The European Antitrust Review 2014 Section 2: EU industry sectors

Energy

EU Competition Law and the Energy Sector 2013

The process of opening the EU energy markets to competition started over 15 years ago. In the meantime, the European Commission (the Commission) has taken numerous steps to further enhance the liberalisation process: it has investigated the sector and with the Energy Packages it has implemented the appropriate legal measures. However, as summarised by the Commission in its communication ‘Making the internal energy market work’, published in November 2012, today the EU and its member states are not on track to meet the deadline set for 2014 to complete the internal energy market.1

In recent years, the Commission has particularly focused on renewable energy. As set out in the ‘20-20-20 goals’ the following goals until 2020 are aimed at achieving a 20 per cent reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20 per cent; and a 20 per cent improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency. Many state aid measures and mergers notified with the Commission reflect and enhance these goals.

After a brief summary of the regulatory developments, this chapter will illustrate the main activities of DG Competition in the energy sector (electricity/gas) during the last 18 months.2

Regulatory developments

Regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (REMIT)

In December 2011, the Regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency3 entered into force. It sets out rules on wholesale electricity and gas trading by improving market transparency and integrity. Its main objectives are to prohibit insider trading and the obligation to publish inside information,4 to prohibit market manipulation5 and to establish a framework for monitoring wholesale energy markets at European level in order to effectively detect market abuse and manipulation.6 Pursuant to REMIT, all energy traders are required to report their transactions to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),7 including price, volumes, date and time, names of seller and buyer, and the beneficiary. Based on the data passed on, ACER will be able to analyse the ongoing trade. However, this obligation is not yet applicable as the Commission still has to adopt an implementing regulation clarifying the details regarding the data to be transmitted.8 ACER has already published recommendations on the records of wholesale energy market transactions for the data collection under REMIT to the Commission. The aim of the recommendations is to assist the Commission in drafting the REMIT implementing measures pursuant to article 8 of REMIT.9

As regards non-compliance with the duties set out by REMIT, it is the member states’ task to establish effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties.10Member states must ensure, within 18 months following the entry into force (ie, June 2013), that their regulatory authorities are provided with a toolkit of necessary investigatory powers in order to be able to monitor whether market players comply with the REMIT obligations.

Energy directives – transposition delay

The Third Energy Package (the Package), which traces back to the final report of the Energy Sector Inquiry published in 2007, was adopted in 2009 in order to establish a single and fully effective EU energy market.11Moreover, it should increase competition and ensure the security of supply. Most of the provisions of the directives of the Package had to be transposed into national law already until 3 March 2011.12 The three regulations being part of the Package have been applicable as from the same day. However, the directives provided one more year for the implementation of the provisions on unbundling.13 In 2012 and 2013, the Commission sent reasoned opinions for failing to transpose the electricity and gas directives to numerous member states,14most recently in February 2013 to Lithuania,15 and an additional reasoned opinion was sent to Ireland in April 2013.16 In the past few months, the Commission referred Poland, Slovenia, Finland, Bulgaria, Estonia, the United Kingdom and Romania to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as they had not fully transposed the directives.17 The proceedings against Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and Austria have been closed by the Commission.18 The Commission is still assessing the situation in the other member states.19

Certain member states are also lagging behind as regards the Renewable Energy Directive.20 That directive is designed to ensure the achievement of the 2020 renewable energy targets.21 Austria and Bulgaria have not yet informed the Commission of all necessary transposition measures for fully transposing the Renewable Energy Directive into their national legislation. On 27 September 2012, the Commission sent reasoned opinions to Austria and Bulgaria.22 In March 2013, the Commission referred Poland and Cyprus to the ECJ for failing to transpose the Renewable Energy Directive.23 In May 2013, further reasoned opinions were sent to other member states.24

Other developments

In March 2013, the Green Paper on ‘A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies’ was adopted by the Commission, starting a public consultation. Until 2 July 2013, member states, other EU institutions and stakeholders are able to express their views on certain aspects of EU climate and energy policy in a 2030 perspective.25

