). FMGG comprise food and beverages, tobacco products, health and beauty products, flowers and magazines. Food and beverages are also referred to as ‘food’, health and beauty products as ‘nearfood’ or nonfood I. The true non-food-assortment (non-food II) is not considered in this chapter.

Retail food enterprises usually offer FMCG products through retail formats that maintain a deep or broad assortment of these products and either take the form of full-range distributors (eg, supermarkets, hypermarkets, self-service department stores) or discounters (eg, low-priced full-range providers with reduced assortment).

FMCG are also offered by numerous specialised enterprises. These are specialised retailers (eg, health and beauty retailers, beverage stores, confectionery, wine shops), food-trading enterprises (bakeries and butchers) as well as other formats (mail order companies, functional retail by food producers). These specialised providers are hereinafter referred to as ‘specialised retailers’.

Restaurants that currently account for a significant share of overall supply constitute a third group of providers. Even though there could be cases in which, in particular, fast food providers can be substitutes to the food retail sector, those providers will not be examined below; nevertheless, they provide sufficient reason due to their expansion to examine the substitution relations to the food retail sector in closer detail.

The structure of FMCG distribution on the sales side to the end consumer for the German market area is as follows:

  • The food retail sector (excluding health and beauty retailers) currently has revenue of approximately €120 billion (about two thirds).
  • Specialised retailers (in the above-defined sense including petrol stations) account for approximately €60 billion (about one third).

Consequently, the question that arises in relation to the demarcation of the sales market in the food retail sector is whether the alternative sources of supply available to the consumer should be included in the relevant product and geographic market or not.4 An appropriate definition of the relevant market therefore requires the determination of those forms of supply that, from the consumer perspective, offer substitutable products both in terms of product and geography. On the one hand, the question regarding which retailers offer exchangeable goods or commercial services in the area of the relevant product assortment needs to be addressed; on the other hand, product exchangeability assumes that consumers can in fact switch to these alternatives that are in the very same geographic market.5

The demand-side oriented market concept does not cover different trade services of FMCG assortments provided by retail formats, only when, from a consumer perspective, no exchangeability exists.6 Therefore, all providers must be included in the relevant product market a priori, as long as they offer exchangeable goods. This is undoubtedly the case for almost all specialised retailers (also specialised providers in the following). Exclusion from the relevant market is thus only necessary if:

  • the goods that are offered by the food retail sector and specialised retailers are not exchangeable in their area of assortment overlap (this may be the case for premium specialised assortments, for example, for gourmet products);
  • the food retail sector and specialised retailers do not supply on the same relevant geographic market; or
  • the trade services provided by the food retail sector differ from the assortments overlapping with specialised retailers so that no exchangeability exists (eg, by one stop shopping).

Product market demarcation in competition law practice

The retail format approach of the EU Commission to the assortment market concept


The current market demarcation practice of the EU Commission, which is now identical to the approach adopted by the Federal Cartel Office (see below), originally developed from a type of ‘retail format approach’. Until 1990, the Commission based FMCG distribution on three and, from 1992, four relevant product markets:7

  • specialised retail stores;
  • convenience stores of up to a 400 square mile sales area that are primarily oriented towards extra purchases; and
  • the remaining retail formats in the food retail sector (medium-sized and large store formats).
  • Since the Spar/Dansk Supermarket decision, the discount segment has been made out as the fourth sub-market.8

This demarcation approach was thoroughly revised by the Rewe/Meinl decision.9 Since then, the Commission has begun to regard the food retail sector as a uniform market. Following an in-depth investigation, the EU Commission recently included discounters in the relevant product market in the light of the Rewe/Adeg decision,10 after it failed to fully address this issue within the Rewe/Meinl decision. In this respect, it abandoned its previous supply-side demarcation practice in the food retail sector, which was criticised by the Monopolies Commission,11 but continues to exclude specialised retailers as competitive outsiders from the relevant product market based on supply-side criteria.

On the significance of specialised retail stores in the implementation of EU law

The European Commission refers to various retail formats in its product market demarcation for the food retail sector. Due to existing competitive relations, the European Commission demarcates a total market in the food retail sector, which encompasses all retail businesses, in particular supermarkets and hypermarkets with an assortment of food and non-food products that are typical of the food retail sector.

