The European, Middle Eastern and African Antitrust Review 2018

Germany: Private Antitrust Litigation

14 August 2017

OPPENLÅNDER Rechtsanwälte

Why litigate in Germany?

There are obvious reasons why Germany is one of three European jurisdictions in which private antitrust litigation, in particular private damage claims, have become a significant factor of competition law enforcement. Following significant changes introduced to its national competition legislation in 2005, German courts were building up a body of case law step by step, clarifying issues that needed clarification. In 2017 Germany introduced a legislative package referred to as the 9th Amendment to the German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC) to implement the rules of the European Damages Directive of 20141 in German law. These changes partly confirmed the body of case law that has been built up since 2005. But the package also introduced significant changes to German law, especially a system of disclosure of evidence relevant for damage claims.

Under German law, civil courts were already before the 9th Amendment to the ARC bound by a national authority's decision establishing an infringement of competition law (provided that this decision has become final and unappealable).2 In a growing body of judgments, German courts considered that decisions by competition authorities establishing an infringement constitute prima facie evidence that the sale of cartelised products during the cartel period had been affected by the cartel as found by the competition authority. In addition, there is prima facie evidence that at least long-lasting cartels lead to inflated prices and thus lead to damages sustained by those purchasing the cartelised product.

Whereas German law only allows for mere compensation of damages sustained and thus ignores multiple or punitive damages, German law grants pretrial interest as of the moment in which the damage occurred.3 Although interest payment only compensates for the lapse in time, it adds substantial value to damage claims in case of long-lasting cartels. There are a number of cases in which interest due exceeds the nominal damage amount. Germany also offers reasonable rules on limitation periods. The typical five-year limitation period will not start prior to the claimant knowing (or reasonably being expected to know) of the infringement and its damage. Even more importantly, limitation periods are suspended during the proceedings of a competition authority, subsequent appeal proceedings and for an additional one-year period. Finally, the German court system continues to offer some significant advantages. Cartel damage cases are decided by specialised chambers in a limited number of first instance courts. Some of these courts have acquired considerable expertise. With respect to costs, the German system, despite some uncertainties, continues to offer advantages too. Although there is a ‘loser pays' rule, compensation of the adversary's fees is limited to statutory attorney fees.

Growing importance of private antitrust litigation

Germany has a long-standing tradition of private antitrust litigation. In the past, these cases had been predominantly dealing with refusals to supply, challenges to the validity of agreements and discrimination by dominant or near-dominant undertakings. In addition, following liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets, network access litigation had initially been based on antitrust rules. While these more traditional cases continue to be litigated, the landscape changed significantly with the emergence of cartel damage cases. There are currently several hundreds of cartel damage cases before the German courts. With respect to the German rail cartel alone, Oppenländer is handling more than 50 court cases. The European truck cartel fined by the European Commission is expected to create an even larger wave of lawsuits.

This change in numbers is primarily due to a change in German corporate culture. There is a growing awareness in corporate Germany that long-lasting cartel infringements typically create damages and thus harm to those purchasing cartelised products or services. As these damages typically reduce profits, it is generally considered that the management of a corporation is under a legal duty to evaluate the possibilities to recover damages from those inflicting the harm. In many cases, this evaluation will lead to the conclusion that it is in the company's interest (and in the interest of its shareholders) to seek compensation. This is in sharp contrast to an attitude prevailing perhaps a decade ago according to which antitrust damage claims should be avoided as the claimant itself could also become subject to antitrust charges. The change in culture is probably best illustrated by Deutsche Bahn AG, the state-owned railway company. Although being itself charged with antitrust infringements, Deutsche Bahn started to vigorously enforce cartel damage claims. This example has been followed by a number of large corporations that, like Deutsche Bahn, created their own in-house departments dealing with cartel damage claims. The result of this development is an increased number of claims, many of which are dealt with in private settlements but an increasing number of them end up in court.

Damages directive lead to significant changes

With the 9th Amendment of the ARC the German legislator introduced a significant amount of changes to the substantive and procedural rules governing private antitrust litigation in Germany to implement the Damages Directive. Unlike in other European jurisdictions, implementation of the Directive did not establish but improved the system of private antitrust enforcement.