Also in March 2013, the European Commission presented its first Renewable Energy Progress Report in accordance with the reporting requirements under the Renewable Energy Directive. The report includes, inter alia, the assessment of the progress in the promotion and use of renewable energy according to the 2020 renewable energy targets, as well as the overall renewable energy policy developments in each member state. Pursuant to the Renewable Energy Directive, such a report will be published by the Commission every two years.26

In October 2012, the Energy Efficiency Directive27 was adopted. The directive establishes a common framework for promoting energy efficiency to ensure the target of 20 per cent energy savings by 2020. The directive has to be transposed by June 2014.28

Investigations

EPH and EP Investment Advisors – obstruction of inspection

On 28 March 2012, the Commission imposed a fine of €2.5 million
on two Czech energy companies, Energetický a průmyslový holding (EPH) and EP Investment Advisors, for obstructing an inspection carried out by Commission officials in November 2009 at their premises in Prague as part of an antitrust investigation.29 The Commission decided for the first time on an obstruction related to e-mails occurred during an inspection. The companies had failed to block a person’s e-mail account and diverted incoming e-mails so that they had not been visible for the inspectors. Pursuant to the Commission, that behaviour constituted a breach of the companies’ obligations to cooperate with Commission officials during an inspection and to disclose all documents relevant to the investigations pursuant to article 23(1)(c) of Regulation No. 1/2003.30

In June 2012, EPH and EP Investment Advisors appealed the Commission’s decision before the General Court. One of their arguments put forward is that the decision was adopted in violation of their rights of defence because the Commission did not ensure that the relevant individuals had been properly informed of their duties in the course of the inspection nor of the consequences of non-compliance.31

E.ON – break of seal

In December 2010, the General Court decided on the annulment action of E.ON against the decision of the Commission of January 2008 by which a fine of €38 million had been imposed on E.ON for having broken the seal affixed during an investigation into alleged anti-competitive practices on the German electricity market in 2006.32 This was the first case concerning the application of article 23(1)(e) of Regulation No. 1/2003 (break of seal). Therefore, the General Court examined the issue of the burden of proof in this type of situation in detail. The General Court confirmed the Commission’s decision regarding the amount of the fine and stated that the fine imposed (0.14 per cent of E.ON’s turnover) was not disproportionate to the infringement.33 E.ON lodged an appeal against the judgment.34Although the competent advocate general, Yves Bot, proposed to partially annul the judgment of the General Court and refer the case back to the General Court,35 the ECJ dismissed the appeal in November 2012. The ECJ concluded that the General Court had not erred in law by assessing that a breach of seal was particularly serious in itself and that the fine of €38 million was not excessive due to the need to ensure its deterrent effect.36

Cartels and other anti-competitive agreements

E.ON and GDF Suez – market sharing/duration of infringement

In June 2012, the General Court decided on a decision by which the Commission had for the first time imposed fines for an antitrust violation in the energy sector in July 2009.37

On 29 June 2012, the General Court decided on the appeal of E.ON and GDF Suez against the Commission decision of 8 July 2009. The Commission had imposed a total fine of more than €1 billion against these undertakings for market sharing on gas markets in France and Germany.38 The market sharing agreement dated back to 1975 when they decided to jointly build the MEGAL pipeline across Germany to import Russian gas into Germany and France. At this time, E.ON and GDF agreed not to sell gas transported over this pipeline in each other’s home markets. The undertakings applied the agreement until 2005. The Commission explained that, as regards the French market, the infringement started in August 2000 when the First Gas Directive39 setting the liberalisation of the gas market should have been transposed.40 Prior to this date, GDF had a legal monopoly regarding the supply and import of gas. For this reason, before August 2000, competition could therefore not be restricted by the market sharing agreement. As regards Germany, the Commission concluded that, since prior to the liberalisation of the gas market no monopoly existed on the German market, the violation regarding the German market had already begun in 1980 when the MEGAL pipeline started to operate. E.ON and GDF brought an appeal against the Commission’s decision in which they mainly pleaded that the Commission had not correctly assessed the duration of the possible infringement.