The European Commission does not include so-called ‘specialists’ in the relevant market. This is due to the fact that it proceeds on the assumption that consumers in the food retail sector expect a specific distribution service. This may be that the supply of a certain assortment or shopping basket comprises food as well as non-food products. By contrast, purchasing in specialised stores such as a butchers or bakers is not exchangeable with broader purchasing in a supermarket or other selling methods in the food retail sector, where the consumer finds all its required goods in a single outlet (one-stop shopping). According to the European Commission, the supply of specialised trade is typically limited to a certain product or a certain product group and is not in direct competition with the distribution formats in the food retail sector in terms of the product concept, the sales areas and the average price level. The European Commission is therefore of the opinion that the supply of specialised trade serves, first and foremost, as a supplement to the supply in the food retail sector.12 According to the European Commission, it cannot be clearly concluded from parallel purchasing behaviour whether consumers shop at specialised retailers instead or in addition to the food retail sector. Nevertheless, parallel purchasing behaviour indicates that, from a consumer perspective, specialised stores are unable to meet the consumer demand in the same way as stores in the food retail sector do. Otherwise one would expect to see less of a parallel and more of a substitutive behaviour.13

The Federal Cartel Office made a similar assessment in its decision Edeka/Spar.14 In the area of specialised trade, which is marked by a greater assortment depth, higher quality standards and a higher price level, as is the case for retail food products, the Federal Cartel Office defines, in regular administrative practice, product-related, independent markets. Nevertheless, the effects on competition originating from specialised retailers have been considered in the assessment of the case. The European Commission concludes that specialised retailers and the food retail sector are no substitutes for consumers because of different competition parameters and price levels.

This argument also relates to the exclusion of cash-and-carry wholesale outlets of the relevant market. The European Commission points out that cash-and-carry markets represent a separate market stage, which primarily provides distribution services for small grocers, service firms, small outlets, restaurants and the like. Access to cash-and-carry markets is also restricted to holders of an authorisation card (traders). Therefore, the European Commission is right not to include cash-and-carry markets in the relevant market of the food retail sector.15

Market demarcation Edeka/Tengelmann by the Federal Cartel Office

The market demarcation undertaken by the Federal Cartel Office in its decision concerning the merger of Edeka/Tengelmann will be subsequently presented. The acquisition of PLUS markets by the Edeka’s subsidiary Netto affects the trade with FMCG. FMCG include daily goods such as food and beverages, health and beauty products (detergents, home and personal care products), pet food, flowers and magazines. These goods are traded by the food retail sector as well as specialised retailers. However, the Federal Cartel Office only defined the market for retail with FMCG to the food retail sector with the result that specialised providers have not been included in the relevant market.

The Federal Cartel Office based the exclusion of specialised providers from the relevant product market on the assortment market thesis that the customer seeks to regularly meet its needs in a single store. As specialised retailers offer a narrower product assortment, the customer cannot purchase all daily goods in a single store, in contrast to the food retail sector. Consequently, only providers of FMCG, where customers can purchase all daily goods in a single store, are in competition with each other. Specialised retailers at most apply competitive pressure in specific circumstances without having a decisive effect.16 In geographical terms, the competition potential of the food retail sector and specialised retailers can likewise only be compared to a limited extent. Only companies that use equivalent competition parameters in terms of assortment, price and location policy have an impact on competition.17 The Office thus assumed a specific purchasing behaviour as well as a strictly limited cohesiveness of response between the food retail sector and specialised providers, but without providing supporting evidence. The cash-and-carry market has rightly been excluded due to its role as wholesalers.

On the conceptual and empirical evidence of product market demarcation practices

Violation of the demand-side oriented market concept

In its market demarcation, the Federal Cartel Office focuses on the retail formats, which maintain a widespread assortment of food and non-food products. The Federal Cartel Office observed a hierarchical, competitive relationship among these retail formats and channels of distribution (eg, self-service department stores, full-line distributors, soft discounters and hard discounters). These distribution channels must therefore be added to the relevant sales market. By contrast, retail food products and health and beauty retailers are nonetheless excluded from the relevant market, even though they provide some part of the food assortment to these distribution channels and thus provide some kind of competitive pressure.