Significant changes to procedural rules were introduced in order to comply with the Directive's provisions on the disclosure of evidence. Before, there were no specific rules on evidence for private antitrust litigation. Plaintiffs therefore had to rely on a couple of rarely used provisions which, in theory, allow courts to order defendants or third parties to produce specific documents.4 As the German judicial culture, like in most ‘continental' European countries, is rather opposed to disclosure, these rules have been sparsely used thus far. Implementation of the Directive with respect to disclosure of evidence will bring about fundamental changes, if not a small revolution. Regarding disclosure, the German legislator did not merely copy the approach in article 5 of the Damages Directive. To the surprise of many, already the first informal draft opted for a substantive claim to have certain documents disclosed. This follows a similar approach chosen when implementing the IP Enforcement Directive into German law. Apparently, this served as a kind of road map to the disclosure rules in the modified Act on Restraints of Competition. As these changes will be of a procedural nature, they will affect litigation that starts after 26 December 2016.

To implement the Damages Directive the German legislator also introduced changes of substantive rules. That includes rules that presume that cartel infringements result in harm and that an overcharge paid by a direct purchaser has been passed on to indirect purchasers under specific circumstances as well as extensions of limitation periods. With respect to substantive issues, private antitrust litigation will however for quite a long time be governed by the rules currently in place. As a matter of fact, Germany could serve as an example for the long time span needed to have private damage claim cases decided under new substantive rules. This type of litigation being essentially formed by follow-on cases investigated by the authorities for years, the rules applicable during the time of the infringement will for a long time remain those currently in force.

Direct and indirect plaintiffs

For all practical purposes, private damage cases in Germany are cases brought by direct plaintiffs (ie, those who purchased the cartelised goods or services directly from the cartelists or their competitors). In its landmark case ORWI,5 the German Federal Supreme Court had clearly established that under German and European competition law rules, not only direct purchasers, but all those harmed by the infringement are entitled to compensation. With respect to substantive rules, it is thus clearly established that indirect purchases are entitled to bring compensation claims.

For indirect purchases it is, however, extremely difficult to substantiate damages caused by the cartel to them. The new German rules on disclosure of evidence will enable indirect purchasers at least in theory to access means of evidence available to both the cartelists and direct purchasers. As set out in the Damages Directive, it is presumed that an overcharge paid by a direct purchaser has been passed on to indirect purchasers under specific circumstances.

Most frequently, the issues linked to claims of indirect customers are dealt with in the context of attempts to counter a possible passing-on defence. Similar to the Damages Directive, the flipside of indirect customers being entitled to damages is the ability of cartelists to argue that damages sustained by direct customers had been passed on, wholly or in part, to subsequent levels of the supply chain. Although accepted in principle, many details of a passing-on defence under German law are still unclear. The German legislator introduced an explicit clause on passing-on to implement the Damages Directive, but pointed out that substantive changes in the application of the passing-on defence in court proceedings could not be expected. In the context of indirect claims, we would limit ourselves to point out attempts to counter a possible passing-on defence by having damage claims of indirect purchasers assigned to direct purchasers.

There are no per se restrictions regarding the assignment of damage claims under German law. Some restrictions apply with respect to assignments to special purpose vehicles the financial means of which might be regarded as insufficient to cover subsequent cost compensation claims in court proceedings. A major difficulty with respect to the assignment of damage claims of indirect purchasers to direct purchasers is the need to agree on a ratio for the distribution of proceeds. Claims of indirect purchasers will depend on the degree to which damages have been passed on by the direct purchaser. Direct purchasers are generally reluctant to give their customers too detailed information on calculation and cost structures which might be used to their detriment in subsequent commercial negotiations. This favours distribution ratios applying rules of thumb or determined by a jointly appointed expert after collection of the damages. The assignment mechanism, however, only works in relation to a distinct number of indirect customers. It is most likely no solution in relation to widely disbursed private end-customers. In the absence of collective redress mechanisms, they continue to lack meaningful mechanisms to claim their damages under German law.