In its judgments of 29 June 2012, the General Court reduces the fine for each undertaking to €320 million due to errors of the Commission regarding the duration of the infringement.41 The General Court stresses that article 101(1) TFEU only applies to sectors open to competition.42 While the intention of an undertaking to enter a market may be of relevance in order to determine whether it can be considered to be a potential competitor in that market, nonetheless the essential factor on which such a description must be based is whether it has the ability to enter that market.43 Pursuant to the General Court, due to the use of demarcation agreements and exclusive concession agreements that had been covered by an exemption granted by German law, a de facto monopoly existed on the German market until 1998. For this reason, the General Court holds that the infringement regarding the German market did not begin until 1998.

Abuse

Gazprom – upstream gas supply markets

In September 2012, the Commission opened formal proceedings to investigate whether Gazprom might be abusing its dominant position in upstream gas supply markets in Central and Eastern Europe.44 The Commission administrates the case under ‘upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe’.45 Information regarding the inspections carried out at the premises of gas companies in Central and Eastern Europe in September 2011 is also provided under that case title. In the corresponding press release of September 2011, the Commission had concerns that the companies concerned might be engaged in anti-competitive practices in breach of EU antitrust rules or that they were in possession of information relating to such practices.46

CEZ – capacity hoarding

In July 2011, the Commission opened formal proceedings to investigate whether CEZ, the incumbent electricity producer in the Czech Republic, might have abused its dominant position on the Czech electricity market. The Commission had carried out inspections on the premises of CEZ and other companies in November 2009.47 The Commission’s concerns were that CEZ was preventing competitors from making new investments in electricity generation, and thus preventing their entry into the market for generation and wholesale supply of electricity in the Czech Republic. In order to eliminate the Commission’s concerns, CEZ proposed certain comitments in June 2012. In particular, CEZ offered to divest coal-fired generation capacity in the Czech Republic.48 In April 2013, these commitments became legally binding. The Commission concluded that electricity customers would benefit from the commitments as they would enable a new player to enter the Czech market for the generation and wholesale supply of electricity, effectively competing with CEZ.49

Other abuse proceedings

The Commission opened proceedings against OPCOM, the operator of the only power exchange in Romania, and its parent company Transelectrica. OPCOM requires all participants on the spot market on the power exchange to hold a Romanian VAT registration (ie, to be established in Romania).50 In May 2013, the Commission sent its objections regarding OPCOM’s business practice to OPCOM and its parent company. The Commission takes the preliminary view that OPCOM’s business practice is discriminating against companies on the basis of their nationality and their place of establishment, and therefore violates EU antitrust provisions.51

In 2012, the Commission also opened antitrust proceedings against the Bulgarian Energy Holding. The Bulgarian Energy Holding may have abused its dominant market position on the wholesale energy market in Bulgaria through territorial restrictions in electricity supply agreements.52

Mergers

During the time frame covered by this chapter, the Commission assessed several concentrations in the gas and electricity sector. As in previous years, many of the transactions concerned renewable energy53(eg, photovoltaic electricity generation,54 solar thermal power generation,55 on-shore wind farms,56 or the generation of electricity from renewable resource in the framework of restructuring of the sugar-beet industry57). As most of the decisions have been adopted under simplified procedure or have not raised serious concerns, many questions regarding market definition are, as the following decision demonstrates, still open.

DONG Energy/Boston Holding/Borkum Riffgrund I Offshore Windpark

The transaction concerned the acquisition of joint control over Borkum Riffgrund I by DONG Energy – active in exploration and production of natural gas and oil, power generation and sale of energy – and Boston Holding. The joint venture should own wind farm installations and would be the holder of the necessary permits issued by German authorities.58

Although in previous years many concentrations concerning the production of renewable energy have been notified with the Commission, so far there are few decisions dealing with the market definition regarding wind farms. In 2008, in Iberdrola Renovables/Gamesa,the Commission identified a possible market for the development and promotion of wind farms. However, in that case, the Commission left the precise market definition open.59 Neither does the Commission finally define the product market in the case at hand. However, the Commission at least repeats that the development of wind farms by undertakings for their own use (in order to generate electricity for its sale into the wholesale market) and the development of wind farms for their sale to third parties do not constitute separate product markets. As regards the geographic market, the Commission refers again to the Iberdrola Renovables/Gamesa case: the existence of differences in legislation and regulation of the sector which still exist in each member state, and the need to have a good network of local business contacts and different administrative steps that need to be taken in the course of the wind-farm development are indications for a national market. However, the precise definition of the geographic market is also left open.