This market definition in the food retail sector reflects the long-standing practices of the Federal Cartel Office and the European Commission, which can be traced back to decisions made at the beginning of the 1980s. However, the Office has departed from the principle underlying this relevant market concept. After all, it only includes supply-side considerations in large parts of its appraisal, to the extent that it only includes providers with equivalent competition parameters as competitors in the market.18 However, it is not of crucial importance whether the competition parameters are equivalent, but whether the scope for action in the food retail sector is restricted by the existence of specialised retail stores.

This type of market demarcation focuses on a supply-side feature: that of assortment depth. It is assumed that the customer wants to generally meet its needs for consumer goods in one store. There is no empirically proven ground for this assumption. The distribution formats’ retail food products and health and beauty retailers are therefore excluded from the relevant product market only due to an undifferentiated supply characteristic (assortment depth) and an a priori assumption about consumer behaviour; not, as demonstrated above, in accordance with the demand-side oriented market concept.19

Also, when taking ‘more economic approach’ into account, it is not particularly convincing when market demarcations are not based on evident competitive and market correlations but rather on pure speculation without any empirical evidence. At least since the introduction of the guidelines of the Commission on market demarcation, the main focus has to be on demand-side substitutability. The areas in which providers are able to behave as monopolists must be determined by means of the ‘Hypothetical Monopolist Test’ (HMT). Accordingly, flexibility in supply can only be included in the market demarcation if it affects as effective and directly as demand-side substitutability.20 In our view, it is obvious that supply-side substitutability for market demarcation of FMCG is less applicable, because specialists cannot switch their assortments at short notice to the sub-assortment, which has suddenly become more attractive due to price increases as there is a lack of access to the sales and supply markets (capacity and know-how restrictions).

Market demarcation in this retail sector thus almost exclusively relies on demand-side substitution. The market would be correctly defined by means of the HMT if permanent and significant price increases of between 5 per cent and 10 per cent were profitable. Not that many consumers switch to substitutes previously excluded, so that the price increases would result in decreases in profit.21 In the area of fast-moving consumer goods distribution, the question arises as to whether different forms of specialised retail stores are able to restrict the pricing scope of the food retail sector in the respective assortment overlap. Conversely, it must be examined whether the food retail sector needs to take the respective specialised providers into consideration when pricing, particularly since significant, permanent price increases are unprofitable due to customers switching to specialised providers.

Fulfilment of demand considerations and space economy in the food retail sector

Similar to the EU Commission, the Federal Cartel Office draws on supply-side criteria of assortment scope for market demarcation on the sales side. This is correlated with the implicit notion that consumers demand shopping baskets and not individual products. However, the assortment market or shopping basket thesis has been contested from the very beginning.22 Thus:

scope and composition of the product bunch, which a consumer purchases in the same assortment retail store, vary dramatically according to proximity of competing assortment and specialised stores, the degree of the purchasing volume and the disposable time.


The product basket purchased in an assortment retail store will be smaller, if specialised trade stores that are competitive in relation to certain goods (eg, for fruits and vegetables, fish, dairy products, drinks and tobacco products) or retail food product stores (a baker or butcher) are in close proximity and easily accessible. Providers of special trade and retail food products become relevant competitors, once they are in close proximity to providers.23

If the economies of scope are noticeable, this will not inevitably result in the exclusion of specialised stores and convenience stores from the relevant sales market. The Monopolies Commission therefore states:

If an additional assortment store is located in the close proximity of another assortment store or a specialised retail store or retail food product store, the transaction costs that arise for the consumer from a provider substitution are reduced for its entire demanded shopping basket or a part of it [...] the transaction-related economies of scope in sales therefore disappear.24

Transaction costs can be reduced not only by shopping in a single store, but also by shopping in aggregated locations. It is therefore not plausible to exclude specialised providers from the relevant sales market due to a lack of assortment depth, even if economies of scope exist. Furthermore, it is questionable whether consumers – despite the assortment extent of the food retail sector – prefer one-stop shopping at all.

On the one hand, the retail formats of the food retail sector already differ significantly according to the time required for shopping. As such, they make allowances for the different time preferences of consumers. Accordingly, almost half of consumers regularly meet their needs by smaller purchases, primarily at discounters, supermarkets and convenience stores that offer considerable time advantages over discount stores and, above all, self-service department stores.25 The pre-requisites for the usage of economies of scope only exist among half of all households that buy in bunches (purchasing from one single source).