‘Binding effect' of infringement decisions, standard of proof

Under general standards, the burden of proving a competition law infringement and the damage caused by this infringement is on the plaintiff. This burden, however, is alleviated by a number of mechanisms. We already mentioned the statutory provision in section 33b ARC, according to which the court shall be bound by a finding of the European Commission or a national European competition authority that an infringement has occurred. Although there is still some debate around the precise reach of this ‘binding effect', it is established that a civil court deciding on a damage claim is bound by a final and unappealable decision that a competition law infringement as described in this decision took place. This necessarily includes the participants in the cartel (or more generally in the infringement), the type of competition law infringement, but also the facts upon which the authority relied to establish the infringement. This ‘binding effect' considerably reduces the difficulties of any plaintiff to prove what generally is a secret infringement the details of which are normally hidden to the outside world. This binding effect, on the other hand, increases the need to obtain access to the decision of the relevant authority. The European Commission is obliged to publish a non-confidential version of its fining decisions. The Federal Cartel Office (FCO), according to a rule introduced in 2017, will now be obliged to provide information about the relevant details of every fining decision on its website. We will address possible difficulties to assess the FCO's fining decisions in the context of ‘access to evidence' below.

The ‘binding effect' of decisions by competition authorities is limited to the infringement and does not include damages, even in cases in which the FCO had to estimate the proceeds of the cartel in order to determine the fines imposed. There is, however, according to the German jurisprudence, a prima facie evidence that long-lasting cartels lead to increased prices as this is considered to be the very reason why they are concluded. The plaintiff in cartel damage cases can rely on this prima facie evidence, which will normally enable a court to hand down a declaratory judgment according to which the defendant cartelist is obligated to compensate damages caused by the cartel to the plaintiff. According to the new law there is a rule of presumption for the harm caused by a cartel.

Depending on the competition authority's decision, it may be less apparent that a given cartel affected not only ‘many' customers but also affected the purchases made by a given plaintiff. In many cases, decisions by competition authorities will not enter into a detailed description of transactions or customers affected by the cartel. Competition authorities will typically refer to specific examples but, for their own purposes, are only interested in setting out the infringement, its participants and the duration which will affect the level of the fine. Based on this approach, decisions by competition authorities will normally not set out that a given cartel did affect purchases made by a given plaintiff. Typically, descriptions of the infringement will be of a more generic nature. This will in part reflect a generally cautious approach of the authorities. In particular in settlement decisions it might also be the result of attempts by the addressees to mitigate negative effects by increasing uncertainty for potential plaintiffs.

At least some German courts of first instance have helped plaintiffs to overcome difficulties linked to generic descriptions of infringement in the authority's decision. According to several judgments of lower and higher regional courts long-lasting cartel arrangements including quota and ‘preferred supply' arrangements lead to a prima facie evidence for a generally increased price level for these products during the cartel period. This generally increased price level, in turn, creates prima facie evidence for purchases of cartelised products made during the cartel period being affected by cartel-inflated prices. These judgments are under appeal. They are nevertheless indicative of a certain reluctance of German courts to allow cartelists to benefit from more generic descriptions of the infringement in order to escape liability for claims made by specific customers.

There is another important element which reduces the plaintiff's burden of proof. It is a general feature of German procedural rules which allow the court to estimate whether an infringement caused damages and, in particular, to estimate the amount of damages. Under this general provision,6 the court is under an obligation to estimate at least minimum damages to the extent the person harmed did provide a suitable basis for estimation. Currently, there is, unfortunately, still no clarity as to the minimum requirements for this ‘basis' to be provided by the plaintiff. There are indications that a court might estimate cartel damages based on a comparison of average product prices during and after the cartel period.7 Courts could also rely on econometric evidence introduced by plaintiffs to estimate damages. There seems, however, to be a certain reluctance of German courts to venture into estimation without the help of a court-appointed expert. At this stage, we are still lacking decisions on the use of econometric evidence and the standard to be applied by court-appointed experts to allow for an estimation by the court.

Also based on general rules, it is on the defendant cartelist to substantiate and to prove any pass-on of cartel damages he or she wants to argue. There are apparent difficulties for a cartelist to substantiate and even more to prove a level of pass-on given his or her ignorance with respect to pricing and market conditions on subsequent levels of the supply chain. The German Federal Supreme Court in its ORWI judgment was only prepared to impose a secondary burden of proof on the cartelist's customer claiming damages in very limited circumstances. Such secondary burden of proof could only be accepted following a case-by-case balancing of all relevant factors. The court seems more inclined to impose a secondary burden of proof to the extent a plaintiff claiming pass-on is able to substantiate the mechanisms and conditions which made a pass-on likely. On the other hand, the Federal Supreme Court is aware of the possibly sensitive nature of information on pricing to be forwarded by the cartelist's customer in order to discharge the secondary burden of substantiation. According to the new rules on disclosure the cartelist can request the disclosure of evidence which is necessary to defend himself against damage claims.