BP/Chevron/Eni/Sonangol/Total/JV

The creation of a joint venture is only a notifiable concentration under EU Merger Control if it will perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. If at the time of its (original) creation the joint venture does not perform all functions of an autonomous economic entity, the development of the joint venture has to be taken into account by the parent companies as a subsequent change in the activities of an existing joint venture and may be qualified as concentration, as the decision BP/Chevron/Eni/Sonangol/Total/JV demonstrates:

In 2002, BP, Chevron, Eni, Sonangol and Total created a joint venture intended to be active in the production of LNG based on gas supplied from the off-shore exploration blocks in Angola. As at the time the joint venture was created the parent companies intended that the gas should only be sold to affiliates of the parents for resale in the US, the transaction was not notified with the Commission due to the lack of full functionality. However, after a couple of years, the parents decided that the joint venture should also sell gas to third parties. Consequently, the joint venture would have market access and act as a full function entity. For this reason, the parents notified the transaction with the Commission as a concentration within the meaning of article 3 paragraph 4 of the Merger Regulation on the basis of a change in activities of an existing joint venture. As during the last 10 years the joint venture only sold to affiliates of its parents for resale in the USA, the Commission qualifies it as pro-competitive outcome that, in the future, the joint venture will supply LNG to Europe. The Commission cleared the transaction on 16 May 2012.60

Electrabel/Compagnie Nationale du Rhône

In this case, the General Court ruled for the first time on a Commission decision that imposed a fine for infringing the ‘standstill obligation’. The underlying transaction concerned the acquisition of the French energy company Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) by the Belgian energy company Electrabel.61

In 2007, Electrabel contacted the Commission and, after pre-notification talks, Electrabel notified the acquisition of de facto sole control over CNR in March 2008. The Commission cleared the transaction in April 2008. However, Electrabel had already gained sole control over CNR in December 2003 by increasing its shares to nearly 50 per cent of the capital and around 48 per cent of the voting rights. Furthermore, Electrabel gained a stable majority in the shareholder’s general meetings due to the dispersed shareholding structure of CNR (almost 200 other shareholders) and the attendance rates at CNR’s general meetings in the past. The Commission therefore concluded that Electrabel had violated the ‘standstill obligation’ by acquiring de facto sole control in December 2003 without obtaining clearance. Due to the gravity of the infringement, the size and the merger experience of the company and the lack of complexity of the analyses concerning the acquisition of control, the Commission imposed a fine of €20 million on Electrabel. Deviating from its general principle to consider the period of pre-notification and examination of the concentration when determining the duration of the violation, the Commission found (without prejudice) that the infringement stopped when Electrabel contacted the Commission for pre-notification talks in 2007.62

Subsequently, Electrabel brought an appeal against the Commission’s decision in which it mainly pleaded that the Commission’s findings on acquisition of de facto sole control were incorrect and that the Commission had contravened the principle that it is required to comply with the rules which it has imposed itself (in particular, the definition of the acquisition of control laid down in the Commission notice on the concept of concentration63). The General Court rejected all the arguments and confirmed the Commission’s findings.64 The case is now pending with the ECJ.65

State aid

During the past few months, the Commission approved various state aid measures in the energy sector. It approved state aid measures for the generation of electricity from small and large-scale wind power; landfill gas and small-scale hydro power;66 the increase of efficiency of centralised heat supply systems;67 an electricity cable between mainland Finland and Aland;68 the partial financing of the costs relating to the decommissioning of shut down nuclear power plants;69 the development of an offshore wind farm;70 the transitional free allocation of greenhouse gas certificates;71 and a green deal for energy efficiency measures for buildings, among others.72