On the other hand, purchasing activities differ so highly that specialised retailers might sometimes depict competitors to the food retail sector.26

Discount supermarkets, which generate nearly 45 per cent of the total turnover in Germany’s food retail sector, are oriented due to their limited assortment, that their customers also purchase at further sources of the food retail sector (mainly full-service providers) and specialised retailers.27

The real purchasing behaviour itself makes it questionable whether the criteria ‘purchasing from a single source’ is that selective that specialised providers can be excluded from the relevant market solely on the basis of this argument.

Market demarcation based on the SSNIP Test (by product, by geography)

Survey approach regarding product market demarcation

The following findings are results of an extensive competition analysis, which has been performed by Edeka’s discount line Netto against the backdrop of the acquisition of the Tengelmann Group’s Plus markets. Telephone household surveys were carried out with 2,100 households in an area in which approximately 14 million people live (primarily parts of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Hessen, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt). The survey is representative for this region. From this we can conclude that their findings can also be applied to similarly structured regions in Germany. The results apply to an even greater extent to agglomerations, because the store density in the latter ones, particularly of specialised providers, is even higher than in the survey area, which is less densely populated.28

On the one hand, consumers were asked about their purchasing behaviour and their readiness to switch in case of price increases. Furthermore, a survey experiment, which allowed an estimation of own price elasticity required for the SSNIP test, was used. The survey was designed so that the following three conditions were monitored:

  • assortment overlaps with the food retailer sector;
  • location of specialised providers in spatial range to the main source of supply; and
  • willingness to switch between specialised providers and the food retailer sector.

Findings and evaluation of market correlations

Price elasticities

Price and cross-price elasticities are an integral part of the SSNIP test. These elasticities are used to analyse the switching behaviour of customers when confronted with the exercised market power in the form of increasing prices. Based on the above-mentioned discrete choice analysis, the relevant elasticities can be determined in full and the switching behaviour of customers can be analysed in connection with simulation estimations. Changes in selection probabilities, as a result of the price increases, can hence be calculated by making use of econometric approaches. The estimation result is called ‘arc elasticity’.

The probabilities of selection of the initial scenario for the various purchasing situations (weekly purchasing and extra purchasing) were first calculated for the SSNIP test. These were determined by utility functions of the various choices based on a logit model.

Second, the changes in the probability of selection for different price increase scenarios were simulated. The determination of the migration of consumers due to an increase in relative prices forms the preliminary stage of the SSNIP test. Based on these selection probabilities in the various price scenarios, the profitability of such a price increase can then be determined.

The calculated elasticities relate to weekly and extra purchasing, which indeed slightly differ (-2.73 resp. -3.35). For the purposes of market demarcation, it is necessary to analyse the average purchasing behaviour. The total average elasticity amounts to:

ε = -3.07

On the profitability of price increases (SSNIP – testing)

It is reviewed below, whether the food retail sector, with a full assortment, could profitably increase the prices for a certain product group as a hypothetical monopolist. In order to calculate the profitability of a price increase, the data on changes in sales volume and margins of specific choices are required for a 5 to 10 per cent price increase.

In the present case, an absolute price increase results in a proportional increase in the absolute margin and an elasticity-related reduction in the selection probability, which can be interpreted as volume effect. Under the assumption that the incremental costs (in this case, the costs per unit) remain stable in the near term, and this can be assumed in retail trade sector, the change in profit due to price and margin increases as well as to lost customers can be examined using the following formula:

Due to the price increase, the original margin proportionally increases. In return, the hypothetical monopolist loses consumers, which is reflected in a lower number of customers. The change in volume (here, the losses in customers) is derived on the basis of an elasticity, which is calculated for the particular percentage of the price increase:

Specialist providers

Decrease in profit with a 5% price increase

Decrease in profit with a 10% price increase

Bakers and butchers



Health and beauty products






Fruit and vegetables



A hypothetical monopolist must, in the present case due to a price increase and assumed that incremental costs remain stable, expect a decrease in profits. A price increase in these product groups is therefore completely unprofitable. The own price elasticity, in combination with increased margins in the range of assortment overlaps at specialised providers, is on average on such a high level that the migration of only a few consumers is already sufficient to render a price increase unprofitable for the food retail sector.