Disclosure of evidence

By their very nature, cartels are secret infringements. Cartelists not only tried to disguise the existence of a cartel but also typically deployed significant effort in hiding the detailed mechanisms of the cartel's operation. In addition, data which would allow to estimate overcharges created by the cartel are held by the cartelists. It is therefore obvious that those seeking redress either need access to means of evidence in possession of the cartelists or, at least, need access to information obtained by the cartel authorities during their investigation of the cartel. With the 9th Amendment of the ARC the German legislator introduced rules on disclosure of evidence necessary to support the plausibility of claims for damages or to defend such claims.

Under section 33g ARC, anyone in possession of evidence required to establish a potential damage claim - including the defendant and third parties - is obliged to disclose such pieces of evidence upon request of the claimant. This is clearly more than a procedural provision allowing the court to order production of these documents. A procedural approach most likely constitutes the minimum standard under the Damages Directive. It would have also been closer to the traditional approach under section 142 German Code of Civil Procedure. The legislator fully intended to deviate from a merely procedural solution. Those harmed by cartels should be able to rely on the disclosure claim already prior to the commencement of court proceedings. This, according to the legislator, could facilitate out-of-court settlements. In addition, the substantive claim allows for enforcement by injunctive relief.

Under the German concept, entitlement to disclosure is not limited to those harmed by cartels. In accordance with the Damages Directive, defendants may also seek disclosure of documents in their favour. Unlike the entitlement of those harmed, potential cartelists will, however, only be able to claim access to evidence after a damage claim became pending (section 33g para 2 ARC).

In establishing a strict proportionality test, the German legislator, in principle, followed article 5 of the Damages Directive. Disclosure of documents is therefore excluded to the extent it is disproportionate considering the legitimate interests of all parties and the third parties concerned. In order to determine proportionality, the courts have to operate a balancing test.

The German legislation implements the restrictions with respect to evidence included in the file of a competition authority which follow from article 6 of the Damages Directive. The documents blacklisted in article 6 of the Damages Directive therefore cannot be disclosed pursuant to section 33g ARC. This particularly applies to leniency statements and settlement submissions. With respect to other documents in the files of competition authorities, the German legislator further restricted the ability to order disclosure in hybrid cases. Claimants will have to wait until proceedings by competition authorities are closed against all parties before a German court can order disclosure of:

  • information prepared specifically for the proceedings of competition authority;
  • information that the competition authority has drawn up and sent to parties in the course of its proceedings; or
  • settlement submissions that have been withdrawn.

In yet another respect the German legislator goes beyond the Damages Directive and modifies disclosure rules. Pursuant to section 33g para 7 ARC, those obliged to produce documents are entitled to be reimbursed for ‘reasonable costs' associated with disclosure. For now, however, it is entirely unclear what could constitute reasonable costs with respect to disclosure. Any standards for ‘reasonable costs' will therefore have to be developed in future jurisprudence.

Among the most hotly debated provisions of the modified ARC was the initial proposal to allow for disclosure by means of injunctive relief. Originally, the courts would have been entitled to order disclosure of ‘means of evidence' by way of injunctive relief. During the legislative process, this provision was significantly modified and restricted. Pursuant to section 89b para 5 ARC, injunctive relief will be limited to the production of the respective decision of the competition authority establishing the infringement of German competition rules or articles 101, 102 TFEU.

The Damages Directive requires, for the proportionality test to be applied when ordering disclosure, to consider to which extent the documents to be disclosed contain confidential information and what arrangements are in place for protecting such confidential information. The German legislator translated this requirement almost literally into its own proportionality test. The responsibility to deal with confidential information and to device suitable means is left with the courts. Pursuant to section 89b para 7 ARC, the courts will take all measures required in order to safeguard protection of business secrets and other confidential information.