Many projects involving aid to the development of renewable energy have been authorised by the Commission.73 Sustainability is at the heart of the measures reviewed under state aid control rules. The Commission recognises that state aid can correct market failures caused by negative external factors where environmental costs for society cannot yet be reflected in the production costs borne by companies.74 In its communication ‘Renewable Energy – a major player in the European energy market’,75 the Commission deals with the challenges renewable energy still faces: the cost of renewable energy is not determined solely by wind, solar, biomass or water resources. Project costs are also driven by administrative costs and capital costs. Complicated authorisation procedures, the lack of one-stop shops, the creation of registration procedures, planning processes that may take months or years and fear of retroactive changes to support schemes, increase project risk.

Energy-intensive firms in the context of the EU Emissions Trading System

In 2009, the reform of the EU Emissions Trading Systems (ETS)76 was adopted and entered into force in 2013. It is expected to result in increased electricity bills for electricity intensive companies since electricity producers will no longer receive free allowances to emit CO2. For that reason, the Commission adopted a Communication77 setting out criteria under which member states may compensate some categories of users particularly affected by the reform of the ETS for a certain percentage of the expected higher costs.78 The sectors eligible for compensation include producers of aluminium, copper, fertilisers, steel, paper, cotton, chemicals and some plastics. The aim of the new state aid regime is to prevent production shifts from the EU to third countries with fewer environmental regulations in vulnerable industries. Such production shifts could counteract the goal of global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.79

German Regulation on Network Charges for Electricity (‘section 19-surcharge’)

In order to prevent high local production costs in Germany, large electricity consumers are exempted from network charges. In March 2013, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess if this exemption qualifies as state aid.80

Since 2011, section 19 of the Regulation on network charges for electricity (StromNEV) provides that end-users need not pay network charges if their energy consumption exceeds certain limits (large electricity consumers). These consumers mainly belong to the manufacturing sector (industrial gases, chemical industry and paper industry). Since 2012, the corresponding loss of revenues is compensated through a surcharge (section 19-surcharge) that must be paid by the final electricity consumers. The Commission concludes that, based on the information currently available, the exemption from network charges for large electricity consumers constitutes state aid and has required further information.81

Preliminary ruling – Association Vent de Colère

Pursuant to current French law, there is an obligation to purchase the electricity generated by wind-power installations at a higher price than the market price. In May 2012, the Conseil d’État (France) referred to the ECJ if this mechanism for financing the additional costs qualifies as state aid.82

Conclusion

Against the background of the ‘20-20-20 goals’, renewable energy is at the very top of the Commission’s agenda. Member states enhance green electricity by state aid measures in order to meet the goals. Such positive atmosphere created by these measures leads to numerous transactions being subject to EU merger control.

The Commission stresses it will continue to ensure that consumers benefit from the liberalisation of the energy sector.83 Further enforcement actions by the Commission against abuses of dominant undertakings (including surprise inspections) are very likely. Geographically, the Commission’s focus of antitrust enforcement in the energy sector has shifted eastwards.84

It remains questionable whether the original goal of completing the European single market for energy by 2014 will be met. To put it in the words of the Commission: ‘Much has already been achieved and ongoing work is expected to bear fruit soon.’85