Evaluation of the findings

Consequences for market structure analysis

According to the SSNIP test concept, the food retail sector, which has a full assortment, cannot be defined as an independent market. Specialised retailers limit the scope for price-setting within the range of the respective assortment overlap. This assessment could be challenged by stating that:

  • specialised retailers in a product group are only able to limit the price-setting behaviour of the food retail sector under specific circumstances; and
  • broad segments of the food retail sector assortment are not offered by specialised providers (eg, tins, milk, yoghurt, staple foods) and the food retail sector is provided with a scope for price-setting in these segments.

Both arguments are closely correlated. They ultimately raise the question as to how limited assortment overlaps are to be considered in defining the market, but not whether they are of any relevance at all to defining the market. The ultimate objective is to define the market as the area in which the behaviour of a provider is restricted by the existence of competitors to whom customers may switch.

The first reservation can be challenged by the fact that each restriction of price-setting behaviour has to be taken into account in a market demarcation. It is true that behavioural restrictions in one product group do not mean restrictions for other product groups without assortment overlaps. Essentially, this criticism touches two intertwined assumptions, which form the basis for the market demarcation practices of the Federal Cartel Office. On the one hand, the assortment market thesis according to which consumers do not buy products, but shop in baskets (therefore also shopping basket thesis); on the other hand, synergies in assortment, which generate a non-exchangeable service or even an autonomous, independent market, due to the combined supply of different product groups from a single source.

The assortment market thesis, as the basis for market demarcation, is not viable. As the findings based on the direct willingness of customers to switch as well as the SSNIP test show, purchases from a single source are not only the exception, but as the shopping orientations in a situational context illustrate, also the purchasing of equivalent, constant shopping baskets is an exemption (see above). Consumers evaluate their purchasing options taking available specialised retailers into account, as the fact is that apparently different food retail sector or specialised trade alternatives are considered depending on the specific requirements. Consumers ultimately respond not only to price increases in the overall range, but also to unilateral price increases in specific product groups (see results of the SSNIP test).

That also answers the second objection, which posits that the assortment scope establishes the food retail sector as an independent market. If consumers would not regard the food retail sector as a separate market, the crucial question then is how these competitive relations should be considered when demarcating the market. In our opinion, two starting points are possible.

On the one hand, the market can be demarcated by product groups. This would result in numerous submarkets, on which the food retail sector operates. Specialised retailers would thus be adequately addressed and considered, where it has been proven to exist as a relevant purchasing option (eg, in assortments, in which no specialised provider exists). The Federal Cartel Office (correctly) adopts such an approach in the supply market. It would be beneficial, if the actual competitive relations were assessed and market power in specific circumstances were identified. However, a main disadvantage would be that dominant market positions are identified as market control in very small submarkets, which would in turn lead to interventions by competition authorities. This might, for example, combined with conditions imposed by the Federal Cartel Office or self-restrictions imposed by the food retail sector, reduce the scope effects in the assortment and result in inefficiencies at the expense of the consumer.

On the other hand, the food retail sector and specialised retailers would be understood as a relevant total market. With this in mind, the revenue generated by the food retail sector would have to be augmented by the revenue of specialised providers without drawing a distinction between product groups. The advantage of this approach would be that the position of food retail sector competitors in relation to each other can be presented more appropriately due to the increased total market volume. Complex submarket definitions could also be omitted, because all providers in the food retail sector operate as full-line distributors or full-service providers (see above) in nearly all product groups. Only slight distortions between food retail sector competitors would arise, in case companies in the food retail sector were assessed by each other regarding their market strength. The ‘revival’ of the assortment market thesis, which is economically unviable, is unfavourable. This thesis fails to recognise dominant market positions in specific product groups.

Consequently, a choice must be made between a logical and de facto appropriate market demarcation by product group, which might result in undesired inefficiencies on the one hand and a holistic market analysis on the other. The levelling average analysis by adding the specialised retail stores to the food retail sector can be accepted, especially if there is a focus on the factual assessment of market strength of the leading providers in the food retail sector.