In IP matters, German courts had developed solutions which, overall, are practicable. They cannot be transferred directly to competition litigation, but can be applied accordingly. The court may well order additional confidentiality obligations for outside counsel. It is, however, not entirely clear whether there are sufficient sanctions in order to make these confidentiality undertakings work. There is no clear German equivalent to English rules on contempt of court. But the German Federal Supreme Court stated in a patent case that the disclosure of confidential information of the opposing party in a disclosure proceeding by an outside counsel could be a criminal offence.8 It is apparent that the availability of disclosure in Germany will, to a very substantial part, depend on the ability of its courts to device procedural mechanisms similar to those developed by English courts. Unfortunately, this development cannot rely on any guidance by the legislator. Under the strict constitutional rules in Germany, it seems questionable whether the mere entitlement to ‘adopt necessary measures' to protect confidential information is sufficiently precise to justify restrictions. The legislator is confident that the courts will themselves develop the necessary rules and techniques to make disclosure work.

It remains to be seen to which extent potential plaintiffs will in the future additionally turn to the competition authorities' files to access information. The German legislator restricted access to the FCO's file, but left the possibility to obtain the fining decision on this way.

Limitation periods

Many of the fining decisions handed down by the European Commission or national authorities in recent years did concern long-lasting infringements. In addition, the authorities' own proceedings often took considerable time. Appropriate rules on statutory limitation are thus important to ensure effective redress for those harmed by cartels. The 9th Amendment to the German ARC of 2017 extended the limitation periods for antitrust damage claims. The new rules apply to all claims which were not already time-barred when the 9th Amendment came into force.

As briefly mentioned above, the modifications introduced into the ARC in 2005 already introduced a specific suspension mechanism for proceedings by cartel authorities. According to section 33h (6) ARC, the limitation period for claims for damages is suspended if proceedings are initiated either by the European Commission or a national competition authority. The suspension period now ends one year after the proceedings are terminated, which may include several levels of court appeals. The standard three-year limitation period was extended to five years by the 9th Amendment of 2017. The five-year limitation period starts to run at the end of the year in which the claim arose and the claimant obtained knowledge of the circumstances giving raise to the claim and of the identity of the infringer (or would have obtained such knowledge if he or she had not shown gross negligence), therefore typically does not constitute a major obstacle to bringing successful antitrust damage claims. In many cases the required level of knowledge will only be obtained once the non-confidential version of a Commission decision has been published or, in case of a German proceeding, the plaintiff obtained detailed knowledge on the cartel by publications of the FCO or access to the fining decision.

The situation is more complex with respect to the maximum limitation period of 10 years. This limitation period starts regardless of knowledge or grossly negligent lack of knowledge on the day the claim has arisen. Particularly in cases of long-lasting cartels and relatively short investigation periods, possible claimants - until the 9th Amendment of the ARC in 2017 - ran the risk of at least part of the oldest claims becoming time-barred before they were able to enter into meaningful settlement talks or bring court proceedings. Although the suspension rules equally apply to this maximum limitation period, it remains questionable to what extent this period was compatible with the effet utile requirements under European Union law. Since the 9th Amendment of 2017 this limitation period does not start before the infringement on which the claim is based has ceased. This modification significantly reduces the risk of claims becoming time-barred before there was any possibility to assert them.

Typically, potential claimants will try to avoid risks of statutory limitation by entering into tolling agreements in which the infringing party waives the right to invoke statutory limitation of claims.

Pretrial interest

As briefly mentioned above, German law expressly provides for interest to be paid as from the occurrence of the damage. In particular for long-lasting cartels, this considerably increases the value of claims. In most cases courts tend to apply the statutory interest rate under section 288(1) of the German Civil Code, which amounts to five percentage points above the basic rate of interest. Surprisingly there is still considerable debate as to the grant of interest prior to the entry into force of section 33(3) ARC in 2005 (now section 33a (4) ARC) expressly providing for pretrial interest in cartel damage cases. As the right to full compensation under EU law includes the payment of interest, it seems beyond doubt that interest is also due for damages caused prior to 1 July 2005. Again, there is doubt as to the exact interest level. Even prior to 2002, the interest level cannot be lower than 4 per cent, the then applicable standard legal interest rate. It is undisputed that, like any other payment claim, damage claims for cartel infringements carry trial interest as of the date of pendency.