Notes

  1. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2012) 663 final, p2.
  2. The main focus will be on the period January 2012 until May 2013.
  3. Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (OJ 2011 L 326, p1).
  4. Art 3 and 4 of REMIT.
  5. Art 5 of REMIT.
  6. Art 7 of REMIT.
  7. Established by Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (OJ 2009 L 211, p1).
  8. Art 8 of REMIT.
  9. www.acer.europa.eu/remit/Pages/Recommendations-on-REMIT-Records-of-transactions.aspx, 31.05.2013.
  10. Art 18 of REMIT.
  11. Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p55); Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, (OJ 2009 L 211, p94); Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, (OJ 2009 L 211, p1); Regulation (EC) No. 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 (OJ 2009 L 211, p15); Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005, 36 (OJ 2009 L 211, p36).
  12. Article 49 of Directive 2009/72/EC and article 54 of Directive 2009/73/EC.
  13. Article 9 of Directive 2009/72/EC and article 9 of Directive 2009/73/EC.
  14. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Austria, Poland, Ireland and Slovenia.
  15. MEMO/13/122.
  16. MEMO/13/375.
  17. IP/12/1139, IP/12/1236, IP/13/42, IP/13/260.
  18. MEMO/13/122.
  19. IP/13/260.
  20. Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p16).
  21. Communication of the Commission of 06 June 2012, Renewable Energy: a major player in the European Energy market, COM (2012) 271 final.
  22. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infringements/20120927_infringement_en.htm; 31.05.2013.
  23. IP/13/259.
  24. Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Latvia, Netherlands and Slovenia; MEMO/13/470.
  25. COM (2013) 169 final.
  26. Renewable energy progress report, COM (2013) 175 final: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/reports/reports_en.htm, 31.05.2013;
  27. Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC (OJ 2012 L 315/1).
  28. IP/12/1069.
  29. Commission decision of 28 March 2012 relating to a proceeding under Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (refusal to submit to an inspection), COMP 39.793, EPH and others; IP/12/319.
  30. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p1).
  31. Action brought on 12 June 2012, T-272/12, EPH and EP Investment Advisors (OJ 2012 C 250, p17).
  32. Commission decision of 30 January 2008, COMP/B-1/39.326, E.ON Energie AG; Judgment of the General Court of 15 December 2010, T-141/08, E.ON v Commission, ECR 2010, II-5761.
  33. See also Annual Report 2010 of the European Court of Justice, p117 seq.
  34. Case C-89/11 P, E.ON v Commission.
  35. Opinion of AG Yves Bot of 21 June 2012, Case C-89/11 P, E.ON v Commission, not yet published in the ECR.
  36. Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 22 November 2012, C-89/11 P, E.ON v Commission, not yet published in the ECR.
  37. IP/09/1099.
  38. Commission decision of 09 July 2009, Case COMP/39.401 – E.ON/GDF (OJ 2009 C 248, p5).
  39. Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (OJ 1998 L 204, p1).
  40. Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (OJ 1998 L 204, p1).
  41. Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2012, T-360/09, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON AG/Commission, not yet published in the ECR; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 June 2012, T-370/09, GDF Suez SA/Commission, not yet published in the ECR.
  42. Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2012, T-360/09, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON AG/Commission, para 84; Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2012, T-370/09, GDF Suez SA/Commission, para 81.
  43. Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2012, T-360/09, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON AG/Commission, para 87; Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2012, T-370/09, GDF Suez SA/Commission, para 84.
  44. IP/12/937.
  45. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39816, 31.05.2013.
  46. MEMO/11/641.
  47. MEMO/09/518.
  48. Case COMP/B-1/39727, CEZ & others; IP/11/891; Communication from the Commission published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in Case 39727 – CEZ (OJ 2012 C 202, p1).
  49. IP/13/320.
  50. IP/12/1355.
  51. IP/13/486.
  52. IP/12/1307.
  53. See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Report on Competition Policy 2011, COM (2012) 253, p17.
  54. Commission decision of 28 August 2012, M.6669, CDC Infrastructure/Foresight Solar/Adenium Solar/VEI Capital/For VEI.
  55. Commission decision of 22 August 2012, M.6679, STEAG/Fronterasol/OHL Industrial/Arenales Solar.
  56. Commission decision of 09 April 2013, M.6870. GE/Munich RE/Iberdrola Renovables France.
  57. Commission decision of 13 March 2013, M.6849, Enel Green Power/Seci Energia/Powercrop; MEX/13/0313.
  58. Commission decision of 10 May 2012, M.6540, DONG Energy Borkum Riffgrund I HoldCo/Boston Holding/Borkum Riffgrund I Offshore Windpark.
  59. Commission decision of 04 December 2008, M.5366, Iberdrola Renovables/Gamesa.
  60. Commission decision of 16 May 2012, M.6477, BP/Chevron/Eni/Sonangol/Total/JV.
  61. MEMO/12/976.
  62. Commission decision of 10 June 2009, M.4994, Electrabel/Compagnie Nationale du Rhône; IP/09/895.
  63. Commission notice on the concept of concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (OJ 1998 C 66, p5).
  64. Judgement of the General Court of 12 December 2012, T-332/09, Electrabel/Commission.
  65. Case number C-84/13 P.
  66. Commission decision of 12 January 2012, SA.31236, Ireland – Renewable Feed In Tariff.
  67. Commission decision of 24 May 2012, SA.34681, Latvia – Amendment to scheme regarding the increase of efficiency of centralized heat supply systems.
  68. Commission decision of 31 July 2012, SA.33823, Electricity cable between mainland Finland and Aland.
  69. Commission decision of 20 February 2013, SA.31860, Slovakia – Partial financing of decommissioning of two already shut down nuclear plants (A1 and V1).
  70. Commission decision of 20 November 2012, SA.34742, The Netherlands – Q10 Offshore Wind BV.
  71. For example: Commission decision of 05 December 2012, SA.34753, Romania – Transitional free allocation of greenhouse gas certificates for electricity producers under Article 10c of the ETS Directive; Commission decision of 19 December 2012, SA.33537, The Czech Republic – Transitional free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances for the modernisation of electricity generation installations.
  72. Commission decision of 05 February 2012, SA. 34611, United Kingdom – Provision of public funds to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in support of the UK Government’s Green Deal policy (UK).
  73. DG Competition Management Plan for 2012, p14.
  74. Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2011, COM (2012) 253 final, p20.
  75. COM (2012) 271 of 06 June 2012.
  76. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, (OJ 2009 L 140/63).
  77. Communication from the Commission concerning Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme post-2012 (OJ 2012 C 158/4).
  78. IP/12/498.
  79. Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2012, COM (2013) 257 final, p7f.
  80. IP/13/191.
  81. Commission decision of 06 March 2013, SA.34045, Exemption from network charges for large electricity consumers (section 19 StromNEV).
  82. Case C-262/12 – Vent de Colère and Others (OJ 2012 C 243, p8).
  83. DG Competition Management Plan 2012, p4.
  84. Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2012, COM (2013) 257 final, p7.
  85. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2012) 663 final, p3 and 5.