Consequences for the concentration assessment in the food retail sector

The market demarcation depicts a central precondition for concentration measurement and its assessment on the FMCG sales market. It should also be mentioned that concentration on a market with regards to the assessment of the market structure is also a pre-requisite for robust measurements of competitive factors. There has been some attention to this fact within the recent past.29 After examinations of selected assortment overlaps, it has to be concluded that beverage stores, fruit and vegetable stores, drugstores and the food trade, in case of spatial overlaps with the food retail sector (which has to be affirmed for about 80 per cent of all locations), are active on the same market as the food retail sector. Even though it has not been explicitly analysed, it can be assumed that the same conclusions can be drawn for other divisions of specialised trade (eg, the pet-food trade). Without trying to make a final point about the frontier of the relevant product market, it can be stated that the major share of the turnover generated by specialised retailers (approximately €60 billion) should be added on the turnover of the food retail sector.

The market share of a leading provider in the food retail sector decreases up to one-third due to this extended market demarcation. The product market relevant market volume would even increase more (approximately €40 billion), in case of only including the share of specialised retailers that are located within the product overlap range, but without petrol station shops. The market shares would thus decrease for one-quarter, in case of a more narrow demarcation. The impact is even more serious when looking at the HHI, as size differences between leading companies are considered squared. The HHI decreases disproportionately when market shares of the leading companies are reduced: if only taking drugstores into account, the sales HHI reaches an amount of 1,634 points, including the specialised food retailers 1,352 points and 1,005 points with the food trading companies (such as bakeries, butchers).

Even with a narrow market demarcation, the HHI would not achieve the boundary value of 2,000 points.


The procedure of market demarcation is still indispensable, despite the EU-wide established SIEC test. Demand substitutability is the most important issue in product market demarcation when consistently applying the guidelines of the Commission. A more narrow demarcation, which is mainly based on inappropriate assumptions regarding demand-side behaviour of the consumers and supply-side differences between the food retail sector and specialised traders, does not convince. The SSNIP test highlights, on the basis of demand substitution, that the relevant FMCG market should be demarcated quite broadly. This is due to the fact that the food retail sector does not have pricing freedom in the overlap range of assortment, as consumers have switching possibilities to specialised traders.


  1. EU Commission, 2010 and 2013.
  2. Monopolies Commission 1997, 1984, 1994 and 2012.
  3. EU Commission, 1997, p.5–13.
  4. Treis, B/Lademann, R 1986, p.7 et seq.
  5. Ebenda, p.21.
  6. Möschel, W. 1981, comment on section 22, fn. 28.
  7. EU Commission, 1990.
  8. EU Commission, 1992.
  9. EU Commission, 1999.
  10. EU Commission, 2008, Rewe/Adeg.
  11. Monopolies Commission, 1994, p.162 et seq.
  12. EU Commission 1999, Rewe/Meinl, fn. 13.
  13. Ebenda, fn. 4.
  14. Federal Cartel Office decision B9-52111-Fa-27/05, p.9 f.
  15. EU Commission 1999, Rewe/Meinl, fn. 14.
  16. Federal Cartel Office decision B2-333/07, p.27.
  17. Ebenda, p.28.
  18. Federal Cartel Office decision B2-333/07, p.28.
  19. Treis, B./Lademann, R. 1986, p.22.
  20. EU-Commission, 1997, para. 20.
  21. The SSNIP Test EU Commission, 97C 372/03, fn. 15 et seq.
  22. Monopolies Commission 1984, p.195 et seq, para. 661.
  23. Ebenda, para. 662.
  24. Monopolies Commission, 1984, para. 642.
  25. Lademann, 2007.
  26. Lademann, 2012.
  27. Lademann, 2012.
  28. Lademann, R., 2012, p.103 et seq.
  29. Lademann/Heinen, 2012.


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Rainer Lademann

Niels Frank

Lademann & Associates is since 1986 experienced in providing professional economic advice in the application of German and EC competition and antitrust law. Our clients are major players in their sectors. They trust in our economic expertise in various cases of mergers and cooperative agreements and in the analysis of compliance with block exemption regulations. In addition, we contribute economic expert advice in cases of antitrust violations such as abuse of market dominance as well as cartel-offences in a wide range of industries, particularly in the automotive industry, foodstuff industry, steel industry, plant construction, food trade (wholesale and retail), insurances, TV-advertising market. Our activities range from the provision of professional economic advice in preliminary stages or during proceedings to giving economic expert advice on competition matters in court or before the European Commission.

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