Courts and procedures

There are courts specifically designated to hear private antitrust litigation, typically one to three for each of the German states. Each of these courts will typically designate one of its chambers to hear first instance cartel damage claims. These chambers being specifically designated does not automatically mean that they are in a similar way experienced to deal with cartel damage claims or cartel matters in general. A couple of courts turned out to be better-versed in antitrust matters and less impressed by the bulky files of cartel damage cases. Others acquired a reputation for dragging on cases for years.

Unfortunately, there is still some uncertainty as to the local jurisdiction of courts in antitrust cases. Cases can easily be brought in the courts of the defendant's domicile and in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred, which will typically include the place where the purchaser of the cartelised goods is seated. German courts are hesitant though to consider that damage claims against participants in a nationwide cartel can be brought before any German court based on the harmful effects also occurring in the place of that court. In addition, there is no clear equivalent in German procedural law to article 6 No. 1 of the Brussels Regulation.9 In cases involving only German defendants, the fact that a defendant is jointly and severally liable for a cartel infringement does not allow him or her to be sued in the courts of the place where another jointly and severally liable cartelist is domiciled. There are, however, possibilities to have a court designated to be competent to hear a case involving defendants domiciled in various places for which there is no single court competent.

Due to joint and severally liability of cartelists under German law, any cartel damage claim will most likely lead to court proceedings with either several defendants held jointly and severally liable or cartelists receiving third-party notices and likely to intervene in support of the defendant cartelist.

These third-party interventions created additional cost risks for the claimant. According to a strongly criticised judgment of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf,10 each third-party intervenor prevailing in the litigation is entitled to have his legal costs compensated based on the full amount in dispute. Other courts considered this result to be inappropriate. The German legislator now provided certainty and expressly stipulated that the sum of amounts in dispute for all intervenors shall not exceed the full amount in dispute.

Cartel damage claims before German courts tend to be complex and lengthy cases. There is a growing tendency by first-instance courts first to decide separately on the general entitlement to damages and to leave the question of quantum to subsequent proceedings.

Joint and several liability

Under general German tort law, cartelists are regarded to be joint tortfeasors and thus jointly and severally liable. Implementation of the Damages Directive required the German legislator to limit the liability of immunity applicants for infringements following the entry into force of this legislation. A similar rule was introduced for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Joint and several liability leads to possible compensation claims between cartelists. In principle, a tortfeasor compensating a victim has a compensation claim against other joint tortfeasors. Since 2017 this has been explicitly provided for in the ARC. There are, however, a couple of problems attached to these claims. First of all, before the 9th Amendment to the ARC of 2017 these compensation claims were likely to be time-barred in many cases as the cartelists have knowledge of the infringement and the three-year standard limitation period thus starts running immediately. The 9th Amendment introduced a new clause according to which the limitation period of the compensation claim between the cartelists does not start to run before the victim that asserted the respective damage claim is compensated. It is, however, likely that this new clause only applies to claims that arose after the 9th Amendment came into force. The suspension rules in section 33h (6) ARC do not apply to these compensation claims.

Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty as to the respective shares of liability to be applied to the compensation claims. section 426(1) of the German Civil Code provides for equal portions of all debtors ‘unless otherwise determined'. Since the 9th Amendment the ARC contains a clause according to which the portions shall be determined according to the share of responsibility for the harm caused.11 These shares are all but easy to determine. In many cases it would seem appropriate to grant contribution claims based on the respective supply shares but this has not been established in German jurisprudence.

Notes

  1. Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5 December 2014, p.1.
  2. Section 33b ARC (Act on Restraints of Competition, GWB).
  3. Section 33a (4) ARC.
  4. Eg, section 142 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.
  5. Judgment of 28 June 2011, KZR 75/10.
  6. Section 287 of the German Code of Civil Procedure. Since 2017 the ARC has explicitly referred to this clause in section 33a (3).
  7. Eg, the Regional Court of Dortmund, judgment of 1 April 2004 regarding the vitamin cartel.
  8. Decision of 16 November 2009, X ZB 37/08.
  9. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L012, 16/01/2001 pp. 1-23 as amended subsequently.
  10. OLG Düsseldorf, judgment of 18 February 2015, VI-U (Kart) 3/14.
  11. Section 33d (2) ARC.

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