Eisenberger & Herzog

Wienerbergstra├če 11
1100 Vienna
Austria
Tel: +43 1 606 36 47
Fax: +43 1 606 36 47 58

office@ehlaw.at

Dieter Thalhammer
d.thalhammer@ehlaw.at

Judith Feldner
j.feldner@ehlaw.at

www.ehlaw.at

Eisenberger & Herzog enjoys a reputation as one of Austria‘s most prominent business law firms. National and international clients regularly retain Eisenberger & Herzog to assist them in their most critical and sensitive matters.

Eisenberger & Herzog is among the largest law firms in Austria, and one of the country’s fastest-growing firms. The partners of Eisenberger & Herzog, most of whom have previously been working for major international law firms in Vienna, Brussels, London and New York, are among Austria’s leading advisers in their respective fields of expertise.

The competition law practice group of Eisenberger & Herzog offers high-profile advice covering the whole range of competition law. The involvement of this team in major high-profile cartel cases, as well as in other major projects in alternate areas of competition law, underlines its outstanding position in the Austrian market.

The competition law team of Eisenberger & Herzog was ranked as ‘highly recommended’ by Global Competition Review in its 2012 survey on Austria. In its 2013 edition, Chambers Europe recommends the firm‘s competition law team in the second tier. The team is also ranked as a second tier firm in the current Legal 500 edition.

Next Chapter: Private Equity

Back to top

Law Business Research Ltd

87 Lancaster Road, London
W11 1QQ, UK
Queen's Award logo American Bar Association strategic partner logo

Copyright © 2014 Law Business Research Ltd. All rights reserved. | http://www.lbresearch.com

87 Lancaster Road, London, W11 1QQ, UK | Tel: +44 207 908 1188 / Fax: +44 207 229 6910

http://www.globcompetitionreview.com | editorial@globalcompetitionreview